Oliver Read Whitley

Donovan E. Smucker

Thorwald W. Bender

Martin Niemoller

Walter W. Sikes

Victor P. Morris

Lewis S. C. Smythe

James A. Huston

Noel Salter

E. D. Klemke

Hebrew Abstracts

Encounter

Vol. 19, No. 1 *Winter, 1958*

Encounter continuing The Shane Quarterly

EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF RELIGION
BUTLER UNIVERSITY, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

Editor: RONALD E. OSBORN *Managing Editor*: ORMAN L. SHELTON

Book Review Editors: WALTER W. SIKES, HENRY K. SHAW,
DAVID C. PELLETT

Editorial Committee: T. W. NAKARAI, BEAUFORD A. NORRIS,
ROBERT TOBIAS, JAMES G. CLAGUE

Editorial Council

WILLIAM G. BAKER
Churches of Christ Union Committee
Edinburgh, Scotland

M. SEARLE BATES
Union Theological Seminary
New York, New York

W. BARNETT BLAKEMORE
Disciples Divinity House
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

PAUL A. CUNDIFF
Department of English
Butler University
Indianapolis, Indiana

ROBERT DOBBIE
Emmanuel College
Toronto, Ontario

GUSTAVE A. FERRE
Cotner College
Lincoln, Nebraska

LOREN R. FISHER
The Graduate Seminary
Phillips University
Enid, Oklahoma

A. C. GARNETT
Department of Philosophy
The University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin

WINFRED ERNEST GARRISON
Department of Philosophy and Religion
University of Houston
Houston, Texas

A. L. HADDON
Bible College
Glen Leith
Dunedin, New Zealand

BASIL HOLT
Linden Christian Church
Johannesburg, South Africa

HOWARD F. HUFF
Japan Biblical Seminary
Tokyo, Japan

J. PHILIP HYATT
The Divinity School
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, Tennessee

J. DANIEL JOYCE
Hanover Avenue Christian Church
Richmond, Virginia

T. J. LIGGETT
Union Evangelical Seminary
Rio Pedras, Puerto Rico

HAROLD L. LUNGER
Brite College of the Bible
Texas Christian University
Fort Worth, Texas

LESTER G. MCALLISTER
Bethany College
Bethany, West Virginia

S. VERNON MCCASLAND
Department of Religion
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia

HERBERT L. MINARD
Young Men's Christian Association
Jerusalem, Israel

WILLIAM J. MOORE
The Divinity School
Drake University
Des Moines, Iowa

VICTOR P. MORRIS
School of Business Administration
University of Oregon
Eugene, Oregon

ROBERT S. PAUL
The Ecumenical Institute
Chateau de Bossey
Switzerland

THOMAS L. SHROUT
Missouri School of Religion
Columbia, Missouri

DWIGHT E. STEVENSON
The College of the Bible
Lexington, Kentucky

KENNETH UNDERWOOD
Public Affairs Faculty
Wesleyan University
Middletown, Connecticut

RALPH G. WILBURN
The College of the Bible
Lexington, Kentucky

E. L. WILLIAMS
College of the Bible
Glen Iris
Melbourne, Australia

Published quarterly: Winter, Spring, Summer, Autumn

Entered as second class matter November 13, 1945, at the post office at Indianapolis, Indiana, under act of March 3, 1879.

Subscription rates: $3.00 a year, $7.50 for three years, $1.00 a single copy.

Address all communications to ENCOUNTER, School of Religion, Butler University, Indianapolis, Indiana, U. S. A.

Vol. 19 No. 1

Encounter

Dedicated to creative discussion of vital issues—
among Disciples of Christ and other communions,
among Christians in America and those of other lands,
among theologians and other scholars,
among believers in Christ and men of other faiths.

Copyright, 1958, by School of Religion, Butler University.
All rights reserved. Printed in U. S. A.

WINTER, 1958 * * * * CONTENTS

		PAGE
The New Image of American Society	*Oliver Read Whitley*	3
Multiple Motifs in the Thought of Rauschenbusch	*Donovan E. Smucker*	14
The New Social Conscience in Conservatism	*Thorwald W. Bender*	21
Abundance, Scarcity, and Co-existence	*Martin Niemoller*	35

ARTICLES ON CURRENT LITERATURE

Christian Ethics: Some Basic Issues	*Walter W. Sikes*	43
Studies by Economists and Theologians (National Council of Churches, series on "Ethics and Economic Life")	*Victor P. Morris*	58
What is the Best Guide to Ethical Value? (George F. Hourani, *Ethical Value*)	*Lewis S. C. Smythe*	66
Religious Foundations of Law (Arthur L. Harding, ed., *Religion, Morality, and Law*)	*James A. Huston*	68
A Christian Called to Politics (Konrad Adenauer, *World Indivisible with Liberty and Justice for All*)	*Noel Salter*	70
Kolbe's Criticism of Revelation-Claims	*E. D. Klemke*	74

BOOK REVIEWS

Christian Ethics and Social Issues

Walter W. Sikes on T. V. Smith, *The Ethics of Compromise and the Art of Containment* 78
Walter G. Muelder on John M. Todd, *Springs of Morality* 80
Guy H. Ranson on Howard E. Kershner, *God, Gold, and Government* 81
S. Vernon McCasland on Benjamin E. Mays, *Seeking to be Christian in Race Relations* 81
Basil Holt on Bankole Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah, His Rise to Power* 82
Charles F. Kemp on Everett Tilson, *Should Christians Drink?* 83

PAGE

Biblical Studies

E. Robert Andry on George Wright and Floyd V. Filson, *The Westminster Historical Atlas to the Bible;* Emil G. Kraeling, *Bible Atlas;* and L. H. Grollenberg, *Atlas of the Bible* 85

E. Robert Andry on G. Ernest Wright, *Biblical Archaeology* 87

Robert Dobbie on John Bright, *Early Israel in Recent Historical Writing* 88

John H. Otwell, on H. H. Rowley, *Prophecy and Religion in Ancient China and Israel* 89

John Clark Archer on Abba Hillel Silver, *Where Judaism Differed* 90

Robert Dobbie on Sigmund Mowinckel, *He That Cometh* 92

Robert Dobbie on Helmer Ringgren, *The Messiah in the Old Testament* 94

J. Daniel Joyce on Edward C. Hobbs (ed.), *A Stubborn Faith* 94

Thomas R. Shrout on James M. Robinson, *The Problem of History in Mark* 96

William Baird on Eric L. Titus, *The Message of the Fourth Gospel* 96

Thomas R. Shrout on Martin Dibelius, *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles* 97

E. Robert Andry on A. W. Anderson, *Plants of the Bible* 98

Theology and Philosophy

Walter Marshall Horton on Louis Bouyer, *The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism* 100

John McCaw on Donald M. Baillie, *The Theology of the Sacraments* 101

T. F. Torrance on William Robinson, *Peace in Heaven and on Earth* 102

Albert Outler on D. R. G. Owen, *Body and Soul, a Study on the Christian View of Man* 104

A. Campbell Garnett on Arthur F. Smethurst, *Modern Science and Christian Beliefs* 105

J. Harry Cotton on E. W. Tomlin, *Living and Knowing* 107

Herndon Wagers on Kenneth Boulding, *The Image* 108

Christian Education and Religious Living

Kendig Brubaker Cully on Ernest M. Ligon, *Dimensions of Character* 110

Edward Dyer on Rupert E. Davies (ed.), *An Approach to Christian Education* 111

Charles F. Kemp on Walter W. Sikes, *The Stranger in My House,* and Paul E. Johnson, *Personality and Religion* 112

Lawrence W. Bash on Helmut Gollwitzer (ed.), *Dying We Live* 113

Hampton Adams on Stewart G. Cole (ed.), *This is My Faith* 114

Fiction, Drama, and Poetry

Colbert S. Cartwright on Elizabeth Spencer, *The Voice at the Back Door* 115

John Mills Turner on *The Collected Poems of Kathleen Raine;* Robert Fitzgerald, *In the Rose of Time;* and Robert Thom, *Children of the Ladybug* 116

Books Received 118

Contributors 120

The New Image of American Society

Some Implications for the Church[1]

By Oliver Read Whitley

THE STRUGGLE with "the world, the flesh, and the devil" is a perennial problem for Christians. This struggle arises from the fact that the Christian individual, and the community known as the church, are inexorably and unavoidably involved in the structures and processes of the world. The church, whatever it may be theologically, is a this-worldly institution, subject to the same laws and pressures as other institutions. To talk about the separation of politics and economics from religion is either sentimental naiveté or inexcusable ignorance.

William Muehl, in *Politics for Christians,* has underlined this point forcefully.

> What men believe about political matters, what they believe about religion, and what they take to be the impact of one on the other—all these reflect their understanding of their environment. To the extent that they really comprehend what is happening around them, their religion and politics will be realistic and constructively related. To the extent that their interpretation of their world is faulty, their religion will be degraded, their politics neurotic and the contact between them superficial.[2]

We do not have a choice as to whether religion and the structures of society are to be related; the only question is whether the relation which already exists necessarily is correctly and realistically understood.

What the Christian thinks about the nature of his religion, and about the relevance of that religion to the actual processes of social life in which he participates, is in part determined by what might be called his "image of society." There appears to be much evidence that many Americans operate, both intellectually and morally, with an image of American society which was reasonably accurate for the period of the nineteenth century, but is dangerously inaccurate for the mid-twentieth century. Even where we are aware of the great changes that have taken place in our society in the past hundred years, we often fail to let this awareness affect our understanding of life in such a society.

The material for a new image of American society has gradually been emerging. Social scientists, psychologists, and theologians have been de-

1. Material in this paper is a revised and somewhat expanded version of two addresses given by the writer during the annual "Week of Lectures" at the Iliff School of Theology, Denver, Colorado, in January, 1957.

2. William Muebl, *Politics for Christians* (New York: Association Press, 1956), p. 9.

veloping an image of American society which is penetrating in its description and analysis, and devastating in its implications.[3] We propose in this paper to set forth the main characteristics of this new image of American society, and to point up some of its implications for the Protestant churches in that society.

The Organizational Revolution

Americans now live in the "post-organization revolution" period of their history. Kenneth Boulding has pointed out the key aspects of this revolution. "Since about the 1870's there has been a worldwide increase in the number, size, and power of organizations. . . . So striking is this movement that it deserves the name of the organizational revolution."[4] In all sectors of the American society—in the labor movement, farm organizations, the professions, in business, and in government—one notes the influence of this trend.

Despite the obvious presence of the organizational society, many of us still continue to think in terms of principles and beliefs which were applicable to an earlier kind of American society. We do not reckon with the reality of institutions and structures, but tend to regard them as simply extensions of the individual. The old idea that "an institution is simply the long shadow of one man," or that a modern factory or plant is nothing but an over-grown workshop, lingers on even though its variance from the facts of economic and social life is evident.

The reach of the organizational revolution is pervasive. Peter Drucker suggests that the large-scale enterprise is the crucial institution in our society. What happens in the enterprise is crucial, Drucker says, because

> the beliefs, values, and promises which are being realized in the representative institution are the real beliefs and promises of a society; they are its character and its order. If fulfillment of these beliefs and promises in the representative institution is inadequate to sustain faith in their reality, the whole society will be found wanting. If the order realized in the representative institution is in conflict with the professed social beliefs . . . the whole society will appear irrational.[5]

The large-scale enterprise is not simply an *economic* institution, with implications only in the economic sphere. This view is no longer realistic, if indeed it ever did express the truth about economic institutions. The enterprise functions inevitably as a *political* institution, since it controls the access of citizens to the means of livelihood. More than this, the enterprise

3. Major contributors to "the new image of American society" discussed in this paper are Kenneth Boulding, Peter Drucker, Eric Fromm, John K. Galbraith, Will Herberg, Rollo May, C. Wright Mills, Reinhold Niebuhr, David Riesman, Igor Spectorsky, Paul Tillich, and William H. Whyte. Works by these authors are well-known, and the list is too extensive to include here.

4. Kenneth Boulding, *The Organizational Revolution* (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 202.

5. Peter Drucker, *The New Society* (New York: Harper), p. 138.

performs some of the most crucial *social* functions. The individual in the organizational society finds increasingly that his sense of function (the feeling of performing useful work in the society), and his sense of status (of standing in the community) are almost entirely determined within the milieu provided in what Drucker calls the "plant community." If status and function are not realized here, it is doubtful that they will be realized.[6]

The Great Salesroom and the Big Bazaar

If we are now living in the period of the post-organizational revolution, and if the large-scale enterprise is increasingly the milieu in which the majority of our people are to solve the problems of their lives as human beings, we need to inquire into the characteristics of the organizational society, especially as these may inhibit or promote the growth of individuals into persons or selves. One who professes an interest in the Christian values in respect to human personality cannot ignore the environment in which the very possibilities of the emergence of selfhood are forged. To ignore this environment is to remain oblivious to all that the recent work of the social psychologists has taught us.

The phrase used to introduce this section comes from the work of C. Wright Mills. Mills argues in his *White Collar* that American society looks increasingly like a "great salesroom," the most elaborate symbol of which is the gigantic cathedral of commodities, the big city department store—"the Big Bazaar." The selling of commodities is, of course, not new to the organizational society. But a new dimension has been added to this activity, which Mills believes has changed the character of the society. "In the world of the small entrepreneur selling was one activity among many, limited in scope, technique, and manner. In the new society selling is a pervasive activity, unlimited in scope and ruthless in its choice of technique and manner. . . . Everybody has become a salesman. . . . The market now reaches into every institution and . . . relation."[7] Salesmanship, instead of being a method for accomplishing necessary and useful economic functions, has been transformed into an ideology, a way of life.

The pervasiveness of the atmosphere to which Mills refers here was recently brought out in a cartoon appearing in the *Denver Post.* This cartoon showed a research chemist working feverishly to come up with a great discovery. This intense activity he explains to a colleague with the statement, "I'm on deadline; I have to invent something for which the company already has a hot commercial." In such a milieu the "Death of a Salesman" is not simply the account of individual tragedy. It is a symptom of some of the underlying problems of our kind of society, viewed from the

6. For an interesting example of what happens in a community when the implications of this paragraph are not recognized, see Carr and Saunders, *Willow Run.*

7. C. Wright Mills, *White Collar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 161.

standpoint of the values of personality. One may agree with John Galbraith that the increasing dominance of salesmanship as a basic value in American culture is a product, not of national *character* but of national *wealth*—of "the unseemly economics of opulence"[8]—but the relevance of this point to the emerging image of American society still remains.

The Enormous File

An inevitable accompaniment of the great salesroom is the "enormous file." "The new office," writes Mills, "is rationalized; machines are used, employees become machine attendants; the work, as in the factory, is collective, not individualized; it is standardized for interchangeable, quickly replaceable clerks; it is specialized to the point of automatization."[9] Mechanized and standardized work leads, of course, to the decrease in opportunities for the employee to see the operation in which he is involved as a whole, and to the disappearance of any chance for the vast majority of workers to have personal contact with those who hold authority.

In effect, this means that the principle of the interchangeable part, a useful and perhaps inevitable development in the mechanical realm, has had latent and unforeseen results when extended into the human realm. For one thing, it has helped to foster a view of man which ramifies into many aspects of life in our society. This view has been appropriately referred to by Peter Drucker as the "slot-machine man." According to this concept, man himself is little more than a machine, and therefore the attempt to use engineering principles in dealing with him is justified. Man, the interchangeable part, is little more than "an automaton, responding to monetary stimulus like a chewing-gum vending machine."[10] The implications of this for the emergence and development of persons and selves will be suggested in the sections which follow.

The Decline of the Person

The great salesroom and the enormous file have contributed to the emergence of certain problems of persons in our time. At least three major trends in our society point to the "decline of the person." One of these is emphasized particularly in the work of Eric Fromm, Rollo May, and Karen Horney. This is the emergence of "alienation" (Fromm) and "basic anxiety" (Horney). May (following T. S. Eliot) speaks of "the hollow people," who experience emptiness, and have no definite feeling of their own desires, or who might characterize themselves as "just a collection of mirrors, reflecting what everybody else expects." One basic point emerges. Modern

8. John Galbraith, *American Capitalism: the Concept of Countervailing Power* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1952).
9. Mills, *op. cit.*, 109.
10. Drucker, *op. cit.*, 180.

man is an alienated individual. He does not, as Fromm expresses it, experience himself as the active bearer of his own powers, but rather as a "thing" dependent upon powers outside himself.

Fromm's discussion of alienation reveals several facets of life in the organizational society. He points to six spheres in which man now tends to be alienated.[11] Man is, for instance, alienated in *ownership*. The owner of the large-scale enterprise does not experience a vital relationship with that which he owns. Indeed, what he owns is actually nothing but a piece of paper on which are written certain symbols. This refers, of course, to certain moral and psychological implications of the separation of ownership, management, and control of the modern corporation, discussed by Berle and Means in their classic *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. More than this, Fromm is pointing to the fact that a human person does not really own something unless he can participate in a meaningful relationship to it. The scholar, for instance, may own hundreds of books, but he does not in any significant sense" own" them until he has read them, and has mastered their contents.

Modern man is also alienated in consumption. He acquires things just in order to *have* them, and in many instances does not even attempt to experience himself as a sensing, feeling, judging being in the act of consuming. The connection modern man has with objects is not that of concrete relatedness; it is rather one of manipulation. Even more important than man's relation to objects is his relation to other people. Modern man, says Fromm, is alienated not only in consumption, but also in *interpersonal relations*. To be sure, there is usually an atmosphere of superficial friendliness, but this cannot really hide the fact that men are to each other as commodities. They are not related as man-in-community, but as windowless nomads bumping gently against each other, and then probably saying "excuse me."

The trouble goes even deeper. Man is also alienated from *himself*. Man today experiences himself as a *thing*, a thing to be exploited in the market. He is preoccupied with the production of a marketable personality package, which can be sold at a good price in the economy. Fromm comments here that things do not have a self, and when man becomes a thing he can have no self. It is perhaps not surprising then to go further and assert that modern man is alienated from *authority*. When authority is exercised overtly, and one knows who or what it is that commands, this can be understood even when the authority seems to be irrational. But when, as in our time, authority is increasingly anonymous, invisible, and therefore alienated from persons, it is no wonder that people respond in bewilderment or apathy.

11. Eric Fromm, *The Sane Society* (New York: Rinehart, 1955).

Lastly, man is alienated from *work*. He does not experience himself as a creative and "real" being in this most important sphere of life. C. Wright Mills, expanding on this same point, comments that neither of the two traditional philosophies of work—that it is a religious punishment or reward, or that it is intrinsically meaningful—has great influence over the masses of men in our society. Far from working because of some religious obligation, or with a sense of intrinsic satisfaction, most men work in order to escape an unbearable boredom, or simply to provide the money with which to seek for possible meaning in life elsewhere.

"Other-Direction": The Age of Conformity

A second aspect of the decline of the person in the organizational society is the emergence of the "other-directed personality." David Riesman, in *The Lonely Crowd*,[12] has called attention to the fact that, coextensive with certain periods of Western history and with certain trends in population, there have been some characteristic personality types. In earlier times, of which the medieval period is perhaps the outstanding example, the culture tended to exercise a pervasive control over the individual, and specified the details of his behavior minutely. There was little energy devoted to the search for new solutions of the perennial problems of man. The personality type most appropriate to this kind of society was the *tradition-directed* man.

With the coming of the Renaissance and the Reformation, and all of the ferment and change in every sphere of society which these abstractions denote, there were too many novel situations and too many emerging new problems, for which the traditions of the culture provided no solutions. The tradition-directed personality became inadequate. As Western history proceeded on its course, there emerged in due time the *inner-directed* personality. Here the analogy of the gyroscope, which keeps the individual on course, but yet allows him room for experimentation and trial-and-error, may be used. The outstanding representative of the inner-directed type is perhaps the New England Puritan and/or entrepreneur.

In our time, however, Riesman suggests that the increasingly dominant personality type is *other-directed*. Here the appropriate symbol is not the gyroscope, but radar, with which the individual is equipped in order to be able to receive signals from the others in his group. In this situation, the goal of life becomes the approval of others, which suggests adjustment as a supreme purpose, and the repression of idiosyncrasies. Insofar as this type of personality has emerged it is accurate to speak of the present period in our society as the Age of Conformity. Riesman traces the characteristics of this age of conformity in our political processes, and most significantly, in our socialization of children into the ways of the culture. The three per-

12. David Riesman *et al.*, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

sonality types are not mutually exclusive, nor does the existence of one type as the emerging dominant preclude the existence of the other two in the same society in the same period, or even within the personality of the same individual as he stands in different roles. In any event, the decline of the person is evident, in the trend toward other-direction.

The Ubiquity of Public Relations

The third facet of the decline of the person is false personalization, or what might be called the "ubiquity of public relations." There has been much comment in recent years upon the fact that the new frontier in our society is no longer the production of things. The real problem today is not production, but *manipulation*, the conquering of the human frontier. C. Wright Mills points out that fewer and fewer people in our society work with things, and an increasing number handle people and symbols. Even personality is now a commodity, and in an environment where everybody is selling something, including himself, one may understandably raise the question, "Can anybody be trusted?" or "Is he trying to manipulate me?" or "Does he really like me, or is he trying to sell me a bill of goods?"

The basic premise of public relations may not unfairly be described as an appropriation of the classic principle of Machiavelli, to the effect that "it is not important to *be* virtuous, but it is important to *appear* to be virtuous. The literature of "self-improvement," from Dale Carnegie to Norman Vincent Peale, makes this quite clear, even when it vigorously denies this intent. The most devastating effect of the public relations approach lies at the point where, as Peter Drucker suggests, the attempt has been made to solve the political and social problems of the large-scale enterprise on the basis of personality rather than principle. One cannot solve the problems arising from the organizational revolution by employing bright young business school graduates trained in the latest techniques of "human relations" and "group dynamics." Nor can these problems be solved by hiring Madison Avenue experts in mass communications to exploit the myth that the large-scale enterprise is just an over-grown big happy family. A realistic facing of the human implications of the organization revolution is required, and this will not be forthcoming within the framework of public relations as now understood.

Some Objections to the New Image

The foregoing account of the new image of American society—and of some of its implications in terms of the values of personality—is not a particularly encouraging one. The reader, who perhaps shares the writer's values concerning the moral importance of personality, and who perhaps also agrees that what happens in the structures and institutions of a society must ultimately be assessed in terms of its ethical and/or religious implica-

tions, is certainly justified in raising some questions. Is the situation really this bad? Is it not possible that the description of American society provided by these makers of the new image is really just an expression that the society has not provided for the realization of their own values?

Such questions as these may not be put aside. Some discussion of them is in order. One must admit the possibility that in certain respects this new image of American society may be a caricature. This is especially possible with regard to the effects of the organizational society upon the person. Fromm, May, and Horney generalize from the clinical evidence provided them by the numerous individuals who come to them for help, and whose symptoms of neurosis clearly relate to the characteristics of the organizational society. Yet ever since William James it has been accepted that one may learn a great deal about the "normal" from the intensive study of the "abnormal." The psychotherapists may be over-generalizing when they argue that basic anxiety and alienation are endemic in the society, but their testimony certainly cannot be written off as the anguished cries of bleeding-heart do-gooders.

Whether the situation is really as bad as described of course depends upon the values used to interpret its moral meaning. Here again, it must be admitted that some of the evidence is subject to conflicting interpretations. On the surface, the American society in this period of post-organizational revolution is certainly an earthly paradise in many ways, and it is literally true that many of us who live in it "never had it so good." The organizational society is particularly benevolent to what William H. Whyte has aptly called "the organization man," symbol of the individuals of the American middle classes "who have left home, spiritually as well as physically, to take the vows of organization life, and . . . who are the mind and soul of our great self-perpetuating institutions."[13] But as Whyte goes on to suggest, it is exactly because the organizational society is so good to these individuals that the implications do not immediately appear. In part, whether the situation is really as bad as indicated depends upon where one stands in the organizational society. Its effects are differentially distributed in the various groups in American society.

If one feels compelled to reject certain parts of this new image of American society on the grounds that they are caricature or exaggeration, there are possible grounds for this attitude. But it is imperative that the hypotheses indicated by the builders of this new image be subjected to intensive and serious investigation. If they are to any extent correct in their description and analysis the implications are, to say the very least, profound. This is especially true if we have in mind the place and functions of the church in the organizational society.

13. William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956), 3.

The Response of the Church

No one, in the present state of our knowledge about the implications of the organizational society, can supply *the answer* to all the questions which this society raises for the church. We shall, of necessity, confine our remarks to some tentative suggestions as to the direction in which the adequate and relevant responses of the church lie. We may, I think, dispose summarily of two responses to this new society which the church has made in recent years. One of these is the banalization of religious motifs. The other is the intensification of the drive for members and for money. Both of these are really expressions of the organizational society, rather than adequate responses to it. Little comment is needed here on the current cults of peace of mind, in which God becomes nothing more or less than a cosmic bellhop, or a cosmic projection of the values of white, Protestant, middle-class Americans. This phenomenon has already come in for sufficient discussion in other places.[14]

We do not mean to imply that there is something intrinsically wrong with a church having members and money. Obviously no church could exist if it lacked either of these items completely. We do mean to suggest, however, that the current emphasis upon the idea of a revival of religion in America is questionable if it is taken at face value. The fact that more members and more money for churches and church activities are now available is clear. What is not so clear is what the significance of this trend is in terms of permanent religious values. In some respects the current interest in churches may be interpreted as a spilling-over of responses learned in other situations into the churches. Again, this is all-too-clearly an extension of the organizational society, rather than a response to it.

There are, I believe, some other responses to the organizational society which need to be emphasized and developed in the life of the church. These responses have been suggested and discussed in various places, and I do not claim that they are new or revolutionary ideas. What I do claim is that unless these ideas are taken more seriously and implemented into the church as it attempts to find its place in the organizational society, the church as an institution will increasingly become an irrelevancy, if not an impertinence, in our lives.

The first response of the church must be the development of *a new concept of sanctuary*. Here I follow a lead suggested by Paul Tillich, to the effect that the only salvation for persons in the technical society is to find some method of partial non-participation in the society. To advocate total non-participation is, of course, quixotic and naive. Yet it is pertinent to

14. Most recently in an article in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, 9 March 1957, by Edmund Fuller. For an earlier discussion, see the writer's paper, "The Socio-Ethical Ambiguities of Religion," *Religion in Life* (Winter, 1955).

suggest that the church might begin to develop some characteristics of a haven of partial non-participation in the organizational society. This must not be simply a new version of escapism. Rather it must be a means of developing new strengths and resources by which the Christian may learn realistically to cope with the problems of living in this kind of society. This certainly would involve the increase in our concern for services of personal counselling, provided by ministers adequately and carefully trained to offer them, and not by quacks skilled in the art of dispensing cosmic aspirin tablets. More than this, it would involve developing a place where "the ultimate concerns" of man as man might be pursued, without the necessity of being filtered through the great salesroom and the enormous file.

The second response of the church is clearly related to the one just suggested. Real sanctuary can be provided only if the church makes an effort at *the rediscovery of the meaning of fellowship.* The church needs to be the religious expression of man-in-community, to embody in its life what the Old Testament calls a covenant-relationship. In all too many churches today, there is no really meaningful community at all. Individuals assemble for services on Sunday morning in much the same manner as they shop at the super-market or attend a basketball game. They come, not as members one with another, but as individual atoms in an aggregate which gathers in the same piece of space. These atoms share a common set of social characteristics, and they may have several needs in common, but they do not experience, out of their coming together, a vitally meaningful relationship to the world and to fellow creatures.

This kind of fundamental life-orientation is not realized, of course, in the kinds of activities which usually substitute for real fellowship—the "period of fellowship" which may be inserted into the middle of the service of worship to enable the minister to tell everybody he is so glad to see them, the after-service coffee-hour, during which most participants stand around self-consciously and nervously holding cups in one hand and cookies in the other, and the church night dinner. These are at most pale imitations of what happens in other places. They are actually alienated versions of community. Perhaps it is not without significance that in the bulletins of many churches there is a statement urging each person present to "shake hands with at least three others." This is a friendly church?

Neither of these responses of the church to the organizational society can be actualized without the presence of a third—*the rediscovery of the note of judgment.* We do not suggest here the revival of the notion of Jonathan Edwards' "sinners in the hands of an angry God." Nor do we mean intensifying the sectarian villification of those who practice the personal vices—"we don't smoke, and we don't chew, and we don't go with the girls who do." What we have in mind cuts much more deeply than that. Protes-

tant churches, characteristically, tend to be simply mirrors held up to the values of middle-class life. With the kind of preaching and education that goes on in such churches, the American Protestant may perhaps be forgiven for thinking that he is just a decent, respectable, nice, clean-cut, hard-working person, and that Christianity stands for exactly those values that are being realized and implemented in his concern for social mobility and status. To the extent that the religion expressed in contemporary Protestant churches is a projection of middle-class values, it is of course in no position to be anything but a mirror of the organizational society. Judgment, in this context, then, refers to the need for the church to develop a frame of reference within which the organizational society and its implications may be evaluated, and not merely capitulated to.

Conclusion

In suggesting that an adequate response of the church to the organizational society lies in the direction of discovering and implementing the realities of sanctuary, fellowship, and judgment, we have pointed only to the barest outline of the situation. From what we have said, however, it ought to be clear at least that the church, even in this hour of its greatest material prosperity, faces what may be the most serious challenge to its very existence. The religious and moral ambiguities of the organizational society are becoming increasingly evident, and it is of the utmost importance that the church develop a program and message which transcends these ambiguities and contributes something to their removal. The question is whether or not it is already too late.

Multiple Motifs in the Thought of Rauschenbusch[1]

A Study in the Origins of the Social Gospel

By Donovan E. Smucker

THE YEAR 1957 marked the fiftieth anniversary of Walter Rauschenbusch's *Christianity and the Social Crisis,* one of the great books in the history of American Protestantism. The book created a storm of controversy when it was published. But even more it established Walter Rauschenbusch as the greatest interpreter of the social gospel. When Reinhold Niebuhr delivered the Rauschenbusch lectures in 1934 he said that they were "an extension and an application to our own day of both the realism and loyalty to the Christian faith which characterized the thought and life of one who was not only the real founder of social Christianity in this country but its most brilliant and generally satisfying exponent to this day."[2]

Or, again, note the estimate of William Warren Sweet, the eminent historian of American Christianity: "Walter Rauschenbusch through his three important books . . . probably did more than any other single man to carry the social gospel message over to the church as a whole."[3]

The superlatives reach a climax in President Van Dusen of Union Theological Seminary who declared: "It is clear, it seems to me, that the greatest single personal influence on the life and thought of the American church in the last fifty years was exerted by Walter Rauschenbusch. Probably the three most influential men in American church history have been Jonathan Edwards, Horace Bushnell, and Walter Rauschenbusch."[4]

From these tributes one can quickly descend to more sombre mood of criticism. For example, W. A. Visser t' Hooft's *The Background of the Social Gospel in America* is quite willing to concede that Rauschenbusch is the father of the social gospel but notes some grave problems.[5] Rauschenbusch is historically superficial in trying to make social concern a development of the nineteenth century. Rauschenbusch tends toward humanism and panen-

1. This paper was read to the American Theological Society, Mid-West Section, November 1956.

2. Reinhold Niebuhr, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935), preface.

3. William Warren Sweet, *The Story of Religion in America* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), p. 356.

4. Henry P. Van Dusen, quoted in Dores Robinson Sharpe, *Walter Rauschenbusch* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942), p. 410.

5. This book was Visser t'Hooft's doctoral dissertation. It was published in English by H. D. Tjeenk Willnk and Son in Haarlem, The Netherlands, 1928.

theism in theology, and optimism and idealism in sociology. Finally, he charges that Rauschenbusch has a fuzzy mixture of liberal and sectarian emphases.

A number of others have leveled serious criticisms at the definitive formulation which Rauschenbusch gave to social application of the Christian gospel. These are people as varied as A. C. McGiffert, Jr.[6] and H. Richard Niebuhr.[7] The totality of these criticisms caused Rauschenbusch to receive a bad reputation during the recent era of theological and ethical reconstruction.

In reviewing these criticisms it is immediately apparent that most of these interpretations presuppose unexamined notions concerning the origins of Rauschenbusch's social ethics. There is a tendency to seize on a single motif such as liberal theology and to assume that Rauschenbusch presents a simple version of the liberal consensus of his day. Yet when one probes into the background of this man, it is clear that he is a very complex person who cannot be understood by a single motif or by generally neglecting a deeper quest for the antecedents, sources, roots, beginnings, parentage, or ancestry of his outlook.

It is necessary to test all previous studies of Rauschenbusch by a historical methodology stressing the significance of origins intellectually and socially conceived. This will aid in understanding his kingdom of God ethics in terms of his unique selection and appropriation of materials from the four basic motifs of pietism, sectarianism, liberalism and transformationism. By *pietism* is meant the Protestant reaction starting in the seventeenth century against orthodox intellectualism and formalism in favor of a personal, devotional, subjective, individualistic, conversionist evangelicalism stressing vital religious experience. *Sectarian* is used to signify a particular view of the church as a voluntary, intentional, committed, suffering, lay-centered fellowship living in tension with the culture. The sectarian Christian (in this Troeltschian sense) also stresses discipleship, love and ethical reality rather than polity, sacraments or theological formulation. In addition, it means separation of church and state along with an affirmation of religious liberty. *Liberalism* refers to the rationalistic movements of the eighteenth century which revolted against authoritarianism in both theology and culture. Theologically it sought to lessen the supernatural and sacramental elements in Christianity; culturally it sought, in its later development, to use the state to curb unethical economic oligarchies in the culture. *Transformationism* is H. Richard Niebuhr's term referring to a positive and hopeful attitude toward culture based on the oneness of creation and redemption. It emphasizes the genuine earthly hope of transforming ruthless

6. A. C. McGiffert, Jr., "Rauschenbusch Twenty Years After." *Christendom*, III, No. 1 (1938), 98-109.

7. H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 100.

economic and social systems through Christian socialism as a manifestation of the kingdom of God.

This methodology is particularly appropriate for the study of Rauschenbusch since he was a church historian with a genuine relationship to representative movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He believed that the study of history was a renovating and reformatory influence in the growth of theology.[8] Therefore, the study of history was necessary for ethical reformation. Moreover, Professor Jaroslav Pelikan has pointed out that the study of historical origins is most effective with historical figures who are not system builders but are personalities rooted in specific heritages.[9] The system builders, Professor Pelikan suggests, stress logical principles and internal coherence. While Rauschenbusch developed a measure of coherence in his ethics he was not a system builder in the grand manner.

Dependence and Originality

Out of this study of multiple motifs, Rauschenbusch emerges as a person vitally but not deterministically related to the great movements of his era. He cannot be understood apart from these movements as he formulates the conception of ethics for which he is famous. Yet, his originality and freedom in utilizing his background is so great that he will be seen deviating from some of his contemporaries who used these materials in a different way.

In any case, this study of continuity and discontinuity with his background takes place in relation to a man who was unusually generous in leaving evidence of the movements, persons, books and motifs that influenced him. His sound scholarship, wide reading, copious footnoting and historical consciousness make this possible. Therefore, the study of origins sheds great light on his creative use of these four streams of influence in the master theme of the kingdom of God on earth as an immanent, social, mundane, supra-ecclesiastical movement.

This approach is not the only one which could have been used. And, quite frankly, it is not necessarily the ultimate or definitive method. Some of the alternatives to it are the following:

A similar *motif* study could be undertaken with the same basic historical interests but limiting the study to a *single* motif. For example, Winthrop S. Hudson insists that Rauschenbusch must be seen primarily if not exclusively in the context of evangelicalism. Taking Hudson's approach one would study Rauschenbusch solely from a single perspective: in what sense

8. Walter Rauschenbusch, "The Influence of Historical Studies on Theology," *American Journal of Theology*, XI, 60.

9. Personal conversation with the present writer, April 5, 1957.

does the evangelical background explain or fail to explain the ethics of Walter Rauschenbusch?

One could also study a figure like Rauschenbusch to discover the most *distinctive element* in his ethics. According to Rauschenbusch himself, the most distinctive element is the kingdom of God conception. This would be tested. Perhaps the study might conclude that the most distinctive element is his Christology or his eschatology. The assumption is that when this most distinctive element is uncovered and then underscored, the student can quickly locate the real issue in this person's ethics

One could make a chronological, *biographical* study such as D. R. Sharpe attempted. While Sharpe had only limited interests in explicit interpretation of Rauschenbusch, any biography is, of necessity, an interpretation through the selection of materials and general emphasis. Many other scholars would be justified in writing biographies of Rauschenbusch either because of new materials which are available or because of a fresh interpretive framework in terms of which the chronological development takes place.

A *comparative* study could be made whereby one compares and contrasts two or more representative thinkers in terms of their representative theological and ethical conceptions. Owen Weatherly's Master's dissertation illustrates this approach with the self-explanatory title, *A Comparative Study of the Social Ethics of Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr* (University of Chicago, 1950). Weatherly compares and contrasts the two men on theological conceptions of God, Christ, man, sin, Kingdom of God, teachings of Jesus. He also does a similar study of ethical conceptions of economics, politics and church.

A study can be made which is an *expositional* and *descriptive* presentation of Rauschenbusch's ethics as in the doctoral thesis at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in 1948 by Henlee Hulix Barnett, *The Ethical Thought of Walter Rauschenbusch.* This study provides a quick review of what the person in question said on a variety of basic topics. There is a brief evaluation at the end of the dissertation.

The final option is a study which utilizes *neutral* categories or dimensions of ethical problems. For example, one could take Aristotle's four causes and apply these to the specific ethical outlook of Rauschenbusch. This is more in the tradition of philosophical ethics, permitting the reader to see the person studied in a much wider perspective of issues which reveal genuine points of tension and agreement, regardless of historical contexts and backgrounds.

In the face of these various alternatives the present writer chose to make the historical study of multiple motifs because there appeared to be numerous examples of unexamined notions on origins.

Manifold Aspects of Rauschenbusch's Thought

Consider, then, some of the values of this quest for the origins of Rauschenbusch's ethics through multiple motifs.

First, it is significant to observe in this ecumenical era how various theological and confessional movements interact with one another. Europe and America have engaged in unceasing conversation on the great issues of faith and life. This conversation is international and interdenominational. Rauschenbusch, like his father before him, was a representative man of his time through whom this conversation could readily take place. Perhaps men in more rigorously confessional movements would not reflect the winds of doctrine as much as August and Walter Rauschenbusch. Yet the roots of this family were in Lutheranism, one of the most rigorously confessional and creedal groups in Protestantism. Before Rauschenbusch had completed his definitive books, he had communicated with the right, center and left of the church. He had been influenced by the whole sweep of church life and thought. And, in addition he was conversing with dynamic movements outside of the church such as socialism, labor and cooperatives. Here is a *de facto* ecumenicity before its institutionalization in the World Council of Churches and its forerunners.

Second, in this meeting of motifs and movements the pietistic and sectarian backgrounds mediated by his father have been the most neglected in the understanding of Rauschenbusch. August Rauschenbusch went to Germany in 1868-69 to find materials for a book on the Anabaptists. During this tour he met C. A. Cornelius of Munich University who was the leading scholar of left-wing Protestantism. From Professor Cornelius he obtained a source book of Anabaptist materials from which Walter Rauschenbusch in 1905 translated a letter of Conrad Grebel, a leading figure in the left wing of the Swiss Reformation. This letter with commentary was published in *The American Journal of Theology*, the University of Chicago publication. Among the sectarian themes which are utilized are the following: the location of the kingdom as the reign of God on earth rather than the mystical, the Catholic (identification of the church and kingdom), and the apocalyptic. Unlike the sectarians, however, Rauschenbusch placed the boundaries of the kingdom beyond the *koinonia* of "converted" Christians. Rauschenbusch also has a strong kingdom-consciousness, creating energy, radicalism and audacity. He also accepts discipleship and apostolate leading to suffering and cultural conflict. But he broadened this apostolate to include those secular prophets and social workers who have not formally accepted Christ. Rauschenbusch also accepted the sectarian teaching that the purpose of the kingdom is to Christianize all of life. Yet he extended this to the larger context of the socio-economic order. Another emphasis from the left wing is the primacy of love above law yet,

once again, with a new element of a "socialized" love essentially synonymous with justice. The Rochester prophet also shared the sectarian identification with the working classes through whom God was working in a special way. Rauschenbusch also emphasized the church as a disciplined, suffering, voluntary association but, unlike the more passive sectarian, viewed this as highly creative in the culture leading to the transfer of democracy from the church to society. Finally, he accepted the sectarian feeling for history as periodized into special moments of meaning and development. This insight lead him to believe that science and socialism were the special revelations of his day.

Thus in each case characteristic sectarian themes are merged, synthesized and related to influences from liberalism, sectarianism and transformationism. The sectarian contribution to this formulation is one of the least known aspects of his development. It has been obscured by the uniqueness of this rather eclectic formulation and lack of knowledge concerning his father's pioneering research in left-wing Protestantism.

Third, this methodology raises serious questions over behaviorist and strictly environmentalist approaches to the origins of the social gospel as suggested by May, Bell and Dombrowski.[10] This view declares that the Protestant social gospel is understood primarily as something brought about by the urban industrialism of the nineteenth century. While there is a measure of truth here, the study of multiple motifs reveals that Walter Rauschenbusch responded to industrialism in a particular way based on his ecclesiastical and theological encounter rather than the historical situation itself.

Fourth, the Rauschenbusch view of the kingdom of God can now be understood against the background of the four motifs. To be sure, he did not define the kingdom in terms of the total sweep of biblical and theological interpretation. He combined the immanental, gradualist view of the kingdom with a more sectarian conception of the kingdom as a prophetic instrument of judgment over *all* institutions which manifest injustice, corruption and lovelessness. This conception was the integrating center of his entire outlook.

Fifth, it is clear that tensions and unresolved problems remained in the Rauschenbusch statement of social concern. The two central tensions were in relation to the kingdom and to discipleship. Regarding the kingdom there was the emphasis on the Christ-of-culture conflicting with the kingdom as conflict, suffering and crisis. Regarding discipleship there were numerous eloquent pleas to take Jesus seriously in conflict with his rugged

10. See Aaron Ignatius Bell, *The Urban Impact on American Protestantism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943); James Dombrowski, *The Early Days of Christian Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936); Henry F. May, *Protestant Churches and Industrial America* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949).

institutional analysis dealing with the structural power apparatus of society.

Despite its weaknesses and permanent tensions, Rauschenbusch's statement of Christian social concern made a real contribution to the church. The prophetic critique of the economic order was the most devastating since St. Francis. He helped destroy the simple identification between Christian and *bourgeois* values. He challenged the pietistic legacy of a subjective individualism with a deeper, wiser, more biblical corporateness which demanded recognition of both the kingdom of God and the kingdom of evil. He made Jesus Christ the Eternal Contemporary instead of the Other-Worldly-King.

Our methodology has shed light on the rich context, the reflection of his *Zeitgeist* yet his originality, the great ecumenical conversation across two continents and many Christian traditions. The purgation of the dubiously optimistic elements of his philosophy of history could have taken place in post-war reflections on the end of an era. It was the destiny of Walter Rauschenbusch to live his life between the Civil War (1861) and the first World War (1918). His premature death of cancer at the age of 57 removed him from the American scene before this reconstruction could have taken place. It is a tribute to the vitality of his life that his outlook is still a vigorous topic of study throughout the church. This past year has seen a *Rauschenbusch Reader* published by Harper along with four major conferences in Green Lake, Rochester, New York, and Chicago re-evaluating his work. Walter Rauschenbusch is a part of that great cloud of witnesses of whom we are not worthy.[11]

11. For the full results of this study see the author's unpublished doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago, 1957, *The Origins of Walter Rauschenbusch's Social Ethics.*

The New Social Conscience in Conservatism

An Analysis of Recent Utterances

By Thorwald W. Bender

A RECENT PROGRAM of the American Theological Society (Midwest Section) considered the present status of the social gospel. During the discussion the writer of this article suggested that some attention might well be given to a growing social sensitivity among conservatives. The editors of ENCOUNTER invited the writer to point up some evidence of such change in conservative theological expression.

In 1943 E. V. Pierce, for many years a vigorous leader of fundamentalism within the American Baptist Convention, voiced his social concern in *The Church and World Conditions.*[1] Chapter III bears the title "Christianity's Responsibility for the Good in the World," and chapter IV is captioned "The Church's Responsibility for the Dominance of Evil and for the Present War." Dr. Pierce wrote:

> *There is no social gospel;* let us use language right. There are social duties, but duties are not good news. *But neither is there any genuine Gospel which does not bear the social fruits of righteousness.* . . . The church has a vast responsibility for the present world conditions, both good and bad.[2]

The repeal of prohibition, said Dr. Pierce, must be blamed on "the somnabulism of the Christian Church."[3] He also specified such social evils as gambling, political corruption, international and interracial strife, conflict between management and labor, etc. as challenges to Christian action. He asserted:

> America might as well face the fact that she is in for an industrial and economic revolution unless Christianity does what the Wesley revivals did in England. There are many pastors and laymen who think that what happens in politics and social relations is no business of the Church. But, since in a democracy like ours we are the political and social units, it is the business of all of us who profess the name of Christ to be Christian units through and through.[4]

In 1947 Carl F. H. Henry, a nationally recognized spokesman for conservatism and at present the editor of *Christianity Today,* attempted to arouse fundamentalists with his probing of *The Uneasy Conscience of Mod-*

1. Fleming H. Revell and Company. 128 pp.
2. *Op. cit.,* p. 47; italics in original text.
3. *Ibid.,* p. 86.
4. *Ibid.,* p. 110.

ern Fundamentalism.[5] Henry bemoaned the fact that "Fundamentalism in revolting against the Social Gospel seemed also to revolt against the Christian social imperative."[6] In fact, fundamentalism was inclined to repudiate the efforts of those who attempted to wrestle with such social evils as "aggressive warfare, racial hatred and intolerance, the liquor traffic, and exploitation of labor or management, whichever it may be."[7]

Henry showed in his little book that fundamentalism had become socially ineffective because of its inadequate understanding of the nature of the kingdom of God. By regarding the kingdom as exclusively futuristic and looking upon this world as totally and irrevocably "lost," it not only indulged in social pessimism but became guilty of social indifference. There is something amiss in any Christian doctrinal system that fails to make the gospel relevant to the contemporary world, according to Henry. To quote one of these observations:

> If historic Christianity is again to compete as a vital world ideology, evangelicalism must project a solution for the most pressing world problems. It must offer a formula for a new world mind with spiritual ends, involving evangelical affirmations in political, economic, sociological and educational realms, local and international. The redemptive message has implications for all of life; a truncated life results from a truncated message.[8]

It seems to the writer that at least two results may be pin-pointed as a response to these challenges: firstly, a re-examination of the biblical teachings concerning the kingdom; and secondly, a re-alignment of conservatives into two camps: the former fundamentalism and the neo-evangelicalism.

With regard to the first, fundamentalism's growing indifference to social problems must be seen as more than a negative reaction to the social gospel, although this must not be minimized. Equally significant, and perhaps more determinative in the last decades, has been the eschatology of dispensationalism. Dispensationalism, such as is articulated in the Scofield Bible and related systems, makes *genuine* social concern theologically heretical. Some conservatives in recent years have faced up to the necessity of re-examining the biblical basis of an eschatology that produces social impotence. The result of these studies is beginning to bear fruit in the noticeable decline of dispensational biblical hermeneutics, and the wider acceptance of a broader concept of the kingdom as the rule or reign of God in the present world.[9]

5. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 89 pp.
6. *Op. cit.*, p. 32.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
9. Two noteworthy examples of this type of study may be cited here: (1) Geo. E. Ladd, *Crucial Questions Concerning the Kingdom*, Eerdmans, 1952. 192 pp. (2) Daniel P. Fuller, *The Hermeneutics of Dispensationalism*, Unpublished Th. D. dissertation, Northern Baptist Theological Seminary, Chicago, 410 pp. See also introduction to Ladd's book by Wilbur M. Smith.

The second effect of an awakening social conscience may be seen in the developing tensions within conservatism. Conservatism today may be seen as rapidly dividing into two major camps: fundamentalism, pre-occupied with peripheral questions of eschatology; and neo-evangelicalism concerned with the contemporary relevance of the gospel. Fundamentalism and neo-evangelicalism both hold to the traditional "fundamentals" of the virgin birth, the supernatural character of biblical revelation, the substitutionary significance of the death of Christ, the bodily resurrection, the personal return of Christ, etc. But while fundamentalism dogmatizes on pre-, mid-, or post-tribulation rapture chartism, neo-evangelicalism places its eschatological emphasis on "adventism" rather than any scheme of "millennialism" and recognizes the broader scope of eschatology. Eschatology begins with Genesis 1:1, and to say, "This is my Father's world," means to become existentially and theologically involved with contemporary events. It means to be an eager participant in the milieu of contemporary events rather than an alarmed (or disinterested?) spectator standing on the sidelines of the contemporary world drama.

It should be noted here that the above does not apply to such theologically conservative groups as found in the Reformed or Missouri Synod traditions. These groups, although holding in the main to the "fundamentals" have always eschewed fundamentalism and its eschatological extravagances. In fact, as conservatism experiences a new alignment we can observe how neo-evangelicalism finds greater affinity with the evangelicalism of the Reformed and Missouri Synod theology.[10] When one considers the implications of bridging the gulfs of sacramentalism versus anti-sacramentalism, covenantism versus personal regenerationism, creedalism versus anti-creedalism, one dare not predict what the eventual outcome will be. But these rather heterogeneous types of evangelicalism are held together by a common rejection of extreme dispensationalism in eschatology, a shared growing social concern, and a mutual acceptance in the main of the "fundamentals."

Can this awakened social concern of conservatism be documented? This writer faces a real problem at this point. The fact is that in 1955 Carl F. H. Henry speaks of his 1947 *Uneasy Conscience* as "rather still-born."[11] But at the same time he also states:

> The fact is that the concern for social justice finds its deepest roots in Biblical Christianity; no age witnesses so clearly as ours what are the results of a concern for social betterment prosecuted by men who deny that they are sinners, and regard themselves instead either as crafty animals or miniature gods.[12]

10. The outstanding example of this new alignment may be seen in the names of the contributing editors of *Christianty Today.*

11. "What is This Fundamentalism?" *United Evangelical Action,* July 15, 1955.

12. *Ibid.,* p. 306.

And Dirk Jellema, professor in the department of social studies at Case Institute of Technology, another spokesman for neo-evangelicalism writes:

> A Christianity which is orthodox but which simply accepts in practice the ethics of the contemporary society, rather than working out a Christian ethics, is possible and even likely. It can hardly be called, however, the best kind of orthodox Christianity.[13]

Jellema refers to such men as C. F. H. Henry, H. J. Ockenga, Bernard Ramm, C. Van Til, G. C. Berkouwer, and John Murray as leaders in awakening the social conscience of conservatism. His article lists some of the books, essays, and symposia produced by these and theologically related individuals. He observes that "Neo-evangelical institutions or even groups dealing with the application of Christian ethics as yet would seem to be in the future."[14] But he cites the Social Action Committee of the National Association of Evangelicals, and the Christian Labor Association of Western Michigan as examples of the stirrings of social concern among conservatives, although not too extensive to date.[15]

In order to ascertain to what extent a social conscience exists in conservatism the writer has made an examination of some of the major journals serving conservative groups. The journals chosen do not exhaust the possibilities of investigation, but the writer believes that they are fairly representative. Some books might properly be included, but most of them still concern themselves with "personal ethics" (or individual piety) and do not represent a grass roots contact. For purposes of this report on the social conscience in conservatism we have examined the most recent volumes of *Moody Monthly, Bibliotheca Sacra, United Evangelical Action, Christian Life,* and *Christianity Today.*

These journals were selected primarily because they address themselves to fundamentalism in its traditional groupings across denominational lines, inter- and sometimes anti- denominational. It should be kept in mind that denominational publications of the Reformed and Missouri Synod theological framework might change the picture, but these would not indicate any changes in fundamentalism, although in the new alignment they are related to neo-evangelicalism. Here is a brief report on our findings on each of the named journals.

Moody Monthly

We examined the two last complete volumes of this journal and the recent issues through October, 1957.

13. "Ethics," *Contemporary Evangelical Thought,* ed. by C. F. H. Henry, Channel Press, Great Neck, N. Y., 1957. 320 pp., pp. 107-133.
14. *Ibid.,* p. 130 ff.
15. *Ibid.,* p. 132.

The most frequent social problem given attention by *Moody Monthly* is juvenile delinquency. A series of three articles reports panel discussions under the direction of S. Richey Kamm, chairman of the department of social science at Wheaton College.[16] A fourth article discusses "Who's Responsible for Johnny?"[17]

While none of these discussions may be regarded as scientific they do express a concern beyond that of building bigger and better Sunday Schools!

Several of the editorials deal with alcoholism.[18] At the time of the Russian atrocities in Hungary an editorial, "Whose Face is Red?" expressed disappointment over the paucity of voices of protest in America, but the editor missed the opportunity to voice a vigorous protest of his own in the name of Christianity![19] That same issue also carried an editorial on "The Present Crisis," expressing concern over the development and control of "terror weapons."[20] This editorial presents a good example of the tension between the social conscience and dispensational eschatology. To quote:

> We are not against such studies. . . . We are for any program that seeks the peace of men on an honorable basis. We pray that such measure of success as is possible may attend such efforts. But is even survival a strong enough incentive to cause men to lay down the implements of war? Further, how can a God-fearing man ever fully trust the word of a God-denying Communist? Yet again, when will our leaders understand that it is not weapons, but human hearts that must be controlled?
>
> How good it is that the millennium does not depend on human efforts, well meaning and benevolent though some of them may be. The much-discounted evangelical believer still has the only answer: (1) the regeneration and sanctification of the individual through faith in the Son of God who died and rose again; (2) the coming again of the Great God and our Savior Jesus Christ.[21]

"Being a Christian in a Factory" discusses the Christian's relation to his job and the labor unions. After considering such matters as not punching the time clock for somebody else, etc., the author comes to the question of participation in union meetings. He writes:

> Another consideration is the Christian's attendance at union meetings. They may be held just above or behind a local taproom, an arrangement which facilitates the distribution of beer right after the meeting—or before. *If the Christian in such a case decides to shed his responsibility in union matters who is to blame him?*[22]

16. "Juvenile Delinquency and Our Complex World," vol. 56, No. 5. "Juvenile Delinquency and the Home," vol. 56, No. 6. "Juvenile Delinquency and the Church," vol. 56, No. 9.
17. Arvid F. Carlson, vol. 58, No. 2.
18. "The Brewers' Rights," April, 1956; see also editorials in October, 1956 and January, 1957.
19. Feb., 1957.
20. Feb., 1957.
21. *Ibid.* By permission of *Moody Monthly.*
22. Aug., 1957, vol. 57, No. 12; Clarence Trowbridge; italics mine. Used by permission.

Obviously, the author of that article *does not,* but he *should!*

The January, 1957, issue reproduces an address delivered at the Mid-America Keswick Conference (Chicago, October, 1956) on the theme "The Preacher in Our Modern World."[23] The address should have been entitled "The Preacher's Personal Spiritual Life." It would be "timely" in any century and any culture because of its lack of relevance to any concrete contemporary world situation at *any* time.

Unfortunately, one finds too much of this "timelessness" among conservatives who make an attempt at relevance. *Moody Monthly,* in spite of its monthly pages of "News Report for and about Christians" does not really succeed in relating the gospel to what is "news" in 1957! For instance the last issue of vol. 56, (August, 1956), was devoted to the general theme "Christianity Yesterday and Today." The last article was by Billy Graham on "Is Christianity Relevant in 1956?" One appreciates the readiness of these conservatives to pose the question; but one finds no references to specific socio-economic-political conditions of 1956 to provide significance for the term "relevant" used in the title.[24]

While *Moody Monthly* gives some evidence of social concern it cannot be regarded as too successful in making the gospel truly relevant. One senses a greater desire to become relevant than a readiness so to interpret the gospel or the world as to bring the two into significant contact.

Bibliotheca Sacra

We examined each number of this quarterly for the years 1955, 1956, and 1957.

Bibliotheca Sacra speaks for extreme dispensationalism. Published by Dallas Theological Seminary it conceives its mission to be the perpetuation of the eschatological chartism of the late L. S. Chafer. To the extent that conservatism still holds to the primacy of "dispensational truth" it insists on the designation of fundamentalism. This journal serves a large segment of this constituency in many denominations and independent groups.

Perhaps it is unfair to look for a social conscience among people who by their very theological presuppositions and dispensational hermeneutical fission have abandoned concern for the contemporary world in their hope for the Messianic kingdom. On the other hand, some conservatives do think of theology in such inclusive terms as to demand consideration of contemporary bread and butter facts of daily existence, both personal and corporate.

This journal devotes itself almost exclusively to questions of the millennium, dispensationalism, the rapture, the tribulation, and the variant minutiae related to these topics. There is a lengthy series of articles by the

23. Wm. Fitch.
24. Aug., 1956.

editor, John F. Walvoord, on "Premillennialism and the Tribulation." (It is articles such as this that provide the explosives for the pre-, mid-, and post-tribulation rapture ruptures among fundamentalists.)

Much given to apologetics, a series of articles on "Archeology and Biblical Criticism" fills many pages. Again and again one finds expressions of apologetics designed to eliminate the ethics of Jesus, especially of the Sermon on the Mount, from contemporary life. To quote one author as a typical example: "The Sermon on the Mount presents God's standards for Israel's entrance into the long anticipated Messianic Kingdom and the rules for conduct of life which will obtain during that age."[25] This is not the place to analyze the dispensational hermeneutical presuppositions that produce such an interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount. But this represents the type of fundamentalism from which neo-evangelicals are dissociating themselves even to the extent of explicitly rejecting the very name of "fundamentalist."

The writer did find what appeared to be a ray of light in this shadowy canyon of eschatology. Bernard Ramm, professor of religion and director of graduate studies in religion at Baylor University, provided a series of two articles on "The Existential Interpretation of Doctrine."[26] In answer to Bultmann's charge that orthodoxy is more concerned with the historical cross and Good Friday than with a present crucifixion of the believer, Ramm states:

> The intention of the existential interpretation is certainly valid. That intention is to insure that religious truth is religiously received. It is supposedly possible in orthodoxy to believe a theological truth without genuine change of the mode of one's existence. But if a doctrine is existentially framed, then a person cannot believe it without a change in that person's mode of religious existence. If orthodoxy has not been careful in maintaining the vital, spiritual and life-transforming character of its doctrines, then it is rightly exposed to such a sharp attack.[27]

In the same article Ramm voices some of the insistences of neo-evangelicalism which if heeded, would at least reduce the fervor of eschatological chartism of dispensationalism if not actually cause its collapse. It is to the credit of *Bibliotheca Sacra* that it consented to publish such existential emphases as the following:

> A further value of the existential position is that it insures that every generation must revitalize its faith. One of the perpetual diseases of orthodoxy is that the vitality of one generation degenerates into a sterile orthodoxy in the next. Oftentimes orthodoxy is held in unorthodox spirit. Sometimes orthodoxy, in becoming excessively concerned with creedalism,

25. James F. Rand, "Problems in a Literal Interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount." Vol. 112, No. 445, p. 28.

26. Vol. 112, Nos. 446 and 447.

27. *Op. cit.*, vol. 112, No. 447, p. 262.

> breeds its opposite, e.g., deism and modernism. The existentialist platform would at least *prima facie* seem to have the medicine to cure this disease. It would see to it that every generation received its doctrinal faith vitally and spiritually.
>
> Certainly we must do all that we can to ward off intellectualism (the assent to creed with no change of mode of religious existence), creedalism, and mere theological traditionalism. If orthodoxy rejects the existentialists' medicine it must provide a curative of its own.[28]

It seems to this writer that such social concern as *is* becoming vocal in "orthodoxy" manifests some imbibing of "the existentialists' medicine." However, fundamentalism whose *involvement* and *encounter* is circumscribed by a "hand-me-down" chartism of the "last days" cannot but ignore (repudiate?) the ethical demands of today. *Bibliotheca Sacra's* concern is with another world totally divorced from man's struggles here and now.

United Evangelical Action

This semi-monthly periodical, claiming over 60,000 readers, carries the sub-title "Voice of Evangelical Christianity in America." It is the mouthpiece of the National Association of Evangelicals which came into being in 1942. Thoroughly interdenominational in character it has included in recent years contributions from some of the most outstanding conservative pulpiteers and leaders of Christian colleges and Bible institutes.

This journal has sensed some of the stirrings within conservatism and takes issue with those of its constituency who have rejected the label of fundamentalism in favor of the term neo-evangelicalism. While denying the charge of John Ockenga that fundamentalism has failed,[29] this journal admits that we are living in a changing world that demands "new tactics" even by fundamentalists. In an editorial on "The Future of 'Fundamentalism' " the editor states:

> We need to lift our sights above old non-biblical concepts, accept the valid discoveries and worthwhile advances of modern life and think, plan, and act accordingly. We need to abandon our isolationisms, provincialisms and traditionalisms which are obsolete and which might keep us from a realistic approach to the actual problems of men in our day and time.[30]

One of the main emphases of this journal is the need for a Christian approach to all areas of education. The public school system with its secularistic humanistic spirit comes under attack repeatedly. The teaching of evolution in public schools also comes under condemnation.

28. *Ibid.*
29. *Bulletin of Fuller Theological Seminary*, Vol. IV, No. 4.
30. *United Evangelical Action*, March 1, 1955, p. 12.

Alcoholism and the liquor industry receive attention and vigorous opposition in editorials and special articles.[31]

The United Nations is opposed because it allegedly places the welfare of groups above that of individuals; and this is said to be contrary to the concept of our nation's founders.[32]

American diplomacy comes under scrutiny from time to time. Regret is expressed that our government too frequently has surrendered principle in negotiations with communism. Peace at any price is rejected. To quote: "The trouble has been that fear of war or obsessions of peace have been the motivations for our diplomacy and not determination to serve God and do right."[33]

Changes in the McCarran-Walter Act on immigration are opposed, and the support of such changes by the National Council of Churches is "deplored." One cannot be too happy with the overtones of what some conservatives are pleased to call "Americanism" that creeps into the reasoning in this and similar instances. To quote:

> Suffice to say, we believe that such a fixed and easily determinable method of controlling immigration is wise. . . . This number is all we can annually absorb into our national life without contaminating or perverting it.
>
> It is our business as a nation to preserve the principles which have made us great and the "way of life" which is America. We cannot allow people with other principles or customs to either deliberately or unwittingly undermine, subvert and destroy ours. If we do, we write Ichabod over our portals.[34]

One of the best expressions of social concern this writer has come across in the pages of this journal is an article by Eric Edwin Paulson, entitled, "Social Justice and Evangelical Christianity."[35] The author attacks the *status quo* slogan of some evangelicals. According to him there is nothing sacred about capitalism *per se*. He writes:

> Does modern Capitalism merit the unqualified endorsement of Evangelicals? Anyone listening to addresses at meetings of Fundamentalists might conclude that the affirmative answer is the only possible one. Some articles in Evangelical publications might lead one to infer that Evangelical Christianity and the so-called "American Way of Life" must stand or fall together. This is a most unfortunate and naive conclusion. It is one that is certain to alienate thousands of intelligent people from Evangelical Christianity.

31. See editorial on "Alcoholism" in issue of June 1, 1955; also article by C. Aubrey Hearn, "The Evil Objectives of Liquor Advertising," March 1, 1955.
32. Editorial: "Two Anniversaries," July 1, 1955.
33. Editorial: "Diplomacy and Morality," June 15, 1955.
34. Editorial: "Immigration Debate," Dec. 15, 1955.
35. March 1, 1955.

The author of the article pleads for government support of low-cost housing; he attacks the inadequate tax support for education, and then chastises evangelicals for failing to become socially and politically active in these and related matters. Referring to social needs he writes:

> These are facts that Evangelicals must have the courage to face intelligently. While recognizing the primary obligation of the Church for preaching the Gospel of personal salvation we must confront our people with the responsibility for ministering to the temporal well-being of mankind. People outside the Christian community have little understanding or interest in theology, but they are vitally interested in social morality. Therefore church members who solemnly pray "Thy Kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven" while remaining indifferent to these basic needs of their fellow men, will hardly help in convincing the unchurched as to the validity and relevance of the Christian Gospel[36]

The author suggests that Christ and the apostles showed much more social concern than many fundamentalists. He concludes his article with the question: "Is it not high time that those of us who profess to believe that the whole Bible is the Word of God begin to demonstrate the practicability of that Word in the development of a sound social philosophy?"[37]

In the interest of fair reporting it should be said that such forthright expression of social sensitivity cannot be said to be altogether the norm for *United Evangelical Action.* This writer readily confesses his satisfaction in every instance of conservative social awareness found in this journal. But he must also express his regret in the fact of much apparent timidity on the part of the editors to make the social relevance of the gsopel more consistently and courageously explicit.

Christian Life

This monthly periodical cannot be taken too seriously with regard to theological significance. A slick paper journal, incorporating the use of color and superb printing techniques, it must be regarded as an advertising medium for church furniture, books, schools, etc., designed to appeal to conservative churches and church workers. Its sub-title aptly illustrates its function: "Interpretive News and Business Magazine for Evangelical Christians."

While this journal contains an occasional article on the Christian approach to juvenile delinquency and racial tensions, it is more concerned with news reports of happenings in evangelical churches and circles. Major attention also is given the question of the Christian faith and contemporary science.

For purposes of this report on the social conscience in conservatism the writer will limit himself to the article "Is Evangelical Theology Chang-

36. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

ing?"[38] Representative conservative leaders present in this editor's report their ideas on how "Fundamentalism" has changed into "Evangelicalism," and just what this means for conservative theology as related to science, the Scriptures, dispensationalism, etc. One of the areas of inquiry dealt with "the Christian's role in society."

The findings of the editor show "a more definite recognition of social responsibility."[39] The contributions of the article at this point are rather meagre, but within the framework of a discussion regarding the changes in evangelical theology nonetheless noteworthy. To quote: "Evangelicals believe that only by calling individual men to the reality of sin in their lives will the ills of society be cured. Nevertheless—unlike fundamentalism—evangelicalism realizes the church has a prophetic mission to society." One writer states: "We must admit that a compelling ethic in terms of biblical categories has yet to be worked out. We must . . . make evangelicalism more relevant to the political and sociological realities of our time." Another man writes that "unless conservative Christian theologians take more time to point out the relevance of Christ and the Bible to important [social] issues conservatism will be neglected by the rising generation."

It may be mentioned in passing that this growing social concern as voiced by these representative conservatives parallels a definite decline in dispensational eschatological interest on their part. It may be expected that those who persist in dispensationalism (fundamentalism) will find themselves more and more divorced from the growing company of conservatives who insist on coming to grips with the social relevance of the gospel.

Christianity Today

On October 15, 1956, the first number of *Christianity Today* made its public bow as the newest expression of conservative theological thought. This bi-weekly periodical of forty pages makes an heroic effort to combine the traditional evangelical insistence on the "Fundamentals" with an awareness and sense of responsibility to twentieth century society.

Before the publication of its first number *Christianity Today* announced that it would occupy itself with the social questions of the day. Although, as might be expected, there are frequent articles on "Verbal Inspiration" and the "Virgin Birth," etc., this conservative organ refuses to equate theological orthodoxy with eschatological dispensationalism, and it has made good its promise of providing conservatism with a voice of social concern.

For the sake of brevity, we can only enumerate some of the articles which have appeared during the first year of publication. It should be noted, too, that the editorials provide a major emphasis on social responsibility, and represent serious attempts to aid conservative Christians to under-

38. March 1956, followed in April 1956 with "Is Liberal Theology Changing?"
39. *Ibid.*, p. 18. Reprinted by permission of *Christian Life Magazine.*

stand not only the nature of economic, political and social problems, but also to bring such persons to an understanding and acceptance of responsible Christian action.

Among the editorials, frequently extending to two or more pages, we find the following: "Race Relations and Christian Duty,"[40] Christ and the Atom Bomb,"[41] "The Christian and Political Responsibility,"[42] "Government Service as a Christian Vocation,"[43] "Human Rights in an Age of Tyranny,"[44] "Future of the American Worker."[45]

Here is a listing of some of the contributed articles which appeared during the first year of publication: "Segregation and the Kingdom of God," E. E. Ellis;[46] "Christian Ideals in Foreign Policy," Jos. Simonson;[47] "The Christian View of the State," Jos. M. Dawson;[48] "The Integrity of the Nations," The Hon. Ernest C. Manning;[49] "Admit Red China?" the Hon. Wm. F. Knowland;[50] "The Church and Social Problem," H. Van Riessen;[51] "The Christian Use of Leisure," W. E. Sangster;[52] "Working for Christ on the Job," Sam M. Shoemaker;[53] "Christians and the Economic Order," Norman C. Hunt;[54] "The Catholic Plan for American Labor," Kermit Eby.[55]

The titles listed above have been selected at random. Some of the treatments of contemporary problems are not altogether satisfactory, and the "Letters" columns provide an interesting expression of the reactions of neo-evangelicals, fundamentalists, and liberals. This writer believes, however, that most of these discussions must be regarded as constructive and, in most instances, realistic. The charge of "obscurantism," so commonly hurled at theologically conservative attempts at (or indifference to) relevance, would be less than honest in these instances and, if made, might reflect prejudice in the accuser.

To the best knowledge of this writer, *Christianity Today* provides the most aggressive expression of social concern in contemporary conservatism. As a matter of fact, one is at a loss to mention any *theological* journal, liberal or otherwise, that provides a better challenge to Christian ethics in the modern world.

In the first number of this bi-weekly the editor, Carl F. H. Henry, wrote in "Why *'Christianity Today'?*":

> Christianity Today will apply biblical revelation to the contemporary social crisis, by presenting the implications of the total Gospel message for every area of life. This, Fundamentalism has often failed to do. Christian laymen are becoming increasingly aware that the answer to the many problems of political industrial, and social life is a theological one. They are looking to the Christian Church for guidance, and they are looking for a demonstration of the fact that the Gospel of Jesus

40. Sept. 30, 1957.
41. Sept. 2, 1957. 42. Oct. 29, 1956. 43. June 24, 1957. 44. Feb. 4, 1957. 45. May 13, 1957.
46. March 18, 1957. 47. June 24, 1957. 48. *Ibid.* 49. Oct. 10, 1957. 50. *Ibid.*
51. July 22, 1957. 52. June 10, 1957. 53. *Ibid.* 54. Sept. 2, 1957. 55. April 29, 1957.

> Christ is a transforming and vital force. We have the conviction that consecrated and gifted evangelical scholarship can provide concrete proof and strategic answers.[56]

A perusal of the first year's issues reveals that an honest effort is being made to realize this objective.

One of the finest statements on evangelical social concern is found in an article dealing with "The Evangelical Responsibility."[57] In this statement Henry distinguishes evangelical social concern from that of liberalism and from the neglect of fundamentalism. To quote:

> We need a new concern for the individual in the entirety of his Christian experience. He is a member of all life's communities, of faith, of the family, of labor, of the state, of culture. Christianity is by no means the social gospel of modernism, but is nonetheless vibrant with social implications as a religion of redemptive transformation. To express and continue the vitality of the gospel message, marriage and the home, labor and economics, politics and the state, culture and the arts, in fact, every sphere of life, must evidence the lordship of Christ.
>
> Obviously, the social application of Christian theology is no easy task. For one thing, fundamentalism fails to elaborate principles and programs of Christian social action because it fails to recognize the relevance of the gospel to the sociocultural sphere. Modernism defines Christian social imperatives in secular terms and uses the Church to reorganize unregenerate humanity. Its social sensitivity gave modernism no license to neglect the imperative of personal regeneration. Evangelistic and missionary priorities, on the other hand, gave fundamentalism no license to conceal the imperative of Christian social ethics. Despite the perils, no evasion of responsibility for meaningfully relating the gospel to the pressing problems of modern life is tolerable.[58]

With this we conclude our survey of conservative periodicals. While some of the older journals give rather hesitant and sporadic evidences of a social conscience, one can definitely discern a more frequent expression of it in recent years. At the extreme right of theological conservatism stands dispensational fundamentalism, represented by *Bibliotheca Sacra,* utterly indifferent to contemporary social problems because of its preoccupation with eschatological chartism. At the progressive left we find *Christianity Today* courageously daring conservatives to accept and meet the challenge of this world's needs. In between are many of "Uneasy Conscience" lacking the courage or desire to declare themselves something other than fundamentalists. This appears to be the temperament of *United Evangelical Action* and *Moody Monthly.*

56. Oct. 15, 1956. Used by permission of *Christianity Today.*
57. "Dare We Renew the Controversy?" July 22, 1957.
58. *Ibid.*

Conclusion

In 1954 Harold John Ockenga dared to suggest that conservatives who believed in the social relevance of the gospel should distinguish themselves from anti-social, isolationist fundamentalists and assume the name of New-Evangelicals. He wrote that this "New Evangelicalism" must be concerned "not only with personal salvation . . . but also with the problems of race, of war, of class struggle, of liquor control, of juvenile delinquency, of immorality and of national imperialism. . . . The new evangelicalism believes that orthodox Christians cannot abdicate their responsibility in the social scene."[59]

No informed person can assert today that conservatives do not have a social conscience. While this emphasis on social relevance among conservatives still must be regarded as in a state of infancy, as Dirk Jellema reminds us, it must be recognized that it has "seen the problem, and it has begun to get at it. . . . In the past ten years, a good deal of progress has been made. A neo-evangelical approach to Christian ethics has begun to take shape."[60]

It must also be confessed that not all conservatives share this social concern. Some of these may retreat further into their isolationist, dispensational eschatological ivory towers. Neo-evangelicals, on the other hand, may be expected to open new lines of communication with those of like social passion although of differing theological persuasion. The result should enhance the prospects of a more vigorous and mature ethical impact on the world by a more united Christian community. Where theology divides, social concern may unite.

59. Bulletin of Fuller Theological Seminary, Vol. IV, No. 4.
60. *Contemporary Evangelical Thought*, p. 132 f.

Abundance, Scarcity, and Co-existence[1]

The Spiritual Crisis of Our Generation

By Martin Niemoller

THERE ARE TIMES in the history of nations as well as in the lifetime of an individual, when major decisions are due to be made or to happen. Certainly the beginning of the sixteenth century was such a time of "crisis"; and out of this crisis the Reformation was born. We know that historians do not agree as to the importance of this time with respect to the transition from the Middle Ages to the new age of modernity; and we cannot expect them to be unanimous, since that depends on what you think to be characteristic for the medieval and for the modern era. One thing is certain: that for the spiritual life of people a new era has begun with the Reformation; its impact is being felt even today, and this impact has lasted longer than the effect of the era of the French and other revolutions. Nor was this effect restricted to what later on was called the Protestant world. The time had come when, beginning with the life of faith, the individual had to find its stand and to develop its own responsibility; and this crisis coincided with the era of discoveries, with a widening of the world as a training ground for this newly found personal responsibility.

Are we wrong in saying that our generation is passing through a similar, or at least through a comparable, crisis and that this crisis again reaches down to the roots of our spiritual life, where changes are taking place in the human soul, at a moment when the surrounding world is shrinking, when the population is getting dense, and when everybody feels that his freedom is limited by the claims of others who want their respective share? People are speaking of the beginning of the "Atomic Age," and we may attribute the greatest importance possible to the change that today is happening in scientific and technical progress. Yet this changes only the conditions of the training ground, whereas actually the crisis calls for decisions to be made by the human being itself and in the depths of its personality.

In the days of the Reformation, the haunting problem of the human soul had been the longing for the reestablishment of a normal relation of the human creature to the Creator—how to find the merciful God? This basic question of the Christian Reformation found its echo in thousands and thousands of human hearts; and the crisis could not be solved positively as long as the answer had not been given. And it was given by the gospel of God's mercy revealed and offered in Jesus Christ, a gospel which had been

1. This paper was presented as a lecture at the School of Religion, November 8, 1956.

darkened by a church which had turned it from a message into a program. The message had to be rediscovered and had to be uncovered again, so that everybody could know that he was addressed as a person and that through the mercy of God he was liberated to act and to live a life of personal responsibility. Only now could something new start out of the crisis of those days.

Co-existence: the Problem of the Merciful Neighbor

Today our generation again is haunted by a problem that practically refers to everybody, and that has lingered in the depths of the human mind for a considerable time and needs a spiritual solution, if the crisis is to be overcome and if the task of a new age is to be tackled. The formula of this problem was given to me by an old pastor friend some thirty years ago. We were speaking on the question, how to preach the gospel in our days, and this pastor gave an answer—or at least showed the way to an answer—when he said: Our generation also has a question on its heart which is just as weighty as the question of the Reformation, and only the gospel gives an answer to it. The question is: how to find the merciful neighbor? I am convinced that my old friend really hit the mark. Our problem is that of the reestablishment of normal relations among the human creatures themselves. We may call it the problem of human society, of the living together of men in this world. This problem has to be solved if we want to overcome the crisis of today and if we are to find a way out. The question is clearly put in the one single word *co-existence.*

The problem itself is not new; it has been discussed at least for the last two hundred years, when the old social structure began to crumble. But it was not dealt with fundamentally; at least, it was not recognized by the Christian church, but was left to those groups that were engaged directly in the ongoing change, to the working class and similar underprivileged groups. Marxism came into existence, the Christian churches scarcely taking notice of it or, at most, showing their disgust, since the layer of society in which the churches were rooted had not yet been reached by the change and had not yet been troubled by the problem. Whereas in England the churches became aware of it and took their part in the new social and socialist movement—at least the Free Churches did—the churches on the European continent missed the hour definitely, and the socialist movement grew up without any assistance and correction from the side of the churches. Thus the way was paved for an atheistic socialist system, which has found its headquarters and bulwark in today's Russia and its bolshevism. This system appeals to many in our days because it tries or pretends to try the solution of the great problems of today.

It is easy to blame others and to criticize their program; yet we Christians must not forget that we and our fathers have not lived up to our

Christian responsibility. We ought to have shown in time a Christian way of dealing with this new problem of human coexistence; but the churches have not done so, because they were linked up hopelessly with the bourgeois world of middle-class society; they did not even realize the travail of those who were in need of them as of their merciful neighbors. It was a repetition of the story of the rich man and Lazarus; and so the church lost its reputation as being the friend of the poor. Now the struggle is on, and we must take care that the church must not only fight atheism, which certainly is her legitimate task; but that she must try to do now at last what she failed to do through a century and longer, that she show forth her genuine concern for tackling the problem of society.

It will not do saying that this is not in the Christian responsibility; because we know that peace among men is just one facet of the gospel, we are responsible for providing as much good will and neighborly peace in human relationships as we can. How to do it? That is the question now. We have to prove the truth of the gospel once more in becoming as churches, examples of community life, showing that the solution of the social problem is well under way in the Christian congregation, and that this problem is attacked wherever Christians meet with fellowmen, that we really know of our solidarity with the human need for the merciful neighbor. The Christian community, the church, that knows its responsibility ought to shine out as a light of the world, which in the crisis of today is groping for a way out of this endless struggle of all against all in order to survive. This struggle is being fought continuously not only by individuals, but by groups, by classes, by nations, and this fight is becoming harder and harder.

The problem of co-existence, of our living together in a world, which has ever less space left for the free moving of the human being, has developed in our days into something even more urgent and more complicated than it was through the last century. The world is shrinking fast, and the peoples are growing at the same time. Tensions and frictions between groups and nations are multiplying, and every tension and every friction has its influence on the whole established order, which no longer is stable.

The Problem of War

A war in former days did not affect anybody except the nations involved, and even these were affected only partly and to a certain degree. That is no longer the case—in our days we speak of total war. And even total war is not a last word; the conception of total war has developed in a comparatively short time from something conceivable into something absolutely irrational. When some twenty years ago the term was used first, it meant that everybody and everything in a nation at war had to serve the purpose of the war, everybody was to be a combattant, everything had to

become a means for the war. Now war itself has become total, not only in its means, but in its ends. Formerly, wars were fought in order to achieve some political aim, which could not be attained otherwise than by force and violence. If this aim was achieved, war ceased, and in a peace treaty the dispute was settled. In the social crisis of today when mankind is afraid of a new big war, the idea of this war is to solve once and for all the problem of co-existence by wiping out the opponent from the surface of the earth. For, our globe has become too small, our difficulties in living together have become too great, that we should hope for a peaceful co-existence which would last. But this total war, aiming at the death of the opponent, has become an impossibility. This war is madness because it cannot but end with the annihilation of the human race altogether. The problem of co-existence cannot be solved by violence, since violence will result only in "co-nonexistence."

As Christians we must remember that the use of force and violence has no promise with it and must remind nations and governments that "evil cannot be overcome with evil," that we have to settle our disputes and to solve our problems by peaceful means and in peaceful ways, that not the strong and powerful, but "the meek shall inherit the earth"! We have to be peacemakers. As the Christian church we have to do everything possible in order to prevent war, to prevent madness from becoming general and destructive for mankind. Pacifism in former days has been the hobby of small groups inside and outside the Christian churches; in our days it ought to be the attitude of every human being and of every social group and of every people and nation in the world; and the church ought to do everything to make people see the danger and to help them to change their ways.

When Population Outruns Resources

For the situation is getting worse and more dangerous; and behind the crisis which we see another crisis is arising. We have not yet become aware of it clearly, even if we have known its elements for years. I have in mind the situation and the unrest in what we call the "underdeveloped countries." This is a good word for a bad thing! By "underdeveloped countries" we understand those countries in which social progress has failed to keep up with the growth of the population, where the standard of life is insufficient to such an extent that hunger is a constant threat to a peaceful and normal development. This name applies to more than half of the total living generation. In the two "underdeveloped countries" of India and China, with their population of nearly one billion, more than a third of all people are living on a yearly income of $43 a year in India and of about $16 a year in China! They have to exist far below the minimum we can imagine. More than half of all humanity live on the critical standard of hunger and starva-

tion, whereas the wealth of the earth is in the hands of the "civilized nations" of the "West" and the "East."

Even this is only part of the truth, for the population of the earth is growing, and it is growing faster in the underdeveloped areas than in the civilized world. For the moment the whole population on earth is about 2,800,000,000, of which only about 1,200,000,000 are civilized, not underdeveloped, "haves," mostly in Europe and Northern America, whereas the others are "have nots," hungry and needy. In 1987 (if statistics and projections are reliable) there will be 6,800,000,000 altogether, of which only 1,800,000,000 will belong to the civilized and well-off peoples of Europe and Northern America. That will be the situation in the near future, in thirty years, tomorrow so to speak. The 1,600,000,000 "have nots" of today will become five billion "have nots" in thirty years! This—and not the problem of coexistence between "East" and "West"—will be the real problem tomorrow; it is the real problem even today. Will it be possible for the 1,600,000,000 "haves" to coexist with the five billion "have nots?" And what has to be done that it may become possible, because otherwise nobody can tell what is going to happen? This is not a far-off future; our children will live to face this situation.

A Christian Responsibility

Now, we may put the question whether this really is something belonging to the responsibility of the Christian church? Is it not just fate, something which cannot be changed or avoided? We know that usually communism is charged to be on the back of every expression of unrest in today's world. Yet the situation is not quite that simple: this unrest normally springs from dissatisfactions deep in the heart and life of the "man in the street," the mostly illiterate, poor, hopeless part of the people. The most revolutionary parts of the world are just those where this sort of underdevelopment, want, and hunger prevails. Certainly in many cases the Soviet Union may take advantage of such a situation and kindle the fire of extreme demands and the nationalistic fight for freedom. But the cause of these demands and the source of this dissatisfaction is a different thing; even if the communist world would disappear tomorrow, this rebellion would go on among the "underdeveloped peoples." I doubt whether the Russians really are less afraid of this fast developing crisis than anyone else in the world. This crisis is not the result of even tens of years of communist propaganda in the respective areas, but it is the end-product of a system which has been used for a much longer time.

Let us remember that the so-called "Christian world," the nations of Christian Europe, have had more than 450 years of uncontested world dominion. We have had the opportunity of acting with the riches and with the

peoples of the earth entirely according to our wishes and plans. What we are facing today is the result of our own work and of that of our fathers: many hundreds of millions of human beings existing day in, day out, on the borderline between hunger and starvation; and this when they have been controlled and governed for hundreds of years by the white, "Christian" people. This is the reason why we simply cannot deny our responsibility for them, the responsibility of the Christian churches, especially of Europe. It cannot be denied that the era of colonialism is reaching its very last phase; it will have disappeared in a few years. But what will be the aftermath? Are we allowed to say, "These peoples are no longer our concern, for they did not want us"? We shall see pretty soon that they cannot cease being our concern. We—the "Christian World"—have started the whole thing and cannot escape the consequences, even if we wished to do so. We shall have to meet them in only a few years' time, when they will be three times as many as we shall be; and "we"—the white man of Christian background, Westerners and Easterners, capitalists and socialists, Americans and Russians—we shall have to answer their charges and their claims. They will be fifty hundred million people against eighteen hundred million; and what has been a possibility and has become a reality in wide areas of the world—the annihilation and extinction of the colored man by the superior, technically advanced white conqueror—will be no way out any longer. In at most thirty years' time they will rule the world and the white man's rule will end, a development not different from what happened to the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth century.

In those days a civilization came to its end in a very short time and was followed by long centuries of darkness. And in this case we cannot blame anybody else, but shall have to accept our own liability. It is here that we must recognize the Christian church's responsibility to the underdeveloped countries, and the sooner the better! For we have to try everything possible in order to allow a peaceful change to take place and to hand over what is good and precious in our Christian heritage, to those who are to replace us. The question is how to act as merciful neighbors just early enough that they may take over as merciful neighbors.

Perhaps all this seems an exaggeration. It may be; even experts may fall victims to their own expertness and cunning. Yet, if they are wrong, they will be wrong by degrees and not by principle, and at best we can gain only a little time more. The question remains: what are we to do with the expiring time? The Christian world today is in the situation of the unjust steward in the gospel story. "What shall I do? For my Lord taketh away from me the stewardship!" The advice of Jesus is, "Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness, that when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations!"

What then are we to do with regard to the underdeveloped countries and their future? We ought to finish the struggle and the cold war between East and West as soon as possible, for the real war has to be fought on a different front line. We see the underdeveloped turning, to, or siding with, bolshevism. Why? Because these countries and peoples believe that the bolshevists are their allies, that they will help them to overcome their difficulties and to support them in achieving national independence and economic autonomy. I remember a long talk with the editorial staff of an Indian communist paper in South India. They had invited me for a conversation, and I asked them, "Why are you communists?" It was not easy to find it out, but at last I succeeded. To my question as to their attitude toward class-struggle, they said, "We are not interested in class-struggle!" When I went on, "How, then, will you achieve the classless society?" they replied, "We don't care for a classless society!" "Good heavens," I said, "why then are you communists?" And the answer came, "We believe that the communist system of economic planning is the only way to feed our ever growing population!" This answer was both disheartening and encouraging. Disheartening, for it made me see how easily people—they all were Christians!—can fall to the communist influence without even acknowledging the primitive doctrines of communism, if only they hope that life under communism will give them a better chance for surviving in the struggle for life. What really will become of us if the standard of living will be better in their communist world than in our own? But there was something encouraging in this answer too. We have a real chance to ward off communism by the way of peaceful competition, to bring the best of support and help to those countries and peoples which are suffering from the consequences of our own world-dominion in the past.

The Areas Concerned

The areas concerned are: (1) Asia with a population of 1,600,000,000, which will grown to 4,200,000,000 in 1987. Here the changes are developing fast. (2) Africa with 200,000,000 people which will become 650,000,000 in 1987. Here the changes will become most revolutionary. (3) Latin-America with something like 140,000,000 people which at least will double in the next thirty years. Here the changes will continue in a way of periodical and comparatively light revolutions.

The real task is to give these peoples and groups of peoples a fair chance as soon as possible to control their own life and to feed their own people without getting into unwanted dependence upon any white or Christian domination.

Therefore it will not do just to send food and similar supplies to these areas, but we ought to help them to produce themselves what they need

without being forced to beg their bread from the wealthy. Certainly this must not mean that there ought to be no commercial exchange; but it must be on an equal footing and not of a character that it arouses the feeling of inferiority as happens if a country is forced to export its raw products and to import them again when they have been turned into manufactured goods.

Special programs will be needed in order to raise agricultural production by introduction of modern methods of farming. Such methods, like all sorts of industrial development, are dependent on the abolition of illiteracy and on professional training, which cry for help from outside. We ought to support the training of engineers and of skilled workers in these countries in spite of the fact that thereby we build up their competition against what we used to regard as our own interest.

If once we agree that our real and only task in international life today is to build up peace by creating a responsible society of nations and to pay for it with the loss of any advantage opposed to this aim, there is no choice left. We shall have to pay the price and run the risk of cutting down our own standards rather than accept the certainty that we shall fail and end in co-non-existence.

If this problem is to be solved the Christian churches must provide the persons willing to sacrifice at least part of their lives for this task and must train them that they may help. They will go as a sort of modern missionaries of a church which has been disobedient to her master's call, in just serving those peoples that have suffered from what Christians did not do to them, when their share was due to be paid. "I have been hungry and you gave me no drink!" It is the task for our generation that we make friends with these "underdeveloped countries" before God will take away the stewardship from us, that we build up a peaceful and peace-loving community, so that the era of the white man's dominion will not be remembered by future generations as a curse of greed and violence, but as a blessing at least in its last and decisive phase.

Articles on Current Literature

Christian Ethics: Some Basic Issues in Contemporary Thought

By Walter W. Sikes

JUST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO a basic new orientation in Christian ethics began to show itself with clarity. One can find many evidences of this emergence previously. But no student can mistake the marks of a great watershed in the year 1932, although it was yet a few years before this shift and its significance were generally felt. This year marks the publication of *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen: Entwurf einer protestantisch-theologischen Etik* (The Command and the Orders: an Outline of a Protestant Theological Ethic), by Emil Brunner, translated in 1936 under the English title of *The Divine Imperative.* And it was also the year of the publication of *Moral Man and Immoral Society* by Reinhold Niebuhr.

The ideas which proved to be revolutionary in these two works can be summed up—although in a dangerously oversimple manner—as two. The first of these is the view that no systematic statement of a Christian ethic is possible, whether derived from reason and natural law or from Scripture; neither reason nor revelation provides principles from which we can arrive at normative Christian duties or virtues. The second is the view that fallen, or historic, man is such a creature that, even if such a system of moral laws could be theoretically established (or insofar as these are articulated), they would not serve to produce either individual or social conduct that can be correctly described as Christian.

Although many types of Christian ethics had been elaborated prior to this date, one can sum up the Protestant statements—again with much over-simplification—by recognizing three major families. The first can be typified by the astonishingly popular *In His Steps* by Charles M. Sheldon (1899). This type of ethics took as its basic tenet the view that what Jesus taught and did was definitive for Christian conduct. In its more elaborate and sophisticated statements it provided the rationale for the "social gospel" and more generally for the ethic of Protestant liberalism. "The modern spirit" says Professor Peabody of Harvard, in summing up this ethic, "inquires, 'What would Jesus say?' "[1]

A second family of theories was primarily philosophical ethics, or the ethics of natural law, elaborated from biblical materials, in which Christian ethics was seen to be no more than the proclamation, though perhaps a final one, of what has been eternally written in the nature of the world and of rational man. Bishop Henson, summarizes this point of view in his Gifford Lectures in characterizing "Christian morality as the climax or perfected version of natural morality, the norm of ethics which men . . . must needs accept as they advance in civilization."[2] This position also was embraced by liberalism, the main difference between these two types being the method used by each. The former was more simply biblical while the latter was primarily philosophical.

1. *Jesus Christ and the Social Question,* by Francis Greenwood Peabody. 1900.
2. *Christian Morality, Natural, Developing, Final,* by H. H. Henson. 1936.

A third family of theories was distinguished by the effort to formulate, in the manner of a system of dogmatics and generally as a section of dogmatics, a system of Christian ethics, in which the Bible was regarded as providing comprehensive data for universally valid principles. Christian ethics was the systematic statement, or the science, of these divine demands. Works of this type were numerous in the middle and later nineteenth century. Christ is treated as a lawgiver, perfecting and in his person fulfilling the Law of God. In this tradition Dorner states, "Christ is an external objective law," and Martensen sees him, though not as fashioning "new tables of the law" which are "parcelled out into a multitude of individual commands and prescriptions," nevertheless as giving "the legislation of God's kingdom."[3]

What Brunner and Niebuhr both did, in these two works and in many others as well, was to repudiate in principle all three positions. Most radically they repudiated all philosophical ethics—Brunner on the grounds both of the inconsistencies of all such systems and of their failure to perceive that the ought, the right and the good of man must derive from his relation to God, and Niebuhr on the grounds that adequate norms of human conduct must be discriminated, in part at least, from a realist view of man's psychological constitution (or more exactly from anthropology as a comprehensive understanding of man) and of the nature of socio-economic institutions with reference to which men must always act. They both denied also that the life and teachings of Jesus or of the apostolic church provide moral laws that state, either in precept or in principle, what the Christian ought to do or may become. On the other hand, both found in the gospel, or in the Word of God as given in Scripture, the ultimate imperative of the Christian life, both individually and corporately.

During this quarter of a century, in consequence of this frontal attack, joined in by many and fiercely resisted by not a few, the whole field of Christian ethics has come under radical re-examination. The literature is becoming so enormous as to stultify claims to comprehensive acquaintance. Before me now are more than a score of books in English alone (some four or five are translations) published within the last couple of years, and there are several others that could be added to the stack, to say nothing of the vast literature in journals and in other languages. Much of this has to do with Christian social ethics, and practically none of it is concerned with personal character and conduct in isolation from social implications. This article is an effort to review and relate a dozen of these recent works.

Efforts to Reinstate or Re-state a Systematic Ethic

Two of these books[4] represent efforts to restate the third type of Christian ethics described above, but neither is free from the impact of recent criticisms. One of the more interesting aspects of the current theological ferment, of which the re-examination of Christian ethics is one instance, is the effort of the more conservative Christian thinkers to elaborate some system on the grounds of "propositional revelation." The exponents of this position stand generally if not always within a strict Calvinism with its emphasis on the infallibility of Scripture as revealing supernatural truths and on the definitive and obligatory nature of divine law as thus revealed. These efforts are in principle biblical theologies derived from exegesis of Scripture under the control of the postulate of faith that the Bible, and hence divine laws revealed therein, constitute a unity not only discernible by reason, when one views it

3. *System of Christian Ethics,* by I. A. Dorner, and *Christian Ethics,* by H. Martensen.

4. Books reviewed here are listed at the end of this article. They are referred to in the body of the article by author or title. Page references are given in parentheses.

from the standpoint of faith, but also perfectly consistent with reason. A rational system of biblical ethics is thus attempted.

Principles of Conduct by John Murray, which bears the sub-title "Aspects of Christian Ethics," is one of the better achievements of this effort. It is excellent in being both a direct and pure attempt to use what the author calls "the biblico-theological method" so as to show "the organic unity and continuity of divine revelation," and also in being clear and competent. He defines the biblical ethic as the way of life taught or commanded in the Bible and not an abstraction from the actual lives, even of believers, portrayed therein, since these lives are always somewhat corrupted by sin. The Decalog, "it will surely be admitted" (7), is the core of this ethic, which essentially is the unchanging will of God. The statement of this will has changed, however, being progressively revealed. Thus, when Jesus, as in the Sermon on the Mount, contrasts his teachings with the older laws, he "fulfills" or completes the original intent of the divine will; he does not abrogate any of these. He did not abrogate—in the sense of destroying—even the ritual laws, though he did discontinue them. Nevertheless, all these "stand in the most intimate organic connection with Christ and his work, [as] ectypes of an archetype," adumbrations of a reality that was finally revealed in Christ. (149, 150). "Our relation to the kingdom of heaven is defined in terms of our relation to the law" (152), as positing canons of divinely approved behavior.

Murray is aware of the force of the argument, represented by Brunner and elaborated especially by H. Richard Niebuhr and some of his students,[5] that we cannot find specific and comprehensive commandments to guide us in the actual situations of choice and decision and must await reactions within each actual situation. And he recognizes "an important stratum of truth" in the position that norms of Christian behavior in such situations are "simply the precipitate of the sanctified moral consciousness," which thus comes to have "an intuitive sense of what is right and good . . . [and] dictates the proper behavior in each existential situation" (20). This is strongly supported, he grants, "by the great truth . . . that love is the fulfilling of the law," and that ethical demands are simply formulations of the necessary outflow of love. But he rejects this position on the ground that love is not the law or even a law, since never in the Scriptures (nor could it by nature) does it define its own content. "The renewed heart is [not] allowed to excogitate the ethic of the saints of God" (24). We have no ethic without specific content, and this is given in the commandments.

> The criterion of our standing in the kingdom of God and of reward in the age to come is nothing else than the meticulous observance of the commandments of God in the minutial details of their prescription and the earnest inculcation of such observance on the part of others (154).

One could scarcely go further in reducing the gospel to legalism. Against this reduction must be brought two objections. The first is that this leaves completely out of the domain of Christian ethics most of our day to day behavior. Should I punish my child thus and so? Should I support arms to Yugoslavia? Should I join this labor union? Murray would perhaps object that these refer not to norms but to acts. But this of course is the whole point. His position makes no provision for deriving the specific ethical act from the commands. The second objection the author faces: Where is grace in such a system? He answers that keeping the law does not contribute "in the least degree towards our acceptance with God" (182).

5. This position is stated below in connection with the work of Rasmussen and Gustafson.

What law does is to command and demand, pronounce judgment and expose sin, but it cannot do anything "to justify the person who in any particular has violated its sanctity" nor "to relieve the bondage of sin" (184, 185). Grace is the "sovereign will and power of God" delivering us from our sin of disobedience to the law—but never relaxing in the least demand of the divine will. When one espouses such a dialectic of legalism, he can scarcely object with reason, as Murray does (Appendix III), to what he calls Brunner's dialectic of antinomianism.

In Carl F. H. Henry's massive and often brilliant work, *Christian Personal Ethics*, one finds the same basic criticism of Brunner and Niebuhr—namely, that they in effect dispense with the law—and the same intent to establish a systematic revealed ethic. He especially objects to those who "profess to speak from the standpoint of revelational ethics" but inconsistently "stress the incompatibility of commandment and love" (115). And he undertakes, on essentially the same principles as those postulated by Murray, to derive an ethic of law from the Bible that is consistent with love and grace. In this he is somewhat more successful, for he shifts the emphasis from the keeping of "minutial details" of commandments to "Christian ethics as the morality of the regenate man" (ch. 16). Accordingly "the moral problem must be stated in terms of *being* rather than only of *doing*," and its solution must be found, not in the Aristotelian view that good actions beget virtue, or conduct determines character, but in the biblical view that character determines conduct (393). The work of grace is not only that of justification (an error never escaped by Reinhold Niebuhr) but also that of the "birth of a new self who finds his place in the world of existence by devotion to the will of God" (394). This ethic of the Holy Spirit not only enables Henry to transcend legalism, but it goes far toward correcting his vain effort to elucidate what he calls the "biblical particularization of the will of God" in a "propositional revelation."

But in order to speak to this issue, as it emerges in Henry's work, we should get an over-view of its structure and intent. "The burning question in the present-day study of ethics is the real identity of Christian ethics." Since "revealed ethics moves on a different plane from speculative ethics" and since "it admittedly requires personal involvement," is Christian ethics existential or rational? Does it rest upon an intelligible world-life view or spurn such? Does it dismiss metaphysics as a basis for morality and rest its case "on the subjective leap whose only test for validity is the subjective assurance of the immediate Divine confrontation of the soul?" Or—and this rhetorical question states Henry's position—"Does revelational ethics set the urgency of personal moral choice within the framework of a rationally and divinely revealed world-life view?" (133).

Like Brunner, Henry approaches his positive statement by undertaking to refute all "secular ethics," subsuming all philosophical ethical systems under this term as being either naturalistic or idealistic, or as being existentialist, which is itself a protest against the errors of the two classical types. His criticism of these systems is often persuasive and frequently penetrating. He is especially arduous in his criticism of existentialist ethics because he takes all existentialist thought either to rest upon a basic postulate of irrationalism or to fall into irrationalism in the end. Unfortunately he shows no evidence of having read Kierkegaard, whom he rightly regards as the fountainhead of contemporary existentialist thinking, and fundamentally misunderstands both his method and his intent. He does recognize—as too few critics of existentialist thinking fail to do—that back of Kierkegaard is Kant. Unfortunately, also, he misinterprets Kant in finding him to say "that no meaningful propositions can be formed about the spiritual and moral world" (137). What Kant

said, rather, is that no metaphysical demonstrations are possible by (pure) reason. But surely meaning is not restricted to rational (or demonstrable) knowledge of metaphysics. Yet this seems to be Henry's position, when he says, "Only by reaffirming rational knowledge of the metaphysical world can the 'will of God' have meaning for ethics" (139).

Henry's polemic against Kant, Kierkegaard and their contemporary theological followers, Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr is motivated by his conviction that their position is "rooted in a philosophical perspective rather than in any special Divine revelation." Two aspects of this position cut it loose from "the historic Christian view of biblical ethics." One is the rejection of propositional revelation, thus denying a rational base for theology and ethics. The other is making revelation to be an immediate encounter only. This bypasses an inspired and authoritative Scripture (137). It will surprise many to hear that these estimable gentlemen bypass "an inspired and authoritative Scripture." But what Henry undertakes to prove—and his fundamental position stands or falls here—is that the Bible is or contains a "revealed system of Christian morality" conveyed in propositional truths.

What he finds, however, is not propositions that are concrete and specific in man's work-a-day world but "inscripturated principles." And when he turns to the revealing propositions they prove to be not statements but commands—commands, moreover, that in their specific applications can never be laws. Moreover, when Henry attempts to state "New Testament principles of conduct" (ch. 18) these are strangely ambiguous. For example: "The Christian is not to make common cause with the unbeliever, but is prohibited from an entrance into pagan life for a mutual effort and aim" (433). In employment? In the army? In a university faculty? In a chess club? From which domains of culture shall the Christian withdraw, and to what extent? In the end, Henry says there is no certain answer (434, 435). Each of the six "New Testament principles of conduct" suffers from a similar ambiguity.

Then one must remain without guidance for specific conduct or he must either depend upon the Holy Spirit, which Henry rightly interprets as the source of enabling power (ch. 19) but neglects to see as a guide in decision and action, or be guided by his conscience, which Henry declares "speaks with an absolute authority to human experience [as] the *imago Dei*, which in fallen man is shattered but not destroyed" (519). Henry's treatment of conscience is one of the best chapters in his work (ch. 22). But what it amounts to in the end is to bring him very close to the position of the Christian existentialists at the point of concrete moral choices; namely, that the Christian conscience informed by the Word of God must act in responsible freedom. "Only the healthy conscience, trained to act instinctively in response to the New Testament revelation of the Will of God, makes for spontaneous spiritual morality" (525). Where he differs from these and from most other contemporary theological ethicists is in trying to establish a rational system of comprehensive and specific moral principles revealed in scriptural propositions. In this he fails. And one may take this failure to indicate the bankruptcy of the position, since the competence of the author and the elaborateness of his work will scarcely be surpassed.

Werner Elert agrees with Henry and with Brunner that theological ethics alone and not any form of philosophical ethics is normative. But theological ethics is not normative, as Elert states his position in *The Christian Ethos*, in the sense that it discovers or articulates ethical principles which should or can determine Christian character or conduct. Rather theological ethics discloses the divine norm, the *nomos* of God, which performs only one function. It judges man from God's and not man's

viewpoint and finds him to be a sinner. This *nomos* of God is found, for Elert, exclusively in the Scriptures when the "purity of sources" (*Quellenreinheit*) is respected; that is, when the Bible is read "as it demands to be understood" (6). The function of criticism is solely to clarify the claims the sources make for themselves. When so read the basic claim made by God on man, the cornerstone of theological ethics, is "the divine authority to exercise judgment."

Ethics is thus a branch of theology, and a theology that "does not question the dogma, the ethos and forms of worship of the church but inquires for their adequate justification" (11, 12). However, ethics has its own distinctive materials and is not to be incorporated as part of a system of theology. It "is not a body of doctrines" (13), nor a collection of moral precepts or imperatives. Rather Christian ethics, found when the meaning of Scripture is determined by proper exegesis, reveals "the quality of man according to the divine judgment" (14). Christian ethics is the science of this ethos, an understanding of the kind of life man is called upon to live under God. Nor is the gospel to be regarded as an instrument of law, enabling the sinner to fulfill its demands either by sacramental grace or by a new obedience. Although under grace man does become a "new being," this change always remains "an invisible miracle" (18; cf. ch. 6) and "no practical relation" such as "the observable fulfillment of the law" can demonstrate this fact (200). The determinative factor is not an objective principle but a personal encounter of the living Christ.

How "quality in the eyes of God" is related to and affects conduct in the eyes of men is one of Elert's major problems, which he recognizes as difficult and never satisfactorily solves even on his own premises. His thesis goes like this: Jesus Christ is not a lawgiver (197) and it is a complete misunderstanding of the Christian ethos to suppose, as the Reformed Church does, that "God wants nothing else from us but that we keep his commandments" (196). Yet "the word of the earthly Christ entails an obligation for us" (203), but never an obedience in avoidance of retribution nor in expectation of reward. The new being entails a "new obedience" which is of faith and not of law. "Obedience consists in the fact that we accept the governing activity of God without objection" (248). This "faith must bring forth good fruits and good works" (249) because that is its nature. But no word or example of Christ or another gives specific directions. Every decision is an adventure and a risk. All such decisions must be made "within the natural orders" (264), which Elert calls "configurations of existence," the several communities in which we live and which provide the essential conditions of our lives. These are all God-given social structures to which "we are assigned . . . with total responsibility" (336).

In his effort to clarify the Christian ethic for these orders Elert restates Luther's doctrine of the two realms, the realm of grace in which the church finds its life, and the realm of law in which all secular orders exist. In the latter, law is necessary but condemns nonetheless. Moreover "the two cannot be reconciled because they are fundamentally different" (413) and the ethos of grace (a "subjective ethos") can never become the ethos of law for any corporate structure of the world ("objective ethos"). The Christian must live in a constant "day-by-day struggle of the new man against the old Adam," attempting "to find the inward unity of his conduct in the motive of love" (*ibid.*).

This is on the whole a worthy statement of the Lutheran view of Christian ethics. But we have here, as in Luther, two great unanswered questions. First, since the Christian is called to a life of good works in faith and love and since no specifications of such works is either given or deducible from given principles, how does a Christian discriminate good works from evil works? Elert does not, and on his grounds

cannot, say. That every human act is a moral risk without certain knowledge that it is good one may grant. But to hold that we are left without any means of discrimination except a love which regards the neighbor with the same concern as one naturally regards one's self is surely to fall into obscurantism. Second, how does the Christian relate himself to the corporate orders of existence so as to express his love in these relationships? At what points and in what manner is he to resist and reform these? With this question Elert does not concern himself and it is difficult to see how he could arrive at anything like a statement of principle or policy. He contends that the church through its own objective ethos is a force in history. But how it is to act and speak so as to maximize its own good works is not definable. In fact, its impact on history is always in ways neither intentional or predictable but determined by the power and purpose of God.

Re-statement of an Ethic of Protestant Liberalism

In *Christian Ethics* by Georgia Harkness we have perhaps the best of recent efforts to re-state Christian ethics in terms of Protestant liberalism. Here, however, is a chastened liberalism although still an ardent social gospel. Harkness finds a distinctive Christian ethic which refuses to accommodate itself to secular philosophy and yet is willing to learn from the moral wisdom of the ages. Specifically she thinks the ethic of Kant, of Bentham and Mill and of contemporary philosophies of social adjustment can be *used* in service to an ethic essentially biblical.

But the Bible as read by Harkness is not that as read by Murray or Henry. Specifically "Christian ethics . . . is the systematic study of the way of life set forth by Jesus Christ, applied to the daily demands and decisions of our personal and social existence" (30, 31). The Old Testament is to be used but judged and corrected from this point of view, as is also the New Testament. But the picture of Jesus given here is too untouched by recent biblical or ethical criticism to be regarded as definitive. For instance, in the six summary statements of the ethical principles of Jesus, the fourth recites that "Jesus had a realistic knowledge of both human sin and of the possibilities of the redeemed life" (55). With this no one can quarrel. But when the author goes on to say that "he did not, like Paul, look upon sin as an enveloping state of evil resulting from Adam's fall and corrupting man's whole being" (*ibid.*), one must raise two questions. Did not Jesus regard man as somehow enveloped in evil? And did Paul really regard man as corrupted in his whole being?

These questions are not unrelated to the central thesis of the book, which is that in Jesus we have a "clear pattern of the demands of the God-centered life" (54) though not a blue-print (not, one must think, a complex of specific commands). Yet the exigencies of our human situation are such that we are confronted with necessities of compromise. Harkness makes no effort to elucidate a theology here, giving only the barest suggestion of something of this kind when she says that the problem of compromise arises because of "two focuses" in Jesus and in our own lives—"eschatological and mundane" (64). But it is a bit cavalier to settle an issue by quoting the Oxford Conference Report to the effect that one must do "what appears as relatively best" as "absolute duty to God" (66).

How do the principles of Jesus give us "guidance among the relativities of our present world?" The answers to this question constitute most of the book—first, with reference to "duties to self and society" (ch. VI) and then much more extensively with reference to the social orders of life (Part II). Here the author is insistent that the gospel does speak directly to all our social issues—economic life, racial tension, international issues and the rest, and that the demands thus made by

the gospel should and can be applied in the market place, the forum and the legislature. But she also recognizes that there is wide room for difference of judgment on most if not all such issues. Even if the answer is to be found in response to the simple question, What would Jesus do? our dilemma is that we have no unequivocal answers as to what Jesus would do in many of our actual situations. Faced by these dilemmas—as for example, that of participation in war—one "must decide prayerfully before God what is to be his course of action" (216).

In the same general mood of this book should be mentioned two others, both of which undertake to restate the social gospel after its cleansing and correction in the light of recent criticisms and especially in the form given in or suggested by pronouncements of ecumenical bodies.

Victor Obenhaus, in *The Responsible Christian,* gives us a very useful book, written with the layman and not the theologian in view. In a brief but remarkably helpful statement of the theological bases for a gospel relevant to society, he corrects what most presentday readers will see as a defect in the work of Harkness. Obenhaus rejects the view that "the principles of Jesus" are sufficient for a Christian ethic. "Jesus as the Christ involves something deeper than a set of principles." What this deeper something is, though not adequately defined, is suggested. "He reveals in startling and compelling fashion the very nature of man himself and of his relationship to God" (16). But it is not the author's purpose to elucidate the depth of this assertion.

He does come, in the discussion of the problem of guidance for concrete choice and action, to the same point noted in each of the above; namely, that in most if not all social situations, we can never be absolutely certain of what is God's will. Here again he corrects a deficiency in the solution of Harkness. He briefly proposes three safe-guards. First, we can base our decision upon the affirmation (Obenhaus unfortunately says "assumption") of God's sovereignty in human life and history. Second, we can make our decision within the whole tradition of our faith and the context of the Christian community. And third, we can be aware of the fact and effect of human sin—our own as well as that of others (26, 27).

On these grounds Christians can and must speak and act responsibly in all the orders of social existence. Obenhaus depends for the content of his social ethic upon both the finding of social sciences and recent interpretations of this ethic by ecumenical assemblies, national councils and study conferences. (Unfortunately the book is marred by several minor careless errors of spelling of names and places.)

T. B. Maston, in *Christianity and World Issues,* attempts generally the same task as do Harkness and Obenhaus. He is, however, more influenced by realistic theology than they and hence less optimistic regarding the possibilities of making the Christian ethic effective in society. But he is less interested in the theological ground of Christian ethics than either. His theology, like his ethic, is eclectic, being principally an effort to summarize and relate in a loosely structured whole recent writings of those whom he calls neo-Protestant.

His thesis, insofar as the present reviewer is able to distill it from this work, is that the church has "both a this-worldly aspect and an other-worldly aspect" (1) which sets Christians in "a spiritual dialectic." Every Christian is under the divine imperative to conform to the perfection of God his individual life and conduct and all the corporate institutional communities in which he is involved. But this is beyond his possibilities. He is always in tension between the ideal of Christian perfection which is really obligatory on him here and now and the sinful realities of his own nature and social situation. He must nevertheless act, in which action he "falls

short. He repents. He is forgiven." And he returns again to action with a deeper understanding of God's will and an increased power to perform it. This movement, first from the vision of God's will for the world to obedience in the world, always partial and sinful, then back to God again for enlightenment and forgiveness, and then a return to action in the world, "represents a spiral movement toward the Christian ideal" (352, 353). He examines the typology of H. R. Niebuhr in *Christ and Culture* and espouses Niebuhr's view that while the tension between the two can never be resolved without betrayal of the gospel, the world can be measurably transformed by the gospel. Redemption of the world moves thus from communion with God to community among men.

But whence and how and with what content is the Christian ethic given? Here Maston is less than clear, other than that it is "based on the Bible" (40), and that its content, in part certainly, is given by the social situation. "The Christian ideal, for the world as for the individual, is fleeting. As we move toward it, it moves ahead of us" (353). It is therefore not derived *from* the social situation; it always transcends any actual political, economic, racial or family condition. But just what are the principles of this ethic, what its dimensions and criteria, this we never learn. All this is somehow taken for granted. And what we are told, by copious reference to many works on the social sciences and social ethics, is that the church must engage itself with the world in an effort to transform its total life. For this purpose the book is useful and could be a good textbook for beginners in Christian social ethics.

Toward an Ethic of Social Policy

The last three books noted above move from the theological problem of the source and nature of a Christian ethic toward the other pole of contemporary inquiries; namely, how do we go from where we are toward where the Christian imperative demands that we be? This question is not so much one of authority as of power. How does the Christian restrain evil? What is the relation of power to justice? How, in short, is the Christian ethic to be made effective in society? The books just reviewed eloquently state what the Christian ethic would demand as to the character of social institutions. But just how the Christian citizen, as policy-maker or as administrator in the various forms of collective life, moves to transform these in the direction of obedience to the Word of God, we do not learn from any of these.

How does the Christian ethic become social policy? This is the problem addressed in a number of recent books, four of which may be mentioned here.

The first two stand within the same theological position as that of Murray and Henry, namely an ethic of divinely revealed law. *Responsible Protestantism* with the sub-title of "Essay on the Christian's Role in a Secular Society" is a posthumous collection of essays by Cecil DeBoer. It is accordingly unsystematic. Several of the essays undertake to find the ultimate authority for moral decision, and find it, by way of a Kantian critique, to lie beyond ethics itself in "religion or ontology" (45). The "merely moral man is essentially a self-righteous man and, therefore, an immoral man" (54). True morality is always action under the judgment of God. In this sense we live in a fundamentally immoral society. What can Christians do about this? DeBoer's answer to this indicates that he thinks most nominal Christians are not really Christians. He is critical of "liberals" and ecumenicals on the ground that (as he mistakenly asserts) these believe that "uniting in thought and action on vast political, social and economic problems . . . *is* Christianity" (149), and thinks the ecumenical movement dubiously Christian and socially impotent. Apparently he regards the small group of Calvinistic evangelicals with which he is identified as

likewise but for other reasons, politically and socially ineffective. His conclusion seems to be that the issue is one both of personal regeneration and of social reform. But he leaves us wondering what either of these mean in terms of action. One neds to look elsewhere for any significant light either on the nature of Christian ethics or the processes of social renewal.

The second of these, *The Society of the Future* by H. van Riessen, is grounded on two basic principles. The first is that of special revelation in an infalible Scripture; the second is that of "sphere-sovereignty," a term that requires some clarification. But the explication of these two principles is in terms of contemporary Western culture, of which the author has a remarkable acquaintance both in extent and in depth. Through an analysis of Western culture, in which he makes perceptive use of the great utopias from Plato's *Republic* to Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, he proposes that the one distinctive and unifying characteristic of the West has been and is the belief that "all deficiencies and injustices can be corrected simply by permitting the state to organize society in terms of its own conception of justice" by means of science and technology. "Life is to be redeemed not by the Messiah but by man" (39). The peculiar nature of the present moment in this civilization is that we now see, at least in immediate prospect if not in full operation, the realization of this vision. But rather than elation and a sense of fulfillment we are revolted and frightened. This prospect is quite the opposite of the promise. In numerous contemporary "utopias in reverse"—"hopelessly pessimistic utopias . . . as somber as a tomb," from *The Time Machine* of H. G. Wells to *Brave New World* by Aldous Huxley and *1984* by George Orwell, our revulsion and anxiety are being expressed. But because these writers do not understand who man is and to what end his life should be devoted, "they are nothing but the rebellious gravediggers of Western civilization" (67).

But these "utopias in reverse" do correctly indicate the tragic tendencies of a society moving toward "the end of days, of the period of the anti-Christ" (168). This destructive tendency is seen both in the structure of society and in the perspective of man. As to the first, we have embraced the fatal fallacy of all utopianism, "organocracy" and its correlate hierarchical structure and power, the essence of totalitarianism, in which the balance between the two necessary principles of any viable social order is destroyed; namely freedom and authority. As to the second, our ethical principles and systems, our systems of beliefs which motivate and control our actions and create our institutions, are derived from a view of human nature and needs in which "the self is the center of thought and the ultimate standard." In this view man chooses himself as the highest value and ultimate goal of existence. In contrast to and correction of this fallacy Christianity calls man to a relation of total responsibility to God (225). This vocation and response is defined by the command of God.

The author undertakes to interpret this ethic in societal terms and to propose measures by which Western society can be turned from its present self-destructive tendencies—in short, measures by which a proper balance can be restored and maintained between authority and freedom. The principle by which this must be done is that of "sphere-sovereignty." This is the guiding concept of a whole school of thinkers of the "Re-reformed" Calvinist Church of Holland. Their progenitor is Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), theologian and founder of the Free University of Amsterdam. Their principal spokesman is H. Dooyeweerd, professor of jurisprudence in this university, who has elaborated the concept in a vast and most impressive system—a kind of *summa* on the order of scholastic systems.[6] This concept is used to express the view that every persistent and significant social unit (*e.g.*, family, labor union, economic enterprise, municipality, nation-state) is rightfully sovereign and

free in its own sphere, having authority over its constituent parts but having no authority over any other sphere. Such spheres are coordinate in sovereignty and never hierarchical. "No particular bearer [of power] on earth is the highest power from which other forms of authority are deduced and derived . . . Each sphere of authority is limited by its own societal relationships" (71). Thus no organism, political, economic, or ecclesiastical, can assert rightful power over any other. But each and all are subject to the majesty of God, from whom sovereignty in essence and in each particular form is derived. What we have thus is a pluralism of autonomous social orders, each properly exercising the imperatives of divine will within its own life.

This leaves unsettled two crucial problems. First, what about the interrelations of these spheres? By what principle and by whose action are jurisdictional disputes to be settled? Van Riessen recognizes that in working out its own responsibility each sphere comes upon demands and conditions valid for other spheres. Economic operations cut into other domains than those of corporations and labor unions. They affect, for example, the family and the state. Thus arise "border line" situations. But the author insists that even here the principle of sphere-sovereignty is still definitive although its application is not unambiguous. "Man is continually placed before such practical decisions" where the answer is not to be found "as if every solution to life's problems were written in a field manual," but without the anchorage of this principle we are driven into structures of hierarchical tyranny or fall into anarchism. The main point of the author is that in every situation the ethical issue is determined by the authority of God and by the societal structure and function involved.

This brings us to the second problem of how to discriminate the command of God given in and for the particular societal situation. Negatively we must reject the humanist view that guiding principles are to be derived from man's desires, ambitions and needs as manifest in such situations. Positively these are to be derived from "the biblical data." Van Riessen realizes that this data cannot provide unambiguous direction and that often, if not always, after "weighing all the factors, a compromise conclusion must be reached" (83). But he holds to a view of biblical literalism and a correlative view that the biblical data itself are unambiguous. This defenseless position is the major defect in an otherwise very informative and enlightening work on Christian social ethics.

Van Riessen is concerned more with how society ought to be structured and administered than with how policy decisions are to be reached. This latter problem is the growing concern of a number of recent writers. Several of these who have come under the influence of H. Richard Niebuhr are elaborating a position called by James Gustafson, one of its proponents, "a contextual, relational Christian social ethics." This characterization is made (p. 123) in an essay on "Christian Ethics and Social Policy," one of several essays published in honor of Dr. Niebuhr by ten of his former students under the title, *Faith and Ethics*. Several of these essays speak directly or indirectly to this problem, and all of them deserve careful reading. For the whole book is a significant contribution to what the editor, Paul Ramsey, calls the "trialogue" which Niebuhr sees going on between "God in relation to man, . . . men in relation to God, . . . men-before-God in relation to each other" (xi). The essay by

6. *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*, by Hermann Dooyeweerd. Translated by William Young, David Freeman and H. de Jongste. Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. Philadelphia. 1953-1957. 4 volumes (Vol. IV has not yet appeared in English). The first volume establishes the epistemological foundations of the system; the third volume elaborates the sociocultural meaning of the system.

Gustafson deals more adequately than any other with this issue, and attention is here confined to it.

The premises of this type of ethic are derived from three sources, indicated by this "trialogue." "One of these is the Christian revelation and faith, a second is an analysis of the self, and a third is an analysis of social structures and processes" (122). Ethical principles, whether derived from reason, natural law or *agape* cannot determine the moral act apart from the character of the actor and his vision of the social situation. The ethical decision emerges out of "patterns of meaning" that have been "internalized" by the actor so that he "operates from subjective (in the existentialist sense) moral truths." But such moral truths, or "conceptions of the good society," usually "are not self-consciously articulated" (128).

The Christian policymaker does not so much focus attention on moral principles or precepts, whether given in Christian faith or by philosophical reflection, as on the social situation when analyzed by one who has "internalized the meaning of Christian revelation in faith" (126). Nor is this meaning to be found in any command, not even that of *agape*, but rather in the whole of "Christian revelation as it illumines the nature of Being in God and creation" (131). Love is significant, but less as a command to be obeyed or an example to be emulated than as a revelation of God's nature and action. There is thus no possibility of a system of Christian ethics; there can only be Christian moral life in "loving and obedient response to God as we are concretely related to our neighbors in personal and institutional relations" (132).

The really crucial problems thus become these two: First, how does one evaluate the social situation? Here one must rely upon the findings of social sciences. Second, how does one, if he is not to be guided in ethical decisions by objective principles or precepts but rather by his own character and conscience, become the kind of self whose "subjective moral truths" are determined by God's being and action revealed in Christian faith and internalized by the actor? Here Gustafson turns for light to recent psychological theories of the emergence of the self, especially the view of G. H. Mead, who argues that "the pattern of meanings" held and collectively represented in the community in which the self matures becomes "the core of the self." Accordingly, the Christian self is seen as being continually reshaped in the Christian community under the impact of the meaning of the gospel incarnate in the life of this community. And these meanings become intuitively his norms for action.

Gustafson is aware that this leaves many issues unsettled and acknowledges that further study may substantially modify this relational ethics. He lists some five of these, each of which is important and to none of which does his suggested solution seem to this reviewer entirely adequate. But space is not allowed for discussion of these. There is a sixth issue implicit throughout this essay and indeed fundamental to all contextualist ethics but not yet adequately studied by any of its exponents. That is the function of moral principles in social analysis and decision. Do we have to reject abstract moral principles as irrelevant to specific action in concrete social situations? The tendency, if not the necessary implication, is to deny real relevance of such principles.

Albert Rasmussen, whose excellent work, *Christian Social Ethics*, was reviewed in these pages earlier (Vol. 18, pp. 200-202), and which stands within this school of contextualism, deals with this issue although somewhat inconsistently. He argues that the "Christian ethic . . . is one neither of rational principles nor pragmatic expediency" (162). It is rather "an ethic of community" and of "responsive love" understood not as a principle or commandment" but as "a kind of self-forgetting

response to others and an identification with them" which is made possible "not by calculation or by a rational sense that [one] ought to love" but by grace (164), in response to which "self-interest is transcended and the good of others becames a decisional focus" (167). The ethical decision made under this "dynamic standard of Christian behavior" is always "contextual and concrete" and hence can never be defined before the existential moment when one is confronted with the actual situation; "it is open and unpredictative concerning what must be done—because every situation is unique" (172).

Here we have surely a necessary and adequate corrective to the systems of ethics proposed by such theologians as Murray and Henry. But a corrective cannot be made the primary postulate of a system, nor indeed can the corrective dispense entirely with the system it would correct. If love motivates one to make "the good of others" his "decisional focus," how is this good to be discriminated? Is it to be discerned under the guidance of scriptural precepts or rational principles? Or if neither, then what? Rasmussen disclaims complete rejection of these: "This does not mean a Christian goes into a situation with no principles, no categories, and no memories" (170). But what principles does he take with him, and whence and how are they to be derived? And how do they operate in the situation?

Rasmussen, following Paul L. Lehmann whom he frequently quotes in this connection,[7] proposes that "Christian ethics is indicative rather than imperative," giving "primary attention to what is." This "what is," however, does not refer to ontology but rather to "God's activity in the world," that is his judgmental and redemptive action in human events and especially in Christ. This surely is an essential emphasis, but it does not answer the insistent questions posed above. And as a matter of fact, Rasmussen's whole work is an affirmation that in race relations, economic life, international affairs and other societal involvements there are certain rather well defined and understood principles that are obligatory on Christians in any situation. These are everywhere implicit in the last half of his book and occasionally explicit. While one must recognize that he did not set himself the task of critically examining these and not judge the book too adversely for this deficiency, nevertheless it would have been a better work had it at least recognized a need for this kind of examination of the source, nature and function of moral principles and categories in any Christian ethic. In view of the fact that exponents of this position are so boldly dialectical in pressing the necessity for maintaining all kinds of tensions in moral decision, one can but wonder why they are so timid in recognizing this dialect between the demands of rational principles and concrete actions.

Faith, Reason, and Moral Principles

Two recent books undertake, as a major part of their task, the correction of this defect. They both seek to relate moral philosophy to Christian ethics and both show the impact of classical theories of ethics, yet not to take their perspective from rational philosophy but from biblical faith. The more recent and smaller work by John A. Hutchison, *The Two Cities*, is based on the postulate that, "The role of moral philosophy . . . is to *elaborate* and *test* religious confessions and moral imperatives" (174). Its role is not to generate such principles. These originate not in rational reflection but are given from two other sources. First, "all basic moral values are essentially postulates of faith" (175). They are given in the "belief system . . . or perspective" that provides the viewpoint from which one sees and relates himself

7. "Foundations and Patterns of Christian Behavior" in *Christian Faith and Social Action*. John A. Hutchison (editor). Charles Scribner's Sons. New York. 1953.

to the world. The premises or assumptions thus given constitute the object of ultimate trust and loyalty on which one acts (16) and so constitute an essentially religious ground. These may be taken from revelation or from natural law. "There are some moral principles which as men we *find* and do not make," as generalizations from human experience; this is the "basic truth [of natural law ethics] that must be held at all costs" (175). But these rational principles are apprehended not by inductive reasoning; they are really religious postulates. Nor can they be imposed as *a priori* norms on any social situation. Insofar as they are normative "they must be combined with statements derived . . . from the social sciences." Moral imperatives derive thus, in the second place, from the social facts.

Christian ethics accordingly arise not from specific commands but from the whole biblical view of man in the world before God. *Love* is the most significant category in this Christian perspective. But "to be effective, love must be elaborated philosophically, and must be related responsibly to social facts" (*ibid.*). Hutchinson does not undertake this philosophical elaboration, except to trace briefly with great competence, the history of moral philosophy in the West. He does undertake to show how it must be related to social facts, especially in political affairs. As the title of his work indicates, he restates the basic position of Augustine in terms relevant for today, and manages to do so with commendable brevity and great clarity.

George F. Thomas accomplishes the task of philosophical elaboration. In *Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy* he states a Christian ethic of love that requires both revealed law and rational principles to define its content. In a hundred pages he gives the freshest and best exposition, in my opinion, of the biblical view of ethics available in recent literature. The distinctive and basic principle of this ethic in the Old Testament is that man's duty and good is to be found in obedience to the will of God expressed in the law. Although in Jesus and the New Testament an ethic of love, and of grace, replaces law, this "does not imply that love is everything and law is nothing" (105). For while Jesus did not give a new law or restate the old, his precepts are illustrative and indispensible in showing "the way love acts." The weakness of moral commands and precepts is not that they fail to express the will of God. The weakness is due to man's sin. Law does give us moral knowledge. What is indicated in the New Testament is thus not an antinomian ethic, or a supernomian ethic. It is still in an important sense an ethic of divine law. But it finds law alone self-defeating, for it has no power to accomplish its own fulfillment. This requires love and grace.

Here Thomas sounds very much like John Murray and Carl Henry. But he moves away from them, and also from Elert, in seeing the law to be much more than an instrument of condemnation. It is a real guide and support to "righteousness [which] fulfills the law . . . motivated by love and exercised in liberty" (102). He argues persuasively that this is the position of Paul, Augustine and Luther. Consistent with this position, Thomas finds (Ch. 17) the strength of moral philosophy in its contributions toward establishing ethics on universally valid principles and its weakness in its inability to provide adequate motivation and power to fulfill its demands. Accordingly he criticizes Brunner and others who, insisting that the requirements of love are unique in every situation, refuse to bring moral principles into the concrete situation lest they and not the "divine command" become definitive.

Thomas would use all moral principles as guides for "the general direction we are to go, not the specific road we are to take" (386). In concrete situations, where always the claims and counter-claims of love are in conflict with each other, if the Christian "refuses to make use of reason to discover and apply such principles, his

obedience to the command of love, however sincere, will be irrational" (388). "Faith and love are an adequate *basis* for all morality," but this is not to say that they "by themselves provide the whole *content* of morality")389). Here is solid foundation, but we must build upon it with all the materials available, including the contributions of philosophical ethics.

The central problem thus becomes, How can the Christian use moral philosophy? And the answer, in a word, is that he must utilize the rich and rewarding philosophical tradition. But all the "insights derived from moral philosophers must be *revised* and if necessary *transformed* in order to make them consistent with faith and love" (391). When one does this he finds that moral philosophy has much to say concerning the nature and conditions of the good life, the meaning of value and virtue and the determination of duties. Much of this excellent work is a demonstration of how this can be fruitfully done, both with respect to personal character and social relations.

As a corrective to the excesses of Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr this is perhaps the most important book on Christian ethics in the last quarter of a century. It presents neither a legalistic nor a perfectionist ethic and sees clearly both the limitations of law and the impairment of man's sins. But it also shows us the value of universal principles and of the possibilities of development toward Christian perfection, based not on the moral capacity of man but on the love and grace of God.

PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT. By John Murray. W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, 1957. 272 pages. Indexes. $3.50.

CHRISTIAN PERSONAL ETHICS. By Carl F. H. Henry. W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, 1957. xi, 615 pages. Indexes and bibliography. $6.95.

THE CHRISTIAN ETHOS. By Werner Elert. Translated by Carl J. Schindler. Muhlenberg Press, Philadelphia, 1957. xi, 451 pages. Bibliography and index. $6.00.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By Georgia Harkness. Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1957. 240 pages. Index. $3.75.

THE RESPONSIBLE CHRISTIAN. By Victor Obenhaus. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957. xi, 219 pages. Bibliography and index. $4.00.

CHRISTIANITY AND WORLD ISSUES. By T. B. Maston. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1957. ix, 374 pages. $5.00.

RESPONSIBLE PROTESTANTISM. By Cecil DeBoer. W. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1957. 247 pages. $3.50.

THE SOCIETY OF THE FUTURE. By H. van Riessen. Translated by David Hugh Freeman. Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., Philadelphia. 320 pages. Index. $4.00.

FAITH AND ETHICS. By Paul Ramsey, editor. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1957. xiv, 306 pages. Bibliography and index. $6.00.

CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS. By Albert T. Rasmussen. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1956. xiii, 318 pages. Index. $4.00.

THE TWO CITIES. By John A. Hutchison. Doubleday and Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1957. 190 pages. $3.50.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY. By George F. Thomas. Charles Scribners' Sons. New York, 1955. 529 pages. Index. $6.00.

Studies by Economists and Theologians

By Victor P. Morris

THE MOST FAR-REACHING influence in our present civilization, touching every phase of our complicated human relationships, economic, political, social, family, educational, and countless others, and contributing heavily to effective living in each area, is the basic message in the teachings of Jesus. An excellent series of volumes on one specific phase of these human problems, namely, on "Ethics and Economic Life," is now appearing, originating in a study committee of the National Council of Churches. While the series is sponsored by the National Council of Churches, it is clearly stated that the volumes do not constitute a pronouncement by the council, but that each author is solely responsible for what appears under his name.

The volumes in the series (Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York) are as follows:

1. *Goals of Economic Life,* by A. Dudley Ward
2. *Christian Values and Economic Life,* by John C. Bennett, Howard R. Bowen, William A. Brown, Jr., and G. Bromley Oxnam
3. *The American Economy—Attitudes and Opinions,* by A. Dudley Ward
4. *American Income and Its Use,* by Elizabeth E. Hoyt, Margaret G. Reid, Joseph L. McConnell, and Janet M. Hooks
5. *Social Responsibilities of the Business Man,* by Howard R. Bowen
6. *Social Responsibility of Farm Leadership,* by Walter W. Wilcox
7. *Social Responsibilities of Organized Labor,* by John A. Fitch
8. *The Organizational Revolution,* by Kenneth E. Boulding

The lines of analysis presented in the volumes clearly show the development of the concepts of social and economic welfare and the creative influence of the Christian message in the American pattern of thought. It should not, however, be assumed that the concepts of social responsibility on the part of economic leaders are of recent origin, even though their development has been taking place most rapidly in recent years. The Constitution of the United States, for example, enumerates as on of its objectives, "to promote the general welfare." While industrial warfare and cut-throat competition persisted long after 1787, still underlying all of our historical development has been the steady pressure toward a better way of living embodied in the term "general welfare." The selection by O. C. Pigou, great English economist, of the title *Economics of Welfare* for his volume on principles of economics shows the over-all trend of thinking.

The University of Oregon produced an outstanding illustration of an early expression of the relationship of economic life to "welfare" and the fundamentals of the Christian message. In 1916, Professor F. G. Young, who at that time had been on the faculty at Oregon for many years, made the following editorial comment in the first issue of a new university publication, *The Commonwealth Review.*

> It would have been strange indeed, if all the study and research in the field of the social sciences prosecuted in the halls of universities during the last quarter of a century had not developed light and purpose, and shaped instrumentalities in the universities available for large public and social service. At the same time among the masses there has been a growing divine discontent calling for a larger realization of the ideal of democracy, and for a stronger imbuing of our industrial organization with the spirit of Christianity.

These volumes sponsored by the National Council of Churches clearly show the development of the concepts of welfare and give a forceful statement of the social responsibility of each factor in our complicated economic organization.

The day in which we live has produced a striking paradox. The changes which have rushed upon us have seemingly been associated with material things. Natural resources, railroads, automobiles, trucks, airplanes, automatic machinery and many other clearly materialistic ideas have dominated much of our development. The paradox is seen in the fact that while our economic developments have been largely in terms of material things, the problems which have been produced are human problems. From the recognition of this paradox has emerged a growing appreciation of the fact that "the ethical problems of economic life are becoming increasingly urgent."

The first volume in the series, *The Goals of Economic Life*, analyzes the fundamental objectives of our economic society. It is significant that statements of goals do not include any reference to "the making of money" except in the analysis of the "profit motive." The goals are all statements of considerations, each worthy in itself, such as, high standard of living, economic progress, stability, security, order, justice, freedom, the development of the individual person, community improvement and national security. These are well stated in the opening volume, and each is in basic harmony with the ideals and life purposes expressed in the great passages of Scripture, including the prophets, but particularly centering in the teaching of Jesus.

The remaining seven books, which have appeared to date, may be readily classified into two groups. The first group is broad in nature, analyzing more general concepts. These are volumes 2, 3, and 4, as listed above. The second group is directed toward the definite responsibilities of specific factors in our industrial structure, volumes 5, 6, 7, and 8, as listed above. The specific groups thus far confronted with their responsibilities are (1) the business man, (2) the farmer, (3) organized labor, and (4) specific organizations of each field of production.

The first group of volumes aids each of us in our understanding of the general structure of our economic life and the ethical problems which inevitably arise out of economic activity.

General Principles

The volume *Christian Values and Economic Life* is an excellent statement of the fact that religious ideals cannot be divorced from any phase of life. At the Amsterdam Assembly, the World Council of Churches emphasized the concept of a *responsible society*. It declared, "man is created and called to be a free being, responsible to God and his neighbor."

Looking ahead to the next half century, increasing intensity of problems is forecast, and stress is placed on the need to use the Christian measuring rod as we confront such economic issues as emerge from the existence of organized groups in our society, the significant decision-making powers of businessmen, inequalities of wealth and property control, the unequal distribution of income and of standards of living, the support of dependents (the aged, the unfortunate), the problems of the *common man*.

After focusing attention upon the human problems that emerge from technical developments, the study emphasizes the clearcut responsibilities for handling human beings as human beings should be handled in the light of our Christian ideals. It is made clear that these responsibilities are both personal (individual) and of a group

nature; that there must be not only responsible individuals but also a responsible society.

In part III of this book, the writer has a convincing statement to the effect that each country (emphasis on the United States) has international responsibilities which cannot be avoided, that in fact there is scarcely a domestic issue that does not have perplexing international implications. Note the following statement; "Solutions of internal problems that appear not only to be reasonable and equitable, but also to provide necessary safeguards against recurrence of social injustice, may and frequently do have international effects that are defensible, neither on economic nor on moral grounds." The point is well-made that elected leaders in a nation like our own (any nation) are charged emphatically with promoting the domestic welfare and hence are not as completely free agents to consider outside interests as is an individual in his own personal actions with others, but that this does not erase the fact that the welfare of underdeveloped and dependent people must be considered.

It is concluded without reservations that since the individual American is a citizen of a country "rich in resources, fortunate in location, endowed with economic, military and political power, and dedicated to concepts of individual liberty and religious freedom," he is faced with international responsibilty "which must be met in the day-to-day conduct of private business."

In the volume *The American Economy—Attitudes and Opinions,* there are reported the results of a study of the judgments of about a thousand persons in eighteen states, in diverse occupations and with various backgrounds.

The attitudes and opinions expressed dealt with the daily work of the individuals, the moral problems attendant thereon, and the solutions to these moral problems. Among the many questions which men and women face in their daily work, the following represent the items examined: why men work, satisfactions and dissatisfactions in work, unions, use of leisure time, retirement, training, security, status. As would be expected, most of those questioned as to motives in their work responded with such items as "earn a better living," opportunities for their children, recreation, and home ownership. It is highly significant, however, that when confronted with questions about any "social significance of their work or its service to the public" most of the respondents were "aware of it and had ready answers." If this was not a basic incentive to them, at least "it was a source of satisfaction." This is very significant.

Both the individual responses and the group discussions showed the moral problems and possible solutions to be fully as complex as the incentives to work, probably even more complex. Honesty, justice, ethics of spending, freedom, plus others, were stated and thought over, and conclusions were weighed. The questions involving the ethics of spending were found to be very thought-provoking. "Does your conscience ever bother you when you buy things? What kind of things? What conditions? Do you ever refuse to buy luxuries, even though you can afford them? Do you ever find yourself upset about getting a lot of things when many people in the world are suffering from hunger, disease and distress? Do you ever do anything about it?"

One is led from the material in the volume to the conclusion that both from an individual point of view and from that of a group analysis, moral problems arising from our "work" are always just beneath the surface of our thinking and are frequently breaking through for open consideration; they probably exert more influence upon decision-making and action than at first glance appears.

Another volume of the series, *American Income and Its Use,* is devoted in a broad way to the problems involved in our income. At this point we are in another complicated area of economics. Income is partly the result of immediate production of good things, partly the result of inherited wealth, and almost always results from very involved relationships of many factors of production. Superimposed upon the basic production of income in terms of tangible commodities and many services are the bewildering influences of a "monetary and banking system" which translates the tangible commodities and the services into the common denominator of "money." The result is that the "sharing" process or "distribution" in the economic sense becomes farther removed from the processes of production, hence, is less immediate and more difficult to appraise in terms of individual "justice."

Careful distinction must be made between "wealth" in the sense of accumulated good things and "income" as resulting from current efforts in production. While one would not wish to stress the point too much, it is true that our respective standards of living are more closely related to the current income than to the accumulated income whether inherited or saved by the possessor himself.

The variations in income from group to group, from region to region in the United States and from nation to nation are described and the changing patterns suggested. Many of the problems resulting from urbanization, industrialization, broken families, changes in family size, and in age groupings are introduced and the moral and social problems resulting are specified together with suggestions as to approaches to the problems involved.

While the analysis is good, a reader probably will be aware of the fact that economists have, over the years, paid all too little attention to the economics of consumption. Characteristics of "needs" and "rights" are brought into focus, and the resultant moral problems for Christians are seen to emerge from the increasing mobility of human beings because of which the closely knit groups (kinship and others) have been more and more difficult to maintain. The writer of part V of the volume says, "The extraordinary degree of both social and spatial mobility enjoyed by individuals during the period of mechanization has resulted in the breakdown of extended kin groups and in the progressive concentrations of populations in cities where opportunities for the establishment of close and continuing social contacts are minimal. The implications are far-reaching in terms of personal, family, and community responsibility." The problems of personal poverty, serious lack of opportunities, attitudes of underdeveloped countries, and others, call not only for personal efforts to alleviate conditions but also for action by the "welfare state." This is a creative and stimulating volume, but one fears that some ideas have not been examined with enough care and study, as for example, the idea that "there has been a growing economic inequality between the United States as a whole and the rest of the world." Comparison of incomes, standards of living, needs, and other features of economic well-being from nation to nation involve so many complex and incomparable considerations as to make positive statements on such a point all but impossible.

The belief that the considerations involved in the ideal of love are not alone drawn from the Christian ethics, but are a requisite of the very nature of human life and the effective fulfillment of a human being is well stated in a quotation from Reinhold Niebuhr: "The ideal of love is not superimposed upon human history by scriptural or any other authority. Human existence, when profoundly analyzed, yields the law of love as the final law of human freedom. Man's unique freedom,

in which he rises indeterminately above his determinate existence, requires that his life be fulfilled not within himself but in others."

Specific Responsibilities

In at least one way the other four volumes of the series are the most significant, or perhaps it would be best to say the most immediately challenging and practical. They pin-point the responsibility on specific types of individuals and groups; namely, the business man, farm leadership, organized labor, and "organized groups" of several kinds.

The first of these four volumes is by Howard R. Bowen and is described by him as follows:

> This book is concerned with the role of businessmen in an economy of free enterprise. Its purpose is to explore the implications of the much discussed "concept of social responsibility" as applied to businessmen. It proceeds from the assumption that the several hundred large business firms are vital centers of power and decision, and actions of these firms touch the lives of the American people at many points. The basic questions considered are: What responsibilities to society may businessmen reasonably be expected to assume? What tangible benefits might result if the concern of many businessmen about the social implications of their work were spread widely throughout the business structure? What steps might be taken, practically, to give greater effect to the broader social aspects of business decisions? What are other basic ethical issues facing American businessmen today?

It is impossible in this brief review to outline his answers to all of these questions, but we can take note of a few of his significant conclusions, which underline first of all the fact that "the businessman occupies a strategic role in American life." His decisions and actions affect our "lives and personalities" in impressive ways. It is pointed out that we can support freedom of businessmen in the decison-making processes only if the process shows itself good for the "general welfare." "Business, like government itself," he says, "is basically 'of the people, by the people, and for the people.'"

Since a major portion of the efforts of economic life is directed toward improving the standard of living, it seems almost axiomatic that the business enterprise is centered on the problems of increasing the output of production, and hence, the businessman directing this sees as almost axiomatic also that nearly all practices which would operate to retard or reduce production are basically undesirable. Here are seen reasons for wide differences in judgment between managment and labor on such matters as shorter hours, labor saving devices, strikes, slowdowns, and others.

An analysis is given as to why businessmen grow more and more concerned with their reponsibilities. Recognizing many shortcomings, the conclusion is, nevertheless, drawn that "remarkable progress has been made, and that most of the new developments have become assimilated into the beliefs and behavior patterns of businessmen," though to state this is not to imply that the millennium has arrived. The growth of these ideals is attributed among other things to (a) the evolution of the social ideals of the American people, "the march of the common man," (b) the labor movement, (c) the influence of government legislation, (d) American business education, and (e) the maturation of the large corporation.

A very valuable part of the volume is a brief description of some concrete proposals as to what might be done to create a steady improvement and to maintain such gains as are achieved:

(1) "The composition of boards of directors could be consciously modified to include one or more directors who represent the points of view of workers, suppliers, consumers, the local community, or the "general public."

(2) Provision might be made for some section of management, say one or more vice-presidents or assistant managers to be named who would be especially trained to give direction to the social responsibilities of the enterprise.

(3) "Would a "social audit" be possible?" asks the author.

> Just as businesses subject themselves to audits of their accounts by independent public-accountant firms, they might also subject themselves to periodic examination by independent outside experts who would evaluate the performance of the business from the social point of view. The social auditors would make an independent and disinterested appraisal of a company's policies regarding prices, wages, research and development, advertising, public relations, human relations, community relations, employment stabilization, etc.

(4) Provision might be made for better economic and social education of the managers.

(5) Frequent participation of managers in phases of government may be useful. "An important influence in the social orientation of businessmen has been their increasing acquaintance with government and its problems."

(6) Another suggestion is for a further extension of publicity, voluntary largely, about the affairs of the corporations.

(7) Beginnings have already been made in the formulation of "business codes." These might well be extended.

In addition to the above suggestions, an appraisal is made of the strength and weakness of a few named proposals; such as, "The Industry Council Plan," "The Goyder Plan," and "Advisory Councils."

The suggestion is made in an overall appraisal of all such plans that "the proposals will be most useful which involve research, education, voluntary action by businessmen, and consultation among interest groups on broad questions of national economic policy and on basic ethical principles for the conduct of private business."

The volume on "Farm Leadership" singles out for special attention the American farmer. To a major degree this volume is devoted to a good description of various aspects of that complex economic mass which we customarily refer to as the "farm problem." Parity, price stabilization, surplus, exports, low incomes, hired workers, migratory workers, land tenure, soil conservation, farmer's organizations, credit conditions, and many other elements are brought to attention and well-described. A lesser portion of the material is really devoted to the moral and ethical issues raised. It at least appears that the ethical problems are treated more from the viewpoint that "agriculture is different" and hence, must be handled differently, than from the general viewpoint of social or public welfare. Relatively few specific "social responsibilities" in the same formal sense as treated in the case of "businessmen" are analyzed. The following passage is taken from the exploratory first chapter of this Farm Leadership book:

> In this study of social responsibility in farm leadership, a large and important sector of our economy is directly involved.
>
> The tradition persists that the people who produce essential food and fiber, even though they are now a minority, have a right nevertheless to exert a strong, collective influence in state or national government. And they do. With their organizations and leadership, not only the special problems of agriculture but also related problems of wider range are brought within the scope of discussion and action—right down at the grass-roots as well as in state and national gatherings. And they bring

> to a consideration of these problems resources of information and understanding that were not available a few years ago. With increased information and improved communication facilities, a broader sense of social responsibility may be expected of farm leadership. Farm leaders may gain influence by including in their concern not only the problems of the particular groups they represent but also the social and economic problems of all agricultural groups. They also may be expected to be increasingly sensitive to the welfare of the whole economy.

It will be observed in the quotation that emphasis is on what may be expected in the way of a sense of responsibility developing in the future, rather than upon such as may now have emerged.

The next volume points the finger of responsibility at organized labor. Here a broad statement is first made of the fact that in view of its functions a labor union recognizes the existence of obligations to its members, to other workers, to employers, and to the community.

Says the author,

> In all of these relationships the obligations are reciprocal. While we are concerned here with the responsibilities of unions it must not be overlooked that unions do not stand alone as inheritors of obligations. They, like all other groups, will be able to discharge their responsibilities to the fullest extent only in an atmosphere in which the element of mutuality in such relationships is recognized.
>
> We shall here be giving attention both to rights and to obligations.

Much excellent material is offered descriptive of unions, their objectives and their functions. The chapter on union objectives is concerned entirely with member rights and privileges and not at all with the interests of other groups or of the community or society as a whole. On the other hand, in a chapter on "Organized Labor and the Public" some consideration is given to the place of labor organization as a part of the general public. George Meany, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. is quoted as follows; the trade-union movement "has for its sole, definite, and single purpose the advancement of the welfare and interest of the great mass of workers who are part of this movement," that it has "no other reason for existence than the job . . . of advancing the interests and welfare of its members." Further along, however, Mr. Meany says: "As we face the future . . . we should give some sober thought to the kind of world that we live in, to the problems we have at home and the problems that we have abroad." Nothing could better illustrate the ethical dilemma confronting all economic groups.

There follows specific reference to a substantial number of broad public interests, the impact of strikes, violence, political action and other matters.

In a sense the author summarizes in a "final word." He says,

> To sum up, what shall we say about organized labor's discharge of its responsibilities? The record is neither wholly positive nor wholly negative. Some of the practices here noted are to be condemned, and are increasingly condemned in labor circles as well as elsewhere. Other courses of action are deserving of praise. The fraternal spirit engendered by men working together for their common good is one of the finest fruits of trade unionism.

The final volume in this review—though not the most recent in publication date is entitled *The Organizational Revolution* and is by Kenneth E. Boulding with comments by Reinhold Niebuhr.

The volume first presents in an able way the nature, causes and effects of the impressive growth of organizations of every kind and description, ranging over all aspects of economic and other phases of life. Emphasis is placed upon the dilemmas created by the growth of organizations, dilemmas resulting from the "two-sidedness"

of all organizations, since every organization exhibits two faces—"a smiling face it turns to its members and a frowning face which it turns to the world outside."

Among specific organizations whose growth is described and whose dilemmas are analyzed are labor groups, farm groups, business organizations, American Medical Association, and national governments. These would be samples of literally thousands of separate specific organizations. It is pointed out that our thinking on the problems resulting from organization and the moral and ethical issues involved probably is lagging behind the growth itself of these organizations, which growth constitutes a veritable "revolution." "Ethics" is concerned mainly with the standards by which conduct is judged, the conduct, in this situation, of individuals in their roles as responsible directors of organizations.

The many complexities involved, even in each particular organization, result in the fact that "some unions, co-ops, cartels, etc. are good and some are bad, or that some aspects of unions, co-ops, cartels, etc. are good and some are bad."

After careful study of this volume it seems reasonable to conclude that we are just in the beginning stages of thinking through the moral and ethical impacts of the spectacular growth of organizations.

Conclusion

Portions of the total study, comprehended within these eight volumes, are largely from the economist's point of view and portions from the church point of view, primarily Protestant. Economic goals cannot be separated from the goals of life; economics and Christian philosophy must recognize their reciprocal relationship. They are inextricably intermingled since both proceed out of the behavior of individual men and women.

The lists of goals used in these volumes are necessarily arbitrarily chosen; there are not necessarily eleven of them (as in one section) since they might have been classified, described or weighted differently. Indeed, when some of this material is analyzed ten or twenty years hence, many shifts in emphasis will have occurred, but one clear fact will remain, ably stressed in the total expression of these studies, namely that the forces of the Christian message and the resultant experiences must have increasing influence in the economic life of the world.

These studies give no clear "blue-prints" for action but rather a "frame of reference" within which individuals and organizations will reach their conclusions. It is at the specific moments of decision-making that men must call into use their basic moral standards.

This review may well close with two brief quotations taken from comments by John C. Bennett included in the volume *Christian Values and Economic Life.*

> The Christian should not assume that, as a Christian, he has any short cut to the solution of economic problems. Instead he should be driven by his faith to work with economists to find the best solutions available. And he should have in view the effects of those solutions that are most likely to be seen by economists as well as those effects that he is best prepared to judge by his understanding of Christian thought. It is with this purpose and in this spirit that economists and theologians in this series address themselves to the same problem.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> One of the remarkable aspects of this study is the extent to which those who have specialized in Christian theology and ethics find themselves in agreement with the economists who are their colleagues in the study. There are differences of emphasis among the economists themselves, as there are between the economists and the theologians; but the emergence of a large area of common convictions is the chief impression that this study as a whole makes upon this reader.

What Is the Best Guide to Ethical Value?

By Lewis S. C. Smythe

ETHICAL VALUE. By George F. Hourani. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1956. 233 pages. Notes and index. $4.50.

ONE POPULAR SONG asks "Are you satisfied?" That pleasing lyric expresses the key note of George F. Hourani's book on *Ethical Value*. In this clear and comprehensive work he relentlessly carries out his philosophical analysis of the concepts of value and concludes that "intrinsic good" is a matter of "individual satisfaction," which he says is "a 'feeling quality' of ends of all kinds." (p. 36). He then introduces the social side of his eudaemonism by saying that the "total good" is a matter of "maximum satisfaction of everyone, combined with just distribution."

Professor C. Eugene Conover of Lindenwood College has made a good summary of Hourani's argument in *The Christian Century* for November 27, 1957, and ends his review with the request for "new statements of intuitionism." Consequently, I will attempt here to describe an alternative theory which I hope will be accepted as Christian.

Some phases of life can be measured by satisfaction; but the highest good cannot be so easily measured. Really, utilitarianism is a good test of all social institutions as recognized by Jesus: "The sabbath was made for man and not man for the sabbath." In other words, the whole purpose of social institutions is to satisfy the wishes of mankind. But for the individual there is still the further question, "What is best for the individual to desire?" Then when the desires of many individuals change, the social institution must change to satisfy those desires. The conservative and the liberal seem to differ only as to how far social institutions should lag behind changing desires. And both agree that social institutions should not be at the whim of too few individuals. Segregation of the races in the United States is passing because the majority of the people want it to pass; the Supreme Court merely took note of the shift in majority opinion.

But what *should* the individual desire in order to achieve the best life? Satisfaction is one measure but not the only one. An apple is appetizing. But how many persons want to pick an apple out of a garbage can and eat it? How many want to eat the last available apple and let a little child they love go hungry? How many will struggle for years to discover how to grow more apples than they themselves can ever eat in order that other people's children may have enough apples to keep the doctor and the undertaker away? Does the man who discovers how to grow more apples do it for "satisfaction" or because he responds to a creative process that drives him to the ends of the earth seeking a solution to his problem? In this process of discovery he must continually yield to new, unimagined, and undesired solutions. Changing the area of creative activity, we might ask does the author write the poem or does the poem *use* the poet as an instrument of expression? To creative people the question of "satisfaction" is often a less worthy afterthought: "Who is going to get credit for the discovery?"

While altruistic love of others alone does not seem to produce creativity, on the other hand the presence of genuine concern for others frees the discoverer and creator from his own vested interests that stand in the way of seeing the solution.

And when the good of all mankind is at stake, a compelling concern for the good of all will direct creativity to that end rather than to the destruction of the human race. Usually the creative lover of mankind is *not* satisfied with yesterday's achievement; he is already pressing on to another discovery.

It is along these lines that I would answer Professor Hourani's statement: "I hope I have shown that there is nothing in Christianity which prevents a believer from accepting an ethical theory of the kind I have put forward. Of course he may be convinced of an intuitionist theory. Intuitionism has in fact been strongly favored by Christian philosophers. But I see no reason why it must be so" (p. 208). Neither do I, except that any new hypothesis about the nature of the world and the nature of the good man, even utilitarian theory, was originally an intuition in the mind of some human being. The question is not whether it arises as an intuition. The decisive difference is whether the intuition is put to the test of human living. In the words of Jesus, "By their fruits ye shall known them." But the test is not only whether it is empirical, as Hourani claims utilitarianism is, but rather how has it worked out in human history. A further test according to Josiah Royce is: "Works for *what?*" Does it work for satisfaction of the individual and his group? Or does it work for the creative good of all mankind? Some servants of mankind are fortunate enough to get a great deal of wholesome satisfaction in their life time by seeing the fruits of their labors. Others, however, go down in suffering, persecution, and death. The test is what good they create for others; *not* how much satisfaction they get out of it.

The keen reader asks, "But what is the good of others?" I would say an awakening of their creative impulse and of their appreciation that they share the fate of all mankind.[1] In that devotion to creative good I would include pursuit of truth, love of beauty, and the capacity for happiness.[2]

Professor Hourani makes a thorough and honest attempt to defend "Social Eudaemonism," which he thinks is descriptive, unitary, naturalistic, objective, affective, and universal. In a concluding chapter, entitled "Ethical Disagreement," he takes on the challenges of "Liberalism and socialism," "Communism," "Shinto," "Judaism," "Islam," "Christianity," and "Aristocratic ethics." His honesty is shown especially at the end of his chapter on "Total Good" where he takes up the problem for the "satisfaction" school "provided by the pleasure which various publics have taken in the sight of a criminal being executed" (p. 92). Hourani concludes, "I leave this problem unsolved" (p. 95). In the alternative theory that I have tried to suggest, I would part company with Hourani at the crossroads he marks "affective" and choose to look into the richness of meaning of any act for all human living. Pleasure at seeing people executed would then readily be ruled out of the area of ethical value. A more meaningful reaction would be: "There, but for the grace of God, go I."

1. I agree with Hourani and Wieman that the "good" is more inclusive and fundamental than the "right." But I think that Wieman's description of the operation of "Creative Good" is more adequate guidance for man's achievement of the highest good in this universe than Hourani's criterion of "satisfaction," even though he refines the concept very well. See Henry Nelson Wieman, *The Source of Human Good* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946).

2. For a defense of the reality of these values, see: C. E. M. Joad, *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938), chapter on "A Theory of Good or Value." Also George F. Thomas, *Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), chapter 20. "Values."

Religious Foundations of Law

By James A. Huston

RELIGION, MORALITY AND LAW. Edited by Arthur L. Harding. Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1956. x, 109 pages. $3.00.

THIS SMALL VOLUME is a collection of four interesting and sometimes provocative lectures given at the 1955 annual Conference on Law in Society at Southern Methodist University. Its theme is a statement made by Sir Alfred Denning, Lord Justice of the Court of Appeal in England: "Without religion there can be no morality: and without morality there can be no law."

In the first essay Robert E. Fitch, dean of the Pacific School of Religion, addresses himself to the question, "Can there be morality without religion?" At the outset Dean Fitch frankly gives his answer to this question as an emphatic "no." Holding that all prevailing systems of morality, whether or not they admit it, are in fact rooted in religion, he insists that the humanistic ethic at its best is the tool of a religious ethic. It is suggested that there are five paramount values representing the principal ethical traditions—pleasure, power, duty, wisdom, love—of which the last three are found always to be related in some way to religion; the only consistent secular moralities, he states, are those of pleasure and of power, and these always have failed.

Some of the argument presented here, it seems to me, fails to close the circle, so to speak, and is open to attack on its own terms merely by a shift in point of view or assumptions. Dean Fitch states with a great deal of emphasis, for instance, that purely secular political ethics is totalitarian. Here he joins with other recent writers who have discovered in Rousseau the philosophical godfather of today's "people's democracies." To say that "the writings of Rousseau have deceived several generations of political scientists into believing that he was a champion of democracy" seems to me to take too lightly the views of several generations of political scientists, and to arrive at strained historical connections. Yes, of course, collectivism may be found in Rousseau, but have his writings had a real impact on political thought behind the iron curtain? Surely he did have some influence on the French democracy, and whatever weaknesses it has exhibited, it has evolved into a system which above all has been individualistic and libertarian.

In the *Social Contract* and other writings of Rousseau, Dean Fitch writes, one may see the signs of totalitarianism: the disdain for private property, the disregard of minority rights, the insistence upon a single political party, the theory of an initial lawgiver of superhuman proportions. But can not those same signs be found too in the Christian Scriptures and in the tradition and history of the Christian church—the injunctions to sell property and give to the poor, the attempt at communal living, the persecution of heretics, the insistence upon orthodoxy, the giving of the tables of the law through Moses?

Or again, when Nazi Germany and Communist Russia are held up as examples of what happens in states governed under humanist ethics, would it not be just as fair to point to the Russia of the Christian czars, or the Italy of Mussolini, or the Spain of Franco as examples of Christian ethics in statecraft?

Whether or not morality is essential to law depends very much upon one's definitions of "morality" and "law." It is with these definitions that Professor Arthur L. Harding of the Southern Methodist School of Law primarily concerns himself in the second essay. He regards law as a social institution which should be considered, "not in terms of source, nor in terms of form, but in terms of the functions which it performs in the society." Then he concludes that in the legislative process, in the sanction of law, and in the interpretation of law, the essential frame of reference is morality. Still it seems to me there are some rather more serious questions which are left unattended. One is the question of "legislating private morals." Another is the question of putting law in the framework of a broader morality in practical application. It has become common for some people to assume that anything is all right as long as it is "legal." Any practice then may be approved so long as there is "no law against it." At the same time, legislatures sometimes are given to legalized plunder of the public treasury or of natural resources. Finally there is the age-old question, what should a person do when confronted by a law which is contrary to his conscience?

In the third essay Wilber G. Katz, professor of law at the University of Chicago, turns to a more specific question: Christian morality and the criminal law. This he examines from the viewpoint of classical Protestantism, taking as his point of departure the summary of the purposes of the law given in the Lutheran Formula of Concord. The whole approach goes contrary to the common view that responsibility is a matter of moral blameworthiness, and moral blameworthiness inheres in a free choice of evil. Here punishment is not looked upon as a penalty for a free choice of evil—a position which becomes more difficult to defend as all kinds of social and psychological factors come to be accepted as "causing" crime—and consequently limiting the free choice of the criminal. On the contrary, the law, and punishment, become elements to deter the unregenerate. As Justice Holmes is quoted as writing: "If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged (or electrocuted) I should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But the law must keep its promises."

A second use of the law, in this view, is as a summons to repentance; this is its ultimate purpose. Finally, it has the additional purpose of providing a guide for regenerate men.

The final essay is a theological analysis of natural law by Joseph D. Quillian, Jr., professor of homiletics at Southern Methodist University. Here the attempt is made to resolve historical divergencies between doctrines of Christian theology—particularly to include Protestantism—and of natural law. Professor Quillian arrives at two basic principles of Christian natural law: the benevolent sovereignty of God, and the responsibility of men.

Here there appears to be some difficulty in reconciling the ideas of the preceding lecture. There criminal law was not regarded as assuming free choice of evil. Here Professor Quillian says, "If man's freedom and hence his responsibility were removed, then all talk of ethics would be nonsense, and in Christian ethics, in which love and sin alike posit freedom, it would be nonsense to the nth degree."

All of these, of course, are questions which require a lot of hard thinking. For persons willing to take them on, it is recommended that this collection of lectures not be passed by.

A Christian Called to Politics

By Noel Salter

WORLD INDIVISIBLE WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: A SELECTION FROM DR. ADENAUER'S SPEECHES, 1949-1955. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1956. 128 pages. $2.75.

THE ATTITUDE taken by Konrad Adenauer to the recent protest of leading German scientists against the possible use of nuclear weapons by German troops, has given rise to a renewal of criticisms which have often been made in the past ten years concerning Europe's elder statesman. The German chancellor is accused of authoritarianism, of over-simplification of complex issues, of pursuing a policy calculated to perpetuate the division rather than re-establish the unity of his country.

It is therefore a salutary exercise to read in a good translation what the German chancellor has said in his speeches, during the years in which he has been in office, concerning the great issues of the day. To have one's speeches thus scrutinized constitutes a severe test for any public man.

Your reviewer, having subjected these speeches to a series of cross analyses on the key topics, has had brought home to him forcibly how well they stand up to this treatment. There is an element of massive consistency, and the whole impression is one not of the simplicity of those who do not understand, but the simplicity of a statesman who has known how to direct his people's attention unfalteringly to the critical choices.

The theme which recurs most often in the fifteen speeches quoted, which range in time from the foundation of the Federal Republic in September 1949 until the end of 1955, is the conception of a United Europe. American readers will find Dr. Adenauer's perspective concerning United Europe reassuring, for it suggests that their own attitude towards this question since the end of the second European civil war has not been as naive as clever diplomatists have sometimes tried to make out: it is not a question of analogies with the drawing-up of the American Federal Constitution, but rather of seeing the wood for the trees. How does the German Chancellor describe the issue?

The first thing is that he places the movement towards a United Europe firmly in its world framework. "The newly formed Community of the West will constitute a living example of practical neighbourly union, at first only in the West, but with time, possibly in the whole world" (p. 99). The purpose of "the great movement of our time" (p. 7) is not only common defence, but "in order that we may mutually promote the aims which make life worth living for human beings. Only in peace can man unfold his personality in freedom, and only a free personality can continue to develop, serving himself and those near and dear to him towards a richer life and a deeper faith in his God" (p. 99). This nobility of aim shines through all Dr. Adenauer's other considerations concerning a United Europe, whereby alone can be achieved, he believes, "the salvation of the Christian West" (p. 51).

The first purpose of European union, "the glorious, ultimate goal" is the "ending of future European wars" (p. 51). In this sense the European Coal and Steel Community was welcomed by Dr. Adenauer in 1951 as "marking the final end of centuries of hostility which have brought untold suffering on Europe" (p. 12). The

Soviet menace does not appear to him as the sole factor, but he does feel that unless the dam across Europe holds firm, Western Christian civilization will disappear. In this dam "Germany lies at the very mid-point" (p. 50), and one of the striking things to a non-German reader is the strength of Dr. Adenauer's faith that Germany's "historic mission in this era" is to make its contribution to building a United Europe. In particular he sees this task as "affording a great mission to German youth" (p. 7).

On the issue of a so-called "Vatican Europe," in which Roman Catholic forces would predominate, the chancellor is aware of the danger, but equally cannot as a practical politician be blamed for appreciating the benefits to Europe which the existence of these progressive, middle-of-the-road Catholic parties have conferred since the war. No Protestant will cavil at the sight of Dr. Adenauer kneeling at mass in Strasbourg cathedral together with Alcide de Gasperi and Robert Schuman, as occurred in 1952. These men, all born in ancient Lotharingia, belonging to the generation which grew to maturity before the First World War, found in their supranational religious ties a powerful help towards that mutual trust without which a political Europe cannot be built. Protestants in Europe have need to look into their own consciences to see why the Protestant churches have not made as great a contribution towards a United Europe as has the Roman Catholic Church. A passage on page 14 of the book provides food for thought in relation to these issues.

On the equally debated issue of whether Europe should seek to constitute a "Third Force," Dr. Adenauer has some wise things to say. He reminds us that the purpose of building a United Europe is not to regain world hegemony: "Europe need never again seek to regain its old power," but "henceforth has another greater mission, that of preserving Western culture for all humanity" (p. 52). The foreign policy of a United Europe would always be "unalterably opposed to war, because they have had enough of it, and because by virtue of a United Europe's structure it could never be an aggressor" (*ibid.*). Dr. Adenauer does not hesitate to state with blunt clarity that he sees the basis of a United Europe as a federal one, in which the national rivalries of the past will be ended, but in which the valuable differentiation of each nation's contribution to the whole will be preserved.

That this theme of a United Europe could have occupied so large a proportion of Dr. Adenauer's speeches reflects the political fact that after the war the majority of the German people saw in this idea the one hope of the future. That it has not been possible to proceed as fast as many of us hoped and worked for, has discouraged the German people as it has discouraged the other peoples of Europe. The revival of German economic power has also come to the fore, in making some Germans feel that there may be an alternative policy of independence or even of "playing off" East against West. Your reviewer has always felt that the press has tended to seize on any irresponsible statement made by a West German politician on these matters with the same misplaced optic as has accorded headline coverage to even the flimsiest evidence of a recrudescence of Naziism. Dr. Adenauer rightly puts these things in perspective. But where the policy for which the German chancellor stands—of a Germany irrevocably part of a united West—might conceivably come to political shipwreck, would be if his fellow citizens ever felt that it hindered rather than helped the cause of German reunification.

Now reunification is not a theme which stimulates ready emotional sympathy among the peoples which were occupied by Hitler's Germany. The union of Prussia's military traditions with Ruhr industrial resources provided the power basis of two attempts at world conquest. Some therefore would like to know more of German motives when they call loudly for reunification. Could it be that thus a new

power basis would be established for Germans different from Dr. Adenauer to use? Never would Germany have been given back so much so quickly if it had not been into his hands that it was placed, but who comes after? It would clearly be unwise to sacrifice for German reunification one iota of European security, and in any case we do not see why the enslavement of the East Germans is more heartrending than the enslavement of the Czechs. Such views are not without echo in Europe.

These themes are the subject of controversy and difference of opinion. What is important to remember is that nearly everyone in Western Germany has a sister or a father or some other relation living under the Soviet yoke, and this yoke involves the forcible "Sklavisierung" of towns which belong to the warp and the woof of Europe's heritage, such as Leipzig or the Koenigsburg of Immanuel Kant. The desire for reunification is a most human and natural one, and it is a disservice to the Western cause to read exaggerated theories into German motives. For Dr. Adenauer German reunification will proceed not from the weakness of the West but from its strength. The first essential is that Soviet Russia "should observe that she can get nowhere by either hot or cold war. Then she will ask herself whether it is worthwhile sinking the greater part of our manpower and capital and war industries" (p. 97). When the Soviet Union has understood this they will be prepared to talk seriously of withdrawal from Eastern Germany—and here Dr. Adenauer accepts the position which is the basis of Anglo-Saxon policy—it would never be accepted by the Western powers that Soviet troops should withdraw 300 miles into Poland and American troops withdraw 3,000 miles. "Neutralization" is no alternative since "the Germans would live in constant fear of future developments and sooner or later would succumb to the suction of the Eastern bloc" (p. 57). In the event of war, Germany "would inevitably become a battlefield, for paper neutrality means nothing at all." To all this Dr. Adenauer opposes the will of the German people to regain unity, not by force, but by negotiation. One of the most moving passages in the book is where he describes his visit to Berlin, after the events of 17th June, 1953, when the brave inhabitants of the city proved that nothing could crush their resolve to obtain the "Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit" of the third stanza of the Deutschlandlied.

With regard to the Soviet Union itself, the metaphor of a bulwark is constantly recurring in the speeches, even with reference to the period before 1914 (p. 17). To Dr. Adenauer Soviet Russia is "Christianity's deadliest and most terribly enemy" (p. 39). He knows that "with Germany once secured, the rest of Western Europe would soon fall into her hands and she might feel strong enough to risk war against the United States" (pp. 41-42). Time and time again the chancellor comes back to the theme that it is only by strength that the Soviet Union can be made to understand, and that thereafter one may legitimately hope to reach a settlement by negotiation.

In all these things possible criticism should be moderated by the long time scale of the German chancellor's view. In his years of enforced inactivity under the Nazi regime, he had ample time for reflection (p. 87), and it cannot be said that the chancellor is an old man in a hurry. While sensing the winged chariots, he still can see events on a time-scale far outlasting his own life. To Dr. Adenauer, as to so many others, the defeat of the European Defense Community was a most terrible blow. Yet barely three years afterwards there are reasonable grounds for hoping that the French National Assembly will ratify the treaties setting up Euratom and the European Common Market. How much better to found unity on economic interests than on the too abrupt affront to national sentiment, one may now reflect. But to have carried on the fight after that bitter night of 30th August, 1954, required

not only long vision, but faith. It is this faith that is evident in every speech in this book. Ultimately, it is the faith of a Christian called to work in politics. His achievement in the past ten years has no parallel, for the contrast between the Germany in ruins of 1945 and the Germany of to-day is unique. It has not, of course, been all the work of one man, but Dr. Adenauer has embodied many of those qualities of the German people which made the recovery possible. Certainly the Allied Powers have granted to Dr. Adenauer what they would have granted to no one else, and today, Dr. Adenauer has an unrivalled position among Europe's statesmen. This judgment however we may leave to the historians, as we may leave the judgment of politics in the narrow sense. Perhaps the most significant thing about Dr. Adenauer is that he has based his life's work in the political sphere upon his Christian principles, and stands to his fellows, who may in the new Tolstoyanism be tempted to underrate the part played by individuals in determining historic events, or who may hesitate to sacrifice their talents in the aridity of secular politics, as an example of "how much the weight of one just man can do."

COMMUNIST-CHRISTIAN ENCOUNTER

in East Europe

By ROBERT TOBIAS, Th. D.

A 2-in-1 volume of documentation and analysis of the struggle between Communists and Christians in 9 countries of East Europe, with implications, theological, and practical, for the Church universal.

"Nowhere else within comparable compass is so full and authoritative a conspectus of this historical development to be found . . . informative and exciting . . . an invaluable sourcebook. It should hold equal interest for the general reader and the specialized student."

—PRES. HENRY P. VAN DUSEN.

"No library which attempts to provide materials for the study either of the Communist challenge to western civilization or of contemporary Christianity can afford to miss this book, and no serious writer in this field can fail to take its data and conclusions into account."

—HAROLD E. FEY, *Christian Century*

655 pp. **$8.00**

SCHOOL OF RELIGION PRESS

Butler University, Indianapolis 7, Indiana, U. S. A.

Kolbe's Criticism of Revelation-Claims

By E. D. Klemke

I HAVE NOTED WITH INTEREST Professor Henry E. Kolbe's paper, "The Criticism of Revelation-Claims."[1] The author is greatly concerned about the need to apply logical criteria to revelation-claims, and, indeed, I believe that he would add, to all kinds of discourse, including his account of the criticism of revelation-claims.

1. *Encounter*, XVIII (Winter, 1957).

However, it is quite apparent that Professor Kolbe's own use of language violates certain logical rules, and I am a bit perplexed as to what sort of logic he is espousing. If it is a logic which allows one to affirm contradictories, then it is certainly a peculiar kind of logic. For the logic I know holds that two contradictory statements cannot *both* be affirmed. One must be true, and the other must be false. Yet Professor Kolbe's logic seems to allow him to perform such astonishing feats as the affirmation of contradictories. Let us see some examples.

Professor Kolbe wishes to affirm the possibility of criticizing revelation-claims. Such a criticism is necessary, he believes, unless we are willing to allow that every such claim must be accepted as true. This would make for confusion, since we are all aware of the fact that not all revelation-claims are mutually compatible. Revelation, in order to be criticizable, must be "relative to experience" and "in one of its necessary dimensions, emerges from experience." In revelation, then, no "wholly new truth" can be presented. "The content of revelation is in significant degree contingent upon and relative to past experience." However, even if no *new* truth is presented in revelation, nevertheless, some truth is given. There are certain "propositions of religious revelation," according to Professor Kolbe.

The following assertions are made in or entailed by the above remarks. Some truth is presented in revelation. Since truth is a function of propositions, as Professor Kolbe himself points out, it follows that some true sentences are given in the revelation experience. However, no completely new truth is presented in revelation. The sentences given in revelation must deal with matters about which we already know something, otherwise we could not even begin to understand the sentences, let alone criticize them. The sentences, being contingent upon and relative to past experience, are thus of the nature of sentences which we normally utter. This is what allows them to be criticizable. Wholly esoteric truths would be impossible to criticize.

We may thus find two theses stated in the first part (and certain later paragraphs) of Professor Kolbe's paper:

(1) *Some truth is presented in revelation*, or
Some true sentences are presented in revelation.
(2) *No completely new truth is presented in revelation.*

(I have stated the first thesis in an alternate form, because it is discussed in both forms in Professor Kolbe's paper).

So far, so good. But now Professor Kolbe goes on to say,

> The inescapably empirical connections of the revelational experience do not imply, however, that the revelation must be explicable wholly or simply in terms of empirical categories. There would be no distinctive meaning to revelation if this were the case.

> In the very nature of revelation . . . there is an element of mystery . . . Although that which is known in and through revelation may, after the event, be described empirically, at least in significant degree, it is neither reducible to nor deducible from prior empirical data . . . That which is made known in the revelational experience is related to and in a sense emerges from previous knowledge and experience, but is not wholly describable nor predictable on the basis of a knowledge of that past experience alone. Until the new level of understanding which it represents is realized, there are no adequate canons or criteria which would guarantee the discovery of that which is given in revelation.

As an illustration, Professor Kolbe cites Peter's recognition of Jesus as the Christ. Peter's understanding of the truth of this assertion did not come "through logical deduction from natural experience" but "from God, or through revelation."

The peculiar use of language in the above statements boils down to the following: Some completely new truth is presented in revelation. The sentences made known in the revelation experience are not wholly contingent upon and related to past experience. New canons and criteria are needed because of a new level of understanding that is involved. If no new truths were presented, one could not even speak of a revelation. We thus find a new thesis stated here, which I shall call (2').

(2') *Some completely new truth is presented in revelation.*

Need I point out that theses (2) and (2') are contradictory?

But we encounter further confusion. Professor Kolbe goes on to say that there are no "revealed truths" but only "truths of revelation," or "propositional statements describing that which is apprehended in the revelational experience itself. What is given in the revelation is not propositions about God or Christ . . . but 'confrontation' with God or with Christ."

The thesis of this section of Professor Kolbe's remarks thus is:

(1') *No truth is presented in revelation,* or
No true sentences are presented in revelation.

(In the second formulation, it must be added that not only are no *true* sentences presented, but no sentences at all). Once again, it is obvious that (1) and (1') are contradictory.

It is thus clear that Professor Kolbe has at least twice committed a serious logical error, namely, the assertion of two statements which are contradictory. In the logician's traditional square of opposition, A and O statements are contradictory, as are E and I statements. Professor Kolbe's theses (1) and (2') are instances of I statements, and theses (1') and (2) are instances of E statements. Professor Kolbe affirms both (1) and (1') which are contradictories, and (2) and (2') which are likewise contradictories.

If this sort of logic which Prof. Kolbe employs is the kind by which he would perform the criticism of revelation-claims, then certain grave implications follow. If logic is to be useful in criticizing revelation-claims (or any other claims) it can hardly be a logic which permits the assertion of two contradictory statements. For such a logic cannot by its very nature criticize revelation-claims, since the allowance of contradictories in one's "logic" vitiates any effort to point out contradictories in the revelation claims. Thus there would be no sense in trying to distinguish mutually incompatible claims. In other words, if A asserts *p*, and B asserts *not-p*, and both *p* and *not-p* are simultaneously allowable, what is there to criticize, from a logical standpoint? Certainly, if the application of logical criticism to revelation-claims (or any other kind) is to make sense, it can only be accomplished by the refusal to

accept logical contradictoriness. This means that there can by the nature of the case be only one logic (although the symbolism, etc. may vary), and, further, that one cannot violate the rules of this one logic and make sense.

Apart from the contradictoriness of Professor Kolbe's remarks, I should like to address several questions to him with respect to the meaningfulness of certain assertions.

(1) If some true sentences are given in revelation, what are some of these sentences? If no sentences are given in revelation, what is "that which is made known" in revelation (a favorite phrase of Professor Kolbe's)?

(2) Sentences must be written or spoken by means of some symbols, sounds, or motions. If sentences are given in revelation, in which form are the sentences communicated? Are they spoken or written? If no sentences are given in revelation, by what communicatory device is the revelation conveyed: grunts, groans, whistles, flashing lights, or what?

(3) In order for sentences or truths to be asserted, either in written or spoken form, there must be an asserter. If sentences are given in revelation, is there always one asserter—presumably God; and how do you know that he is the asserter? And how can you distinguish whether or not the person receiving the truths actually received truths or had a dream or hallucination? This is especially pertinent in view of the fact that "since the idea of revelation suggests that what is revealed does not come as the simple valid conclusion to a chain of reasoning, there are no rules which can completely naturalize or rationalize the experience indicated by that term." If no sentences are given in revelation, one might still ask: Who is the communicator of "that which is made known" in revelation, and how do you know, etc.

(4) What is a confrontation with God or Christ? Is it a seeing, or a hearing, or a "feeling," or what? How can one know whether or not one has had a confrontation? And how can one know whether or not it was really God or Christ whom one confronted? Further, if one admits that there may be revelations, what authority does Professor Kolbe have (or what unique insight) for saying that what is given in revelation is a confrontation with God or Christ and not propositions, or vice versa? That is, how would one be able either to affirm or deny either the confrontation theory or the propositional theory?

(5) Professor Kolbe agrees with some logical analysts that a verification criterion is needed in order for sentences, other than tautologies, to be meaningful. Yet he insists that the verifiability of the sentences of revelation need not be of one particular kind, *i.e.*, empirical verification. Yet what other kind of verification is there? He cites Carnap who holds that "verification may take either the direct form of confronting a statement with observation, or the indirect form of confronting the statement with another statement held to be true." Yet the latter form of verification depends upon the empirical criterion (unless the statements are tautologies). Thus I fail to see how Professor Kolbe has presented a genuine option with respect to a non-empirical verification criterion.

There are many more questions which one might like to ask Professor Kolbe. However, I believe that the above sufficiently illustrates the problems connected with his paper so that we may call a halt at this point. I should like to make it clear that I am in no way attempting to discredit Professor Kolbe personally, since I consider him to be a very good friend. My criticisms are directed solely against the logical errors and the lack of clarity and meaningfulness in his paper on the criticism of revelation-claims. I should also like to emphasize that I am in complete agreement with him as to the need for logical analysis and criticism. However, I

would stress that in a discussion of the importance of being logical, one must himself be logical.

I have hesitated in making the above remarks available for publication. I initially thought it preferable to keep silent. However, I have changed my mind because of the persuasiveness of the quotation from Fung Yu-lan's *Short History of Chinese Philosophy* which appears at the end of Professor Kolbe's paper: "One must speak very much before one keeps silent."

Book Reviews

Christian Ethics and Social Issues

THE ETHICS OF COMPROMISE AND THE ART OF CONTAINMENT. By T. V. Smith. Starr King Press, Boston, 1956. 117 pages. Index. $2.50.

This little book, which one can read at one sitting, is in many respects a very wise one. It is the distinguished author's contribution to what the dust-jacket calls "the civilized art of living together as people, families and nations." The "ethics of compromise" which the author expounds here is set in sharp opposition to what he calls "the logic of presumption"; and the shift in the terms—*ethics* to *logic*—is quite significant, as we shall see. The logic of presumption is characterized by the impious claim of finite men that they know and can state unambiguously the moral duty of man because they have grasped the unequivocal truth. This presumption becomes "lethal" when espoused in the name of God and perpetrated as uncompromising political policy by sectarian theologians, who thus mistake their own views for the will of God. That Smith has here probed into a deep and sore wound is indisputable, and we must all flinch, especially when we regard the history of those institutions and groups and systems which we champion.

Whence springs this wide-spread, if not universal, moral error of predicating one's own and one's own group's bias and ignorance and pretenses as the unequivocal truth and the inviolable right? In part, the author correctly says, from the semantic situation. Our language symbols are always more or less ambiguous and equivocal, the more so when used with respect to matters of serious ethical concern. We can save ourselves from this ambiguity, as the scientists do, by arbitrarily delimiting such symbols and making them by definition unequivocal. But then we cannot discourse about the morality of human actions.

In seeking an answer to this question the author is more influenced by the Christian estimate of man than he seems to be aware; and this is not surprising, since he was what he now calls a "sectarian" Christian preacher long before he became an urbane humanist philosopher. So he finds a deeper source for this human frailty: "The rootage of this logic is egoism," with a still "deeper rootage . . . in the will-to-power" (p. 36). Or in theological terms, which he uses in some form a half-dozen times, it is man's presumption that he is God. Consequently "compromise is, indeed, a necessary derivative of finitude" (p. 51), at least this is so when man knows and respects his finitude.

But in spite of Smith's repudiation of the Enlightenment's principle of cosmic (and rational) harmony, his Enlightenment bias does not allow him to pursue this line of search for man's pretenses and presumptions in a perversion of his will, and so he turns to look for the secret in his abuse of reason. "The ethical problem arises from a perverse approach to the logical," specifically the mistake of trying to apply the neat and exact logic of abstraction to empirical matters. On the premise of Aristotle's theory of certainty and probability, that "it is equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from

A broad look at Protestantism in America

The Spirit of American Christianity

***By* RONALD E. OSBORN**

Written out of a background of intimate study and association, Dr. Osborn's new book presents a panoramic, up-to-the-minute picture of Protestantism in America and how it came to be. He considers the peculiar historical forces which have given a distinctive shape to American Protestantism. The individualism of the frontier, the disestablishment of religion, the ardent evangelicalism of the past century, leadership in social conscience, and the recent resurgences of intellectual and emotional interest in religion, are carefully treated and analyzed.

"Interesting, readable, well organized."—WINTHROP S. HUDSON, Past President, American Society of Church History.

Dr. Osborn is professor of Church History, School of Religion, Butler University and editor of the magazine *Encounter*.

At your bookseller $3.75 **HARPER & BROTHERS, N. Y. 16**

a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician [politician] scientific proof," he thinks this moral perverseness arises from a confusion of rational and empirical logic.

Accordingly, when he puzzles over why the "countervailing will-to-perfection . . . surrenders so easy" to this will-to-power, he finds the explanation "in the notion of truth which obtains in sectarian circles . . . (a) doctrine, that is, which grants logical purity only to oneself" (p. 37). But surely this is to pose the problem, not to solve it. Just why does a rational creature with will-to-perfection hang on so desperately to a logic of ethics which is not only unethical but manifestly irrational? Even when he acknowledges that somewhere in this matter is involved "a cosmic 'fault,'" and goes on to say "that no ideal is so humble as not to require of the idealist more than he can perform" (p. 110), he seems to be unfortunately unaware of the light Christian theology offers here, especially Reformation theology.

This blindness may be due in part to the fact that the very word theology seems to set him on edge.

This blindness leads Smith to an unhappy solution of the problem of political life, despite the persuasive clarity with which he argues that in every situation involving political decision and action (and this means the whole of life except purely private contemplation), not only wisdom but goodness as well requires compromise; despite the engaging proposal he presents of a moral theory of compromise; and despite the amazingly succinct and devastating criticism he makes of all three classical theories of truth, on the basis of which presumptive logic operates (those of coherence, correspondence and prediction) and his own surprising solution of the problem in which he holds that what we really have when we say we have truth

is "some vague clairvoyance of satisfactory relationship" with our total environment.

For when he proposes what he calls "the art of containment" as the way to overcome "the logic of presumption," he uses a term not only ambiguous but infelicitous. What he means, apparently, is that when one is in the majority and must act against the will of a convinced minority, one must act with all possible modesty and generosity (so far so good); but when he is in the minority, he should submerge in himself his own feelings of certitude and his own moral convictions, adopting a "heroism of omission," by which he declines to do anything collectively until he can persuade at least a majority of his fellows to agree with him.

If it be "the sine qua non of democracy" that men be "secure enough within to contain one's dearest moral or religious impetuosities," as the author remarks on the dust-jacket, it surely is the *sine qua non* of the ethic of love, which he seems to repudiate with his rejection of Jesus and Gandhi, that one act, even when action falls far short of the ideal, or when that action is so offensive to the majority of mankind that one must walk alone under his own cross.

WALTER W. SIKES
School of Religion
Butler University

SPRINGS OF MORALITY. Edited by John M. Todd. Macmillan, New York, 1956. vii, 327 pages. $6.00.

This Roman Catholic symposium comprises papers which were read at Downside Abbey in Low Week, 1955. Its twenty-four chapters are divided into four sections plus an introductory division and a concluding chapter. The section on historical influences covers such widely divergent themes as the Bible, the Greeks and Romans, the Middle Ages, and the English Protestants. The next section deals with secondary sciences and seeks to show how they contribute to the concept and practice of morality. The essays include such topics as psychology, medicine, economics, and international relations. The third section deals with concrete moral problems including those of school teaching, sex, employees, employers, writers, and confessors. The final section deals with moralities outside the church such as primitive morality, Buddhism, Judaism, communism, secularism, and science. The concluding chapter is entitled "Christian Morality."

This book should be of special interest to Protestants since it introduces them to many strains in contemporary British Catholic thought. It makes possible a more active conversation between Protestants and Roman Catholics on many subjects of current interest. It reflects also an active encounter between Catholic thinkers and the concrete issues which are harassing the whole church.

Throughout the essays is an underlying conviction that ethics requires a theistic metaphysics. This conception entails the recognition of moral obligation and the assumption that there is no natural ethics distinct and separate from natural theology or metaphysics. The next step is the insistence that the most powerful moral motive is love of a Person and that there is no true Christian morality which is not Trinitarian. The succeeding step is to make a rapid transition from the divine Son to the Mass. Hence it is argued that Christian morality must be lived from the Mass. It is not clear how this point of view is to be reconciled with an equally vigorous argument by another writer on the validity of the Natural Law. The Natural Law as here defended implies that moral goodness is in the nature of things and that our nature has an end or purpose which it

must accomplish and a standard which it must reach if we are really to be our true selves. The relation of this Natural Law to the idea that love is not definable in the language of law is not clearly explained. The effort to do this is undertaken partly in the essay by Don Sebastian Moore, who insists that God is not to be treated as an ideal but as the ground of man and his relationships.

The chapters dealing with economics and political problems are valuable contributions to the student of contemporary social ethics since they show how widespread in Western society are the dilemmas of the new functional relationships which urban society is inflicting on all its members including its professional leaders.

WALTER G. MUELDER
School of Theology
Boston University

GOD, GOLD, AND GOVERNMENT. By Howard E. Kershner. Prentice-Hall, publishers, New York, 1957. 146 pages. Bibliography and index. $2.95.

This book would seem to be an exposition of the relations of theology, economics, and political science. It fails miserably, however, in fulfilling any reasonable expectations of such a project. It actually is nothing but weak propaganda for business activity pursued with religious zeal. Such activity should have no restraints placed upon it by either the religious and ethical or the legal community. Indeed, these institutions are to be subordinated to the unfettered economic community which is to operate by its own deified laws.

This book quite defies any exact analysis because no real argument is developed in it. The author who is editor of the mistitled paper, *Christian Economics*, displays such slight acquaintance with either theology, economics, or political science that he fails to develop and undergird a real thesis. His method, rather, is to evoke emotions and move the will through stories and illustrations. The one pattern of thought that does become quite clear to the reader is that the author assumes that personal and group success in attaining wealth is the primary goal of our existence. While it is true that he speaks often of God, quotes the Bible extensively, affirms concern for the spiritual welfare of man, and praises government, he actually makes all of these subservient to his one goal. This book, therefore, is not one that can challenge the thought of intelligent Christian men.

GUY H. RANSON
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

SEEKING TO BE CHRISTIAN IN RACE RELATIONS. By Benjamin E. Mays. Friendship Press, New York, 1957. 84 pages. Cloth, $1.50; paper, $1.00.

One might be tempted to say that the distinctive thing about this book on race is that it was written by a Negro. Benjamin Mays is president of Morehouse College, Atlanta. One could emphasize that Dr. Mays is an excellent biblical scholar. He and I were classmates in graduate study at the University of Chicago Divinity School, and he was one of the best there. One could write of him as one of the nation's leading orators, which is also true. But in this little book, so simply and earnestly written, the most distinctive thing to say is that the author writes as a Christian.

Dr. Mays is acquainted with the learned discussions of race. He knows that such approaches are important. But with profound insight he realizes that as race prejudice is not merely a child of false information, it can never be completely eradicated by only supplying correct information. Nothing

short of a regeneration of the human will can remove race prejudice.

What this little book does, therefore, is not to recount for us the scientific studies of race, but in a lucid way to present what the Christian faith implies with reference to this painful infection of our American life, which scars the souls of both black and white. His thought is indicated by the chapter titles: in the beginning God; the uniqueness of man; love of God and love of man inseparable; a God-man-centered religion; race prejudice a wicked thing; the church and race; beyond knowledge; belief in action. The booklet is suitable for both private reading and group discussion.

S. VERNON MCCASLAND
University of Virginia

KWAME NKRUMAH, HIS RISE TO POWER. By Bankole Timothy. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1955. 198 pages. $3.75.

The evolution of the British Empire into the British Commonwealth of Nations has been the most significant and creative peaceful political development of the last ninety years, ever since the British North America Act of 1867, which gave self-rule to the Province of Canada. The way in which the most extensive and powerful empire in history has adapted itself to the inexorable demands of democracy, and replaced colonies ruled from Westminster with self-governing dominions linked by a thoroughly constitutional monarchy, will command the admiration of succeeding generations of political historians. One by one Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa have achieved independent status, with their own sovereign Parliaments, their own coinages, and their own flags. Since the Second World War ended, there have emerged also the independent states of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. It has even been demonstrated that a republic can be part of the British Commonwealth.

The path to self-government has not been easy, however, as the history of the latest of these independencies, Ghana, shows. Imperialism does not relax its grip without a struggle. Freedom is bought with a price. The present work traces the rise of the free state of Ghana, within the framework of the commonwealth, and does this against the background of the life of the man who became "father of his country." The book demonstrates again the truth of Carlyle's dictum, that "all history is biography."

Nkwame Nkrumah was the child of poor and illiterate parents on the Gold Coast. His early schooling was received in a Roman Catholic elementary school, and was followed by teacher training at the now famous Achimota College, where he came under the influence of Dr. Aggrey. He later went to the U. S. A. and entered Lincoln University, whence he proceeded to Pennsylvania University and took an M. A. in philosophy and M.Sc. in education. Returning to England he studied law under Professor Harold Laski and others, and commenced preparation of a thesis for London University's Ph. D. At the same time pamphlets he published and the part he took with other Africans in London in the Colonial Liberation Movement brought him to the favorable notice of leaders in the Gold Coast. He was summoned home to be secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention.

Thence he never looked back. He later formed his own political party, launched his own newspaper, organized a passive resistance movement called "Positive Action," was imprisoned, and then was liberated to become "Leader of Government Business" and then first prime minister of the new independent state of Ghana.

The book is well written by Mr. Bankole Timothy, a Gold Coast journalist. Just here and there is a naivete, a "Negro flavor," which enhances the attractiveness of the work.

And what of the future? In the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly in 1953, Dr. Nkrumah said:

> And yet, while we are making our claim for Self-government, I want to emphasize, Mr. Speaker, that Self-government is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end, to the building of the good life to the benefit of all, regardless of tribe, creed, color or station in life. Our aim is to make this country a worthy place for all its citizens, a country that will be a shining light throughout the whole continent of Africa, giving inspiration far beyond its frontiers. And this we can do by dedicating ourselves to unselfish service to humanity. We must learn from the mistakes of others so that we may, in so far as we can, avoid a repetition of those tragedies which have overtaken other human societies.

This is a significant book, both interesting and profitable to read.

BASIL HOLT
Johannesburg, South Africa

SHOULD CHRISTIANS DRINK? By Everett Tilson. Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1957. 128 pages. Notes. $1.00 paper; $2.00 cloth.

The author, professor of biblical theology at Vanderbilt University Divinity School, approaches the question, "Should Christians Drink?" from the point of view of the Bible, church history, Christian theology, and Christian ethics. After he traces the scriptural teaching on the subject through both the Old and New Testaments, he points out that those who search for proof texts to support the cause of abstinence face a difficult and discouraging task. "Though the Bible condemns the abuse of wine," he says, "it does not condemn the use of wine."

This does not mean that temperance workers need abandon either their plea for abstinence or the use of the Bible in support of their cause. It does mean that they must find a more realistic method than the proof-text method. They need to approach it in what he calls a "dynamic and functional" manner rather than along traditional and authoritarian lines.

In his chapter on church history, Tilson traces the church's position from the moderation of an early day, through the time of Luther, who he admits used alcoholic beverages in moderation, to John Wesley who took a stand for total abstinence. He includes the position taken by various church bodies on the question of drinking in the present day.

"Christian theology," he says, "defines life as the gift of a Christian Father for the sake of Christ-like fellowship." Then he explores the question of how drinking represents a legitimate expression of gratitude to God for the gift of life. "The victims of alcohol," he says, "do more than leave God with a broken fellowship; they inflict on God the burden of nursing a spurned love." Because of the Christian conception of man, Christians active in the cause of temperance must not become so preoccupied in the war against the liquor traffic that they forget or become indifferent to the victims of alcohol.

In his discussion of ethics he points out how alcohol has been and is the destroyer of spiritual values. If alcohol causes people to be less than their best, or to fall short of the New Testament requirements, he asks if Christians ever can sanction it.

The answer to the question posed in the title is No.

CHARLES F. KEMP
Brite College of the Bible
Texas Christian University

BIBLICAL HEBREW

By T. W. NAKARAI, Ph. D.

Head of Department of Semitic Languages and Literature
SCHOOL OF RELIGION
BUTLER UNIVERSITY

A comprehensive Beginner's Grammar, including Dictionary, grammar, syntax and Hebrew text in one volume

All Hebrew words appearing more than fifty times in the Bible included in vocabulary; Material tested in more than twenty-five years teaching in a theological seminary.

"Out of his experience of many years in teaching Hebrew, and equipped with the finest tools of modern philological scholarship, Professor Nakarai offers here an elementary Hebrew grammar which should convince the novice that Biblical Hebrew is really one of the simplest and easiest of languages . . . He has succeeded in being thorough without being pedantic, and interesting without being superficial."

ROBERT H. PFEIFFER
Harvard University

Order from

SCHOOL OF RELIGION

Butler University, Indianapolis 7, Indiana

Biblical Studies

THE WESTMINSTER HISTORICAL ATLAS TO THE BIBLE (Revised Edition). By George Wright and Floyd V. Filson. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1956. 110 pages. Preface and indices. $7.50.

BIBLE ATLAS. By Emil G. Kraeling. Rand McNally and Company, New York, 1956. 487 pages. Indices. $8.95.

ATLAS OF THE BIBLE. By L. H. Grollenberg. Translated and edited by Joyce M. H. Reid and H. H. Rowley. Thomas Nelson and Sons, New York, 1956. 165 pages. Preface and Indices. $15.00.

Anyone who is familiar with the Westminster Historical Atlas will welcome this improved revision of it. The same format has been followed, although its size has been reduced (10″ x 14″), thereby making it more convenient to use.

The maps, thirty-three in all, are essentially the same, but have been brought up to date by the identification of newly discovered sites and recent excavations. Plate XVIII has been improved by the omission of the political boundaries which appeared on the older map.

New illustrations of photographs and drawings have been added to increase the total number from seventy-seven to eighty-eight. Only two in the former volume have been omitted. A better reconstruction of Solomon's temple has replaced the older one. The added relief sketch of ancient Jerusalem (page 108) is indeed worth-while, but the omission of the panorama of modern Jerusalem, which it replaced, may be regretted by some students.

While the text of this revised edition remains substantially the same, it has been revised to incorporate new historical and geographical information, made necessary by recent archaeological discoveries, particularly the Dead Sea Scrolls and excavations since 1920. Many chapters remain exactly the same. Those which are affected the most are the following: The Political History of Israel and Judah, Central Palestine in Biblical Times, The Great Empires of Israelite Times, Maccabean and Herodian Palestine, and Excavations in Modern Palestine. Because of the discoveries at Khirbet Qumran a whole new section entitled "The Rise of Jewish Sects" has been inserted in the chapter on Maccabean and Herodian Palestine.

Of course, dates in the text have been changed to conform to the latest pertinent knowledge, and in like manner have dates in the Chronological Outline of Ancient History (page 15). For the period of the Hebrew kings, Dr. W. F. Albright's chronology has replaced the older one by J. Begrich.

Other changes include an increased index to the text (by one page), and index to the maps (by two pages). The total page increase in the new edition over the old is sixteen. A most helpful addition to the revised volume is the index of modern Arabic place names equated with their more familiar biblical counterparts.

As an historical atlas to the Bible the accuracy and completeness of this revised edition make it a yet more valuable tool for any student of the Bible.

The *Bible Atlas* by Kraeling is a most helpful and fascinating historical geography of Bible lands, up to date in both technical and scholarly details.

The author's purpose in writing it was to make the reports in the sacred scriptures of Jews and Christians "geographically understandable," "to give a picture of the world of which the Bible tells." By combining text, photos, and maps, he has succeeded admirably in accomplishing this purpose, for the book is pre-eminent in its field.

Forty pages of completely new, beautiful, pastel-colored maps enable the student to picture the geographical and political changes which occurred from period to period in Bible history. Grouped together, as these maps are, in the center of the book for convenient reference, one finds them easy to use.

The informative and interesting text covers both geographically and historically in chronological sequence the Bible history from Abraham through Paul's life and the Book of Revelation. The text's twenty-two chapters are grouped into the following eight divisions: The Land of the Bible, The Ancient Hebrew Tradition (patriarchs and wilderness wandering), The Promised Land (its conquest and settlement), The Great Kings (early Hebrew kings of the united kingdom), The Divided Kingdom (history and downfall of Israel and Judah), Babylon to Jerusalem (the exile and return), The Time of Jesus (His life and ministry reviewed geographically), The Growth of Christianity (its spread from Palestine to Rome). Presented in these chapters is the best information obtainable from all reliable and available sources. What these sources are is discussed in Chapter 1—physical geography, the Septuagint, ancient records and writings, manuscript discoveries, and archaeology.

To illustrate and to explain much of the Old and New Testament history which is discussed in this comprehensive survey, more than three hundred new and apt photographs, the finest available, are included. These are supplemented by artist's drawings and sketch maps to illustrate localized events, and to explain and emphasize their significance in biblical history. Chronological charts and genealogical tables are inserted at various points. At the end is an index of geographical names for the maps, as well as a subject index for the text.

Its size is convenient for frequent study and use (7″ x 10″). It is an excellent text-book for teaching biblical backgrounds and biblical geography.

Similarly, Nelson's publication, as it also purports to be, is a comprehensive atlas of the Bible in the light of the contribution of recent archaeological discoveries to Biblical scholarship. By means of maps, photographs, and text, it portrays the various periods in the whole course of Bible history from Abraham's time through the ministry of Jesus to the destruction of Jerusalem.

The maps, thirty-five in all, are of the best, made especially for this atlas, they show all biblical places—towns, mountains, rivers, seas, valleys, etc.—which can be identified with any certainty. The degree of probability which can be attached to the identification of a site is indicated by a system of signs. A system of symbols supplies additional information about the various places thus identified. Relief is shown by a system of eight colors, each of which signifies a different degree of elevation. Political divisions are likewise shown. Of particular help to students are the overprinted legends on the maps, naming events which occurred in particular locations, thus summarizing much of the history, and linking it with its proper geographical setting. These maps are arranged so as to illustrate different periods of biblical history.

The 408 photographic illustrations are probably the greatest asset of this atlas. They form an unrivaled collec-

tion, and most of them were taken especially for the maps and for the text of this book. They emphasize the architecture, customs, culture, and life of the ancient civilizations of Bible lands. Most helpful of all are the aerial photographs which present such excellent pictures of the characteristic geography of the Holy Land itself. It is visual, living geography—like visiting the land in person.

The text of over 60,000 words is the connecting link between the maps and the illustrations, in addition to the information which it supplies. Numbers in the page margins connect sections of the text with appropriate photographs, while references, also in the margin, link it with the Bible. The text is chiefly historical, with little geographical description, in as much as this has already been so admirably cared for by the maps and photographs.

A comprehensive index of twenty-six pages at the close of the book contains the names of every geographical indication taken from the Bible, along with a brief description of the item, and Bible references. Only the names of persons who played an important Bible role are included. The spelling of names is that of the Revised Standard Version, but cross-references supply spellings found in other translations. Modern Arabic names of biblical places are printed in the index in italics, but they are not shown on the maps.

Each atlas of these three possesses its own distinctive merits, and scholars are likely to disagree as to which one is the best for all-round use. The geographical photographs of the Nelson atlas are unrivalled. Kraeling's atlas is more convenient to use, because of its size, and because its maps are grouped together for ready reference. Furthermore, its text is much more inclusive and complete.

E. ROBERT ANDRY
Butler University

FOR MINISTERS AND SEMINARIANS

Christian Worship: A Service Book

Edited by G. Edwin Osborn

This 598-page book contains materials for use in building worship programs (opening sentences, invocations, topical and pastoral prayers, offertory sentences, etc.) as well as orders and directions for every kind of service. Indexed; RSV Scripture readings. Combines in a matching set with *Christian Worship, A Hymnal.*

Maroon Cloth, gold stamped, $5.00
Black Leather, gold stamped, $10

At all bookstores or

THE BETHANY PRESS
Beaumont and Pine Blvd.
Box 179, St. Louis 3, Mo.

BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY. G. Ernest Wright. Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1957. 288 pages. Index. $15.00.

Because of the vast amount of archaeological data which the author has brought together in this volume, it is an excellent reference book which every student of the Bible needs as a permanent part of his library. True to its title it presents from the general field of archaeology those discoveries which bear directly and indirectly upon the Bible narrative. No archaeological evidence which falls within this area has been neglected, including the very recent discoveries by the Dead Sea and the excavations under St. Peter's Church in Rome.

In structure the author has followed the same approach which writers of recent Bible geographies have used. Into the Bible story, presented chronologically, he has woven his archaeologi-

cal evidence to "illumine" this history and to orient it better in its ancient environment. A few helpful chapters go beyond this general scheme. Chapter I, for instance, discusses what archaeology is, its bearing upon an understanding of the Bible, and a summary of the development of this method of investigation. Chapter II discusses pre-historic man, and chapter XI describes Israelite daily life. Yet all are needed to present as complete a picture of the situation as possible. Whenever they occur, problems raised by an apparent conflict between archaeological evidence and the Bible text are presented and discussed with candor. To help students to understand the Bible better is the author's chief objective, and each of his fourteen chapters does this admirably.

Two hundred twenty photographic illustrations supplement the material discussed. In the back of this book are eight maps, taken from the *Westminster Historical Atlas*, without color, along with five indices: modern names, biblical names, biblical places, subjects, and Bible references. At the end of each chapter appear suggestions for further reading.

E. Robert Andry
Butler University

Early Israel in Recent History Writing (Studies in Biblical Theology No. 19). By John Bright. Alec R. Allenson Inc., Chicago. 128 pages. Index. $1.75.

In this suggestive and intriguing volume Professor Bright seeks to evaluate the histories of Israel which have appeared since 1930, and in particular to assess the work of Alt and Noth on the one hand, and Kaufman on the other. The former uses tradition-history to bridge the gap between traditions in final form and events which give rise to them; the latter uses, for this purpose, a mode of literary criticism which moves the material of the documents back towards the events.

Bright limits his consideration of the Alt-Noth school mainly to the works of Noth. Israel to him is the twelve-clan league, which has common language, common land, and common historical experience among its members. The patriarchal traditions are independent of the rest of the Pentateuch, which is fashioned from five main themes: exodus, entry into Canaan, promise of the patriarchs, wilderness wandering, revelation on Sinai. The principles of literary criticism are presupposed, with the result that no historic reality can be ascribed to the migration of Hebrew ancestors from Mesopotamia, or to Moses as the founder of a religion. Historical experience is created in the Pentateuch and afterwards by the feast of covenant renewal; institutional and political life are primary, faith is incidental.

Bright, in vivacious, imaginative, and sparkling style, objects to the severance of Moses from the Exodus or Sinai, and to his restriction to a "Grave-Tradition" in the Transjordan Steppes, since this does not explain the faith of Israel or the position of Moses in J and E. He contends that Noth does not use archaeology to fill the historical gap thus created. He maintains that form criticism, such as Noth employs, cannot pass final verdict on historicity, and that aetiology is not a primary factor in creating tradition. He adduces numerous interesting traditions from American history to show that tradition is primary, aetiology secondary. He disapproves of the principle of Ortsgebundenheit, which Noth commends, partly on the ground that it is used in a quasi-mystical manner, and partly because traditions are bound, not to places but to people; this principle indeed sometimes localizes people who were not localized at all. These criticisms seem well-taken and pertinent.

Kaufman maintains that much Old Testament history must be re-interpreted on the ground that narratives—as in Joshua 19 and 21—represent a utopian ideal, made at the beginning of the settlement. He thinks that this utopian principle governs all the Pentateuch, Joshua and Judges. The Bible, further has five maps of Israel which correspond to changes in the historical situation; these being of Canaan, Moses' land of Israel, Joshua's land of Israel, the real land from Dan to Beersheba, and the empire (David's state). Legends within the historical framework are aetiological only when they derive from an aetiological motive. Much that has been regarded as local in reference, as the conquest narrative in Joshua 1-11, is not local.

Bright criticizes Kaufmann—while acknowledging no little debt to his sense of historical reality—because of a tendency to indulge in a non-sequitur, an inability at times to understand Alt and Noth, the excessive neatness of his theory, and the eccentric and arbitrary character of much of his literary criticism.

Bright's exposition and criticisms are clear, and his insight is at times most illuminating, but his treatment of the school of Alt and Noth would have benefitted by a consideration of Alt. Objection must however be taken to the slipshod and amorphous character of his English, which is at times plainly ungrammatical. It does not sound correct to the present reviewer to claim that a narrative "roots in" a certain period of history, especially since the German authority he here quotes (p. 45) uses a noun with grammatical correctness. On pages 60-61, Bright is guilty of a completely false mode of speech: "It is not *to be regarded*, as Wellhausen *did*. . . . Likewise it is slovenly to say "It is a begged question in assuming" (p. 69), and unidiomatic to write "belongs in" (p. 52) or "feeling will not down" (p. 71). Other vernacular flavors, such as "discussion will be pegged upon" certain words, and the frequent use of "skip," do not seem in place in an academic dissertation. These criticisms apart, however, the book is informed, shrewd, and highly suggestive.

ROBERT DOBBIE

Emanuel College
Toronto

PROPHECY AND RELIGION IN ANCIENT CHINA AND ISRAEL. H. H. Rowley. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1956. 154 pages. Footnotes, index. $2.75.

H. H. Rowley, professor of Hebrew language and literature at the University of Manchester, is a widely known and respected British Old Testament scholar who has maintained a long-standing interest in Chinese culture. He served for eight years as a missionary in China and lectured for a decade subsequently in the history of religions at the University College of North Wales. This book, therefore, brings together two of Professor Rowley's major interests. In it, he compares five Old Testament prophets, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel, with three Chinese sages, Confucius, Mencius, and Motzu (Motse).

Although the prophets of the Old Testament and the sages of ancient China lived in different cultures and were governed by different standards of propriety, there was a basic similarity in their self-understanding. Both believed themselves to be announcing a message given to them by divine commission. The prophets, however, labored under such a sense of compulsion that they sought out auditors, while the sages, who were more passive, responded only when sought out.

Both groups paid close attention to government. The prophets, working in a tradition which had instigated revo-

lutions and chided rulers, viewed the life of their nation from the perspective of its rejection of a God active in its history. Their message, therefore, was primarily one of judgment. The sages also condemned governmental abuses, but they felt that the evils they condemned could be corrected by the example of right rule. Thus they both advised rulers and sought public office for themselves. Both groups censured evil government, but they differed in their sense of the participation of a righteous God in the history of the state.

As reformers, both the prophets and the sages were concerned with social abuses. Yet the prophets proclaimed, as the cure, a righteousness possible for man only as a gift from God, while the sages described a righteousness they themselves had achieved, one which others could attain by following their example. This goal, for Motzu, is reminiscent of Matthew 25:31-46: "if he sees his friend in hunger, he will feed him; if he sees him cold, he will clothe him" (p. 72). And Motzu denied any limitations to the circle of one's friends.

With the exception of Motzu, who looked forward to a time when the universal acceptance of his rule of love would transform society, the sages lacked a vision of a future golden age. Confucius felt that the perfect society had once existed and hoped to restore it by the force of example. The prophets, on the other hand, viewed man's sin and God's righteousness in such a light that they deemed the transformation in mankind necessary for the golden age too great to be effected by any power other than God's.

The differences in the midst of similarities traced thus far find their climax in the attitudes of the prophets and the sages toward worship and toward God. For the sages, right worship was obedience to tradition, even when the truthfulness of the tradition was denied. For the prophets, true worship was a personal relationship to God reflected in obedience to his will in all phases of life. This, in turn, reflects fundamentally different attitudes toward God.

Although the sages seem to have personalized the 'heaven' to which they frequently appealed, none of them reflect the sense of personal confrontation by God which is the core of the prophets' ministries.

> It is in this conception of the more intimate relationship between God and men that the religion of the prophets is most sharply to be distinguished from that of the Chinese teachers . . . I would differentiate them from the great prophets in Israel by their sense of the remoteness of Him whom they served, and their consequent inability to make Him real for their followers [pp. 138 f.].

Prophecy and Religion in Ancient China and Israel is a carefully documented, responsible, and sympathetic comparison of two great traditions. It delineates not only the common ground shared by them, it also defines forcefully the uniqueness of the heritage in which Christianity stands.

JOHN H. OTWELL
Pacific School of Religion

WHERE JUDAISM DIFFERED. By Abba Hillel Silver. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1956. 289 pages. Notes and index. $4.50.

Rabbi Silver comes of old rabbinic stock. Born in Lithuania, educated in America, for forty years head of the largest liberal Jewish congregation in the U. S. A., he is by all odds an American Jew. He clings tenaciously to Judaism and sets forth his faith admirably in this volume, contending that Judaism alone, by divine injunction and amidst a world of religious differences, has exhibited to mankind the One and Only God. He would, how-

ever, "proclaim God's Unity in love," and cooperate with all faithful in works of "unity, freedom and compassion." He recognizes and makes much of the common stream shared by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, although he insists that Judaism created it, however abundantly the other faiths drew from it, or provided channels for its divergent flow.

He sees in Judaism an original creation, a pattern of religious history (chap. II), and that while Judaism appropriated much (p. 38), it stubbornly resisted all it deemed repugnant to its way (chap. IV). He gives, of course, in great detail the major factors in Hebrew history (chaps. V-IX, especially), an apt and clear delineation. He cites also the views of other faiths, which Jews denied, such as a round of rebirths, a doctrine of original sin, the dogma of saviors or any mediators between man and God (chap. X), asceticism, such as Hinduism emphasizes (chap. XI), and theory of caste or racial distinctions (chap. XII). He denies that man's life is governed by fate, affirming that man is free (chap. XIII). He holds that "man must work, toil and fight for the good of society," ever resisting evil (chap. XIV), and asserts that "Judaism alone was preoccupied with life," man's life on earth (chap. XV).

The book's concluding chapter deals specifically with "differences and underlying unity" and with "the great new insights of Judaism" dominating all (p. 285). He concedes that there are "great areas of common interests in which all religions can cooperate in mutual helpfulness and respect, influencing one another and learning from one another" (p. 289). He ventures freely, as his title would indicate, into the vast field of comparative religion, but emphasizes throughout the distinctive elements and features of his own faith. The reader who may be competent must be himself the judge of all this for himself, whatever his own faith may be. It may be not merely a matter of faith and reason, but of heritage and environment. Silver clings to his own inheritance, offering a striking apology for his own peculiar people, whatever the circumstances in which history portrays them and amidst which they are living still, a Chosen People. He may be seriously challenged when proclaiming, as he seems to do, that Jews and Judaism entered history simultaneously and were the initial spontaneity developing in its own intrinsic way. Such is a claim scarcely to be verified by a historic process productive of a community so comparatively small—not over fifteen million adherents at the present time. God has truly worked as well in other ways his wonders to perform. Nor may we agree that "the originality of Judaism lies in the new frontiers which it reached and crossed, its distinctiveness, as well as its importance to mankind to be looked for in the decisive break with the common past which other religions failed to make" (p. 39).

The Christian may challenge these statements in the book: "Israel the star witness for Christian truth" (p. 18); Judaism in mdiaeval Europe the "daily symbol of a faith which denied Christianity, but in which Christianity sought authentication" (p. 19); "Christianity, in the process of defending itself, was soon forced to become 'narrow' and 'exclusive'" (p. 25); Christianity showing "fatal eschatological overemphasis, on irrational antinomianism, and an attenuation of monotheism in the concept of God-Man" (p. 76); and "the original Christian summons to a life of poverty, penance and prayer" (p. 155), pacifism (p. 257) and nonresistance to evil (p. 257). And Disciples of Christ will often otherwise evaluate Silver's quotations from the Bible, for they have known "where the

Scriptures speak." If we all would see the modern Jew—and Zionist, as well—we have his portrait in this volume. It is worth reading, for we all encounter Jews.

JOHN CLARK ARCHER
Yale University

HE THAT COMETH. By Sigmund Mowinckel. Translated by G. W. Anderson. Abingdon Press, New York. xvi, 528 pages. Notes, bibliography, and indices. $6.50.

Professor Mowinckel, who has already placed all Old Testament scholarship under a heavy debt by his original contributions to learning, has deserved still more gratitude from its students by this massive and erudite analysis of all the material which relates to the concept of the Messiah in the Old Testament and later Judaism.

This volume is divided into two parts, the first dealing with "The Future King in Early Jewish Eschatology," the second with "The Messiah in later Judaism." In the former, Professor Mowinckel treats of the ideal of kingship in ancient Israel, conceiving it as a blend of the charismatic chieftain and the Canaanite monarch, and portraying the king as divine, the Son of God, equipped by superhuman graces for his work as mediator between Yahweh and his people. This Israelite interpretation modifies the Canaanite cultic pattern of a king who communicates natural productivity to his land, by interpreting his work in terms of the renewal and confirmation of the covenant, which is based on Yahweh's election and faithfulness, and depends on the king's religious and moral virtues. To the renewal of nature has been added the renewal of history. But the God he represents is not a dying and rising God: Yahweh is a living God, who does not die (pp. 78, 85-6). The kingly ideal is applied to Isaiah 7, 10-16; 9, 1-6, in both of which the birth of the royal child is the significant phenomenon, and to Zerubbabel in Zechariah 3-4. It provides the substance of a Messianic hope which was born after the cessation of the monarchy in 586 B. C. This hope involved the political and national deliverance of Israel, the restoration of the Davidic monarchy, the reunion of Israel and Judah, the return of the Diaspora, the moral and religious renewal of the nation, which becomes the religious focus of the world, great natural productivity, and the supreme rule of Yahweh, whose foes will be destroyed (pp. 143-149).

This vision is not eschatological; it is rooted and grounded in history, and belongs to space and time. Eschatology is only implicit in the Hebrew conception of history as the arena of divine initiative, and of Yahweh as the God of history (p. 153). Hence "the Messiah is the future, eschatological realization of the ideal of kingship" (p. 156), but the mundane features of the monarch govern and determine the ideal particularly in relation to his Davidic descent.

Within the ambit of this Messianic ideal, Dr. Mowinckel considers the concept of the Servant of Yahweh. The Servant is not Messiah, nor is he Israel. His work is neither political nor military, but is prophetic. He accomplishes his purpose by suffering and death. In this fulfillment he replaces the king as previously conceived, for Messiah is regal, not prophetic (p. 168).

In the second half of the book, eschatological ideas are traced to a metaphysical dualism, which affects the conception of the day of Yahweh, and leads to an extensive development of transcendentalism in Jewish theology. This new eschatology is not unified, but it is elaborate. In it, the figure of the Messiah is not an indispensible feature. But eschatology did not eliminate the picture of a national Messiah,

who remains in the Psalms of Solomon, the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, the Targums, the ancient synagogue prayers, and in some LXX renderings. No Jewish literature suggests a Messiah with authority to forgive sin, which is God's prerogative (pp. 318-19): Judaism knows nothing of a suffering, dying and rising Messiah, or of one who makes atonement, for sin (pp. 327-329), even though suffering was regarded as having atoning efficacy.

The final section of the volume is devoted to a review of the idea of the Son of Man, first found in Old Testament in Daniel 7, but deriving from a general oriental background. The Son of Man is essentially an eschatological figure, elaborated especially in the Similitudes of Enoch, but regarded in the Apocalypse of Ezra as the Davidic Messiah (p. 366). In certain works, such as apocalypses, the national this-worldly Messiah was "entirely transformed into the figure of the Son of Man" (p. 361): in others, as in the Psalms of Solomon, Messiah largely retained his Old Testament character. Transcendental eschatology is thus at times fused with political eschatology. The Son of Man was called Son of God (p. 369), was pre-existent (p. 370), and heavenly, yet subordinate to God, and dependent on him for numinous endowment (p. 375), which makes him God's guarantee that righteousness will be established in the earth (p. 379). The community of the righteous is both empirical and eschatological (p. 380). But the Son of Man is not conceived in a role of suffering, nor does he atone for the sins of the people (p. 416); he represents a fundamental contrast to the Servant of Yahweh, whose suffering and death are vicarious, because his function is to judge the world and destroy Yahweh's foes (p. 413): he has no common origin with the Messiah (p. 421), but, as primordial and eschatological saviour, derives from the ideas of Anthropos, which were equated with messianic conceptions (p. 385). Judaism, by identifying the Son of Man with the Messiah, made him the representative of the living, personal God, the creator, who reveals himself in history (p. 436).

The particular merit of this book, apart from its solid learning, which is manifest in the consummate ease with which innumerable sources are handled, and the precise character of its footnotes, is the brilliant clarity with which it isolates, and sets in unmistakable perspective, the main ideas which govern Messianic thought, the nationalist-political on the one hand, the eschatological-transcendent on the other. Particularly illuminating are the correlation of Israelitish kingship and the king-god idea; the delimitation of the province of the Servant; the Targumic reinterpretation of Isaiah 53 in a nationalist interest; the analysis of the idea of atonement as it bears on Messianic thinking; the concept of Primordial man as the matrix of the idea of the Son of Man; and the references to the Dead Sea Scrolls.

Criticism of such a thorough and masterly volume is almost impertinence, but it may be noted that a printing error occurs (p. 79, n. 3, where a reference to a page has not been completed); that whereas it is said (p. 41) that the Day of Atonement in the Babylonian New Year festival is the fifth, it is said (p. 221) to be the sixth; that it is difficult to correlate the sentences "It is astonishing that the title 'Son of God' is not applied to the heavenly Son of Man" (p. 368), and "There are several indications that the Son of Man was also called the Son of God" (p. 369). At times, perhaps owing to the nature of the treatment, repetition occurs, of ideas and judgments which have already been expressed in an earlier chapter.

It remains to commend the admirable work of the translator, G. W. Anderson. This reviewer does not know Norwegian, but the rendering throughout reads like an original. Its style is clear, cogent, and impressive. Mr. Anderson deserves the gratitude of all Old Testament and indeed biblical and theological scholars for his painstaking and thorough labor.

ROBERT DOBBIE
Emmanuel College

THE MESSIAH IN THE OLD TESTAMENT (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 18). By Helmer Ringgren. Alec R. Allenson, Inc. 71 pages. $1.50.

This modest volume provides an excellent introduction to the interpretation of Old Testament Messianic ideas. It treats successively of the Royal Psalms, Messianic prophecies, the Servant of the Lord, and the "So-called Servant Psalms." Professor Ringgren draws upon current views concerning sacral kingship, and is confessedly dependent on much Swedish Scholarship. Not all his renderings are too happy: the Hebrew of Psalm 20:7 means "answer" rather than "hear." He differs from Mowinckel in that he regards "belief in Christ, the Messiah," as "rooted ultimately in the ancient Oriental idea of the divine king" (p. 24), whereas to Mowinckel Messianism is eschatological. On the other hand, his rendering of Isaiah 7:15, in agreement with A. V., is more in accord with the Hebrew text than Mowinckel's "till [he is old enough] to have discretion"; but Mowinckel rightly interprets Jeremiah 33:16 'of king' rather than 'of Judah and Jerusalem' (*He that cometh*, p. 179), while Ringgren relates it to the latter (p. 36). Another interesting rendering occurs in Isaiah 53:10, where following Nyberg, Ringgren has "he let himself be propitiated," which is at least, as he says, a "wholly exceptional use of the verb" (p. 49). He thinks that the metaphors and expressions of the Servant songs come principally from the Tammuz literature and the Kingship ideology (p. 50). A good summary is given (pp. 63-4) of the motifs in the Servant psalms (first used by Engnell in this regard) where the suppliant, in the power of death or surrounded by foes, despised and reviled, is saved by God and proclaims God's salvation to the congregation and to coming generations.

The book is clear and precise. Perhaps its weakness is a tendency to associate the messianic idea too readily with the New Testament portrayal of Christ. At times (perhaps owing to brevity) it is dogmatic in tone, as on page 66: "It is entirely excluded that the prophet (second Isaiah) should have used such words about himself."

ROBERT DOBBIE
Emmanuel College

A STUBBORN FAITH. Edited by Edward C. Hobbs. Southern Methodist University, Dallas, 1957. xii, 170 pages. List of Publications by Irwin. $4.00.

This volume was prepared by the former students of William Andrew Irwin upon his retirement from Perkins School of Theology of Southern Methodist University in 1955. He began his teaching in the University of Toronto in 1919 and taught until called to Chicago in 1930. There he served as chairman of the biblical field from 1936 until 1949. From the ranks of his many students these scholars have presented papers on the Old Testament and related studies to honor him. To these is appended a list of the publications of William Irwin prepared by Edward C. Hobbs who writes the foreword and is the editor of the volume. The title derives not from the conviction that one has a stubbornness about articles of faith but from the conviction that one's faith is the center of all

he is and does. This kind of stubbornness is attributed to W. A. Irwin.

The scholars who present papers represent several different denominations and both the Christian and Jewish faiths. Some of them are budding scholars and others real seasoned performers. The papers run the gamut from the technical strophic structure of Hebrew poetry to the untechnical and delightful suggestions on a new approach to writing a commentary for the Synoptic Gospels.

It is almost a necessity to list the contents of the book to give some idea of its value:

The Fable In The Ancient Near East—Ronald J. Williams
The Exodus And Apocalyptic—Grace Edwards
The Question of Coregencies Among The Hebrew Kings—Edwin R. Thiele
The 'Enthronement Of Yahweh' Psalms—W. Stewart McCullough
Some Further Observations Concerning The Strophic Structure of Hebrew Poetry—Charles F. Kraft
Jeremiah's Vision Of The Almond Rod—Walter G. Williams
Some Historical Perspectives — Herbert Gordon May
Notes On The Present State Of The Textual Criticism Of The Judean Biblical Cave Scrolls—Harry M. Orlinsky
The Service Of God—R. B. Y. Scott
Identifying The Distinctive Features Of Early Christianity—William A. Beardslee
A Different Approach To The Writing Of Commentaries On The Synoptic Gospels—Edward C. Hobbs

None of the papers is highly technical, and they make no attempt to be exhaustive, but provocative and suggestive. There are some references to new problems which the scholars might well be inspired to pursue beyond these preliminary surveys and some new facets of very old problems in biblical studies which have promise of yielding fruit. An example of the latter is the concern of the paper on "The Exodus and Apocalyptic" as to how the interpretations of the Exodus have influenced the development of prophecy and apocalyptic. Can they possibly furnish the transition link between these two patterns of thought?

Fine exegetical work is demonstrated in the work of R. B. Y. Scott and Walter G. Williams. The former analyzes the phrase "service of God," which seems to have had different connotations both in terms of work and worship. It originally referred to cultic rites. The rich background of the concept is explored in a simple and attractive literary style which does not, with Scott, oversimplify profound theological precepts. Williams examines Jeremiah's vision of the almond rod (Jer. 1:11-12) by looking at the use of the word in other connections.

The most technical is the work of Kraft on Hebrew poetry but this is not without interesting observations for any minister or literate layman.

The most argumentative is the paper by Orlinsky with a vigorous justification of his early contention that the Masoretic Text must not be corrected by the Isaiah Scroll. The tendency to correct the M. T. by the new discovery has been completely reversed, he contends, and proceeds to cite articles in support. He charges off the whole furor to fascination with a new discovery. His argument has a higher charge of emotion than reason.

In broad terms, the most informative is the work of May and of Beardslee. May furnishes some very useful suggestions on historical perspectives in viewing the record of Israel in the Old Testament. Beardslee offers some good analyses of the methods and results of four prominent scholars who have worked and some of whom are working in the history of Christianity.

Perhaps the most delightful is the work of Hobbs in suggesting that someone write a commentary to the Synoptics without centering on the historical Jesus in word and deed, but seeking to

interpret the total message of each evangelist. The model for this is to be found among the interpretations of great literary works such as Shakespeare's plays.

Much of the apologetic is not well-rounded, and one example may be seen in the paper of McCullough. He attacks the position of S. Mowinckel expounded some years ago to the effect that an enthronement festival must be supposed in order to interpret certain of the Psalms. He does not admit any serious difficulty in interpreting these Psalms if Mowinckel is rejected *in toto*. He declares that one must not assume the festival and interpret on the basis of it. We might just as well say that one must not assume "no festival" and interpret on the basis of this assumption. The interpretation is difficult in either case. To say that the theology of the leaders of Israel would not allow for such a festival, is to discount too heavily the influence of Israel's theological and cultural environment.

The fact that some of the papers are not mentioned in this review indicates only a lack of space.

J. Daniel Joyce
Hanover Avenue Christian Church
Richmond, Virginia

The Problem of History in Mark. By James M. Robinson. Alec R. Allenson Inc., Naperville, 1957. 95 pages. Indices. $1.75.

James M. Robinson of Emory University has written a scholarly and interesting book on the problem of history in Mark. This book is divided into six sections. The first section is concerned with the history of scholarship relating to the history in Mark. Robinson delineates the contemporary debate between the "existential" and the "linear, carelessly-connected, evolutionistic view of history." Chapters II, III and IV deal with sections of Mark. Chapter V cites the history in Mark since A. D. 30, and the final chapter deals with "Historical Attitude and Communal History."

This little book serves to orient readers into the way in which existentialism has influenced the New Testament field. Professor Robinson has made a real contribution to the solution of the problem created by Bultmann's argument of two types of history. The approach used is to allow the Gospel of Mark to speak for itself.

Only a few laymen will understand what is being said here. The complex uses of the words "existence" and "history" almost preclude comprehension. The last paragraph of the book illustrates this and also establishes the conclusion of the author. For these reasons we quote:

> It has become clear that Mark sees eschatological existence in terms of the life of a society which is sufficiently historical to have assumed already in Mark's time some of the cultural and traditional aspects of a historical organism. This society has its ethos, its mores, its constituency. Furthermore, each of these is for Mark rooted in the history of Jesus, and envisaged in eschatological perspective. This is not to say that these more mundane aspects of historical existence are central in Mark's understanding of history; but they do indicate that Mark's understanding of Christian existence consists in an understanding of history; the history of Jesus and the history of the Church.

Thomas R. Shrout
Missouri School of Religion

The Message of the Fourth Gospel. By Eric L. Titus. Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1957. 253 pages. Appendix. $3.50.

This commentary has as its major emphasis the idea that the central theme of the Gospel of John is its concept of the Spirit. Titus begins his interesting introductory section with a discussion of the author's literary method. In regard to the debatable ques-

tion of sources, Titus holds convincingly that the evangelist used Mark, Luke, some epistles of Paul, and probably Matthew and Acts. These sources are shaped by the employment of eleven literary techniques such as, the use of signs, the use of individuals as symbols, the use of words with double meaning. Here the commentator makes some incisive observations.

Titus proceeds to discuss the Logos doctrine, insisting that the Spirit, not the Logos, is the "unifying principle" of the Gospel. Dr. Titus even goes so far as to identify Christ and the Spirit. "The total impression of the Fourth Gospel," he writes, "is against a distinction between Christ and the Spirit" (p. 49). Actually, the commentator has difficulty in avoiding this distinction throughout his work, and it seems that the evangelist does make some distinction (cf. 14:16), although it cannot be denied that the Spirit is an important theme of the Gospel.

In the commentary proper, Titus correctly interprets by sections rather than verse by verse; the meaning of a passage in the Gospel of John is never clear until the interpreter pursues the thought to its completion. Nevertheless, an arrangement of the sections into an outline which would show the author's progression of thought would have improved the commentary. This weakness in organization does not detract from the excellent interpretative insights which are evidenced throughout, such as the commentator's observation that the descent of the Spirit and the crucifixion of Christ—the two great events of the Fourth Gospel—are linked together through the figure of the Lamb of God (p. 74).

The major weakness of the commentary is in regard to the author's handling of the difficult problem of history and interpretation. Titus clearly emphasizes interpretation, insisting that history is not of major concern for the evangelist. But if the author does not consider history of great importance, why does he write a *Gospel?* Why not rather compose an abstract treatise on the nature of the Spirit or on Christology? The evangelist seems convinced that revelation occurred *in history;* Christ is not identified with the Spirit, but is the Eternal One who has come in the flesh. Similarly, the Gospel is probably not anti-sacramental, as Titus supposes, but is insisting that through the mundane media of the sacraments, the Spirit actually operates for the church.

Regardless of one's conclusion on these complex problems, he will be grateful to Professor Titus for raising them anew. This commentary is clearly written showing thorough comprehension of recent scholarship. Although reference to Greek terms is occasionally made, Titus avoids technical trivialities in favor of the important and profound themes. His work will be studied with great profit by all those interested in the serious study of the New Testament.

WILLIAM BAIRD
The College of the Bible
Lexington, Kenktucky

STUDIES IN THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. Martin Dibelius. Scribners, New York, 1956. ix, 228 pages. Indexes. $4.50.

Heinrich Greeven has collected a number of essays by Martin Dibelius on Acts. To have between one set of covers and in English these essays makes the volume a most welcome addition to one's library.

There are eleven essays here. The last two have not been previously published. These are entitled "The Acts of the Apostles In the Setting of the History of Early Christian Literature," and "Paul in the Acts of the Apostles." In the former we find again expressed the uniqueness of Acts because of its

content, the difference between Luke and Acts, the existence of a prior time and account journal document as a source, the speeches as written by the author, and that the "we" passages do not lexicographically differ from the rest of the book. The latter of the essays presents Paul as a tool of the author to present Luke's arguments. For example the five trial scenes are used by Luke (and Dibelius believes it was Luke) to present to Christians of his generation themes to be used in their defense. "Luke presents Christian belief with an apologetic purpose."

The two major essays of the book are "Paul on the Areopagus" and "The Speeches in Acts and Ancient Historiography." These essays are still great and deserve serious consideration. Seminary teachers will be glad to have these to place in the hands of students.

In reading through the essays there are many points at which disagreement will be felt. One example is that of Dibelius' statement of Lucan authorship. But at no point does one feel that there is no need to meet the argument. The detail of genuine scholarship, abundantly footnoted, challenges the reader.

This is a book for scholars though a few laymen will find it readable.

THOMAS R. SHROUT
Missouri School of Religion

PLANTS OF THE BIBLE. By A. W. Anderson. Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. 72 pages. Illustrations. $6.00.

The New Zealand botanist discusses various plants which are mentioned in the Bible. He identifies, describes, relates uses, and gives some interesting lore and historical events concerning twenty-four biblical plants—the almond, the apricot, balm of Gilead, bay tree, "bulrushes," cedar of Lebanon, cinnamon, dove's dung, fig, frankincense, lily among thorns, lily of the field, locust, mulberry, mustard, myrrh, myrtle, olive, palm, rose of Sharon, rose of the brook, saffron, sycamore, and the grape vine. The list includes edible plants, spices, balm, fruits, and flowers. Twelve of these plants are illustrated in color plates from botanical works. The preface names other books which have been written on this subject. The introduction supplements this with a brief history of such writing, and a discussion of other plants not included among the twenty-four described in the main body of the book.

E. ROBERT ANDRY
Butler University

Coming in *Encounter*

Spring, 1958—Preaching the Gospel of Christ

The Bible and Preaching	*H. H. Farmer*
Exposition and Encounter	*James S. Stewart*
Prophetic Preaching	*E. Gordon Rupp*
The Role of Preaching	*Ronald E. Sleeth*
Demythologizing and Preaching	*George C. Stuart*
Preaching about Jesus: Changing Emphases	*Hunter Beckelhymer*
"Preach Me Not Your Musty Rules"	*Ray W. Wallace*

✣ ✣ ✣

Summer, 1958—The Mission of the Church

The Ecumenical Prospect: Facts and Fallacies *Charles W. Ranson*

- The Great New Fact
- Popular Fallaciees
- Organizational Problems
- Missionary Action in an Ecumenical Era

A Symposium on W. E. Garrison's "The Quest and Character of a United Church"

Oliver Tomkins, David Hay, J. Robert Nelson, et al.

Autumn, 1958—Theology and Christian Education

✣ ✣ ✣

Major Themes in 1959

Restoration: An Appraisal
The Church and the Expanding City
Christianity and Judaism
Worship in the American Churches

Theology and Philosophy

THE SPIRIT AND FORMS OF PROTESTANTISM. By Louis Bouyer. Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland, 1956. xi, 234 pages. $3.75.

This is a new kind of Catholic apologetic addressed to Protestants. Written by a French priest, formerly a Lutheran minister, it shows a profound comprehension of the positive principles of the Protestant Reformation—*sola gratia, sola fide, sola Scriptura,* and *soli deo gloria*—all of which, it argues at length, were in essential harmony with authentic Catholic tradition.

Why then did Catholicism and Protestantism come to part so tragically? Because this essentially sound message was combined inextricably with a framework of thought derived from the nominalistic philosophy of Occam and Biel, which gave such a negative twist to the message that the Church was obliged to repudiate it. Luther under this influence, was led to twist his Pauline doctrine of really transforming grace into a doctrine of "extrinsic justification," whereby "the grace of God envelops us as in a cloak," while leaving us "exactly as we were" (p. 139). Moreover, when Catholics first tried to refute the new doctrine, "being themselves confined in the same framework of ideas as the Reformers," they tended to reject what was true in the opposing position and fly to opposite extremes. This is particularly clear in Luther's controversy with Erasmus over grace and free will (pp. 155-57).

In the subsequent history of Protestantism, Father Bouyer sees a struggle between its positive and negative elements, irresolvable in purely Protestant terms. If Protestantism still lives, and nourishes the spiritual life of men, it is because of a series of revivals (such as the Pietist and Wesleyan revivals) in which the positive principles have burst their negative bonds, returning not only to essential Lutheranism and Calvinism but to essential Catholicism as well. Yet the anti-Catholic bias of the negative framework has prevented all Protestant revivals, down to and including the Barthian, from really restoring the biblical faith they profess. Thus the destructive dialectic of the negative framework, alternating between the oppressive biblicism of orthodox Protestantism and the pure individualism of its liberal opponents, finally tends to triumph over every temporary revival. Only by a full return to Catholicism, concludes Father Bouyer, can the essential principles of Protestantism be realized in their purity. This appears to have been the line of reasoning which actually led him from the Lutheran ministry to the Catholic priesthood.

The recent decision of the Lutheran churches to reconsider their relations to Catholicism is an eminently wise one, in the light of this new Catholic apologetic. The old anti-Catholic polemic is useless and irrelevant in the face of such sympathetic and chivalrous opponents as Bouyer. His is not an argument to be repelled by counter-argument; it can only be answered by a form of Protestantism that can demonstrate in deed and in truth its fully and integrally Christian character. This is the hope of the ecumenical movement—which oddly enough is hardly mentioned in this book.

WALTER MARSHALL HORTON
Oberlin Graduate School of Theology

THE THEOLOGY OF THE SACRAMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS. By Donald M. Baillie. With a biographical essay by John Baillie. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1957. 158 pages. $3.00.

The brothers Baillie have combined to give us a poignant and touching demonstration of Christian life and grace. After Donald Baillie's recent passing, his brother John brought together his papers on "The Theology of The Sacraments," including two others, "Philosophers and Theologians on Freedom of The Will," and "The Preaching of Christian Doctrine." To these he added "Donald: A Brother's Impression." This bit of writing will perhaps have a deeper emotive impression on those who read the book than the other segments, but it does indeed prepare one to receive with reverence Donald's writing. The brothers can be truly thankful, having a Christian family and the devotion of a Christian mother. They had an inheritance in Christ which enlarged and became more meaningful.

In dealing with "The Theology of the Sacraments," which were lectures delivered on the Moore Foundation in the Presbyterian Theological Seminary at San Anselmo, California, 1952, Donald Baillie takes the Reformed principle that the existence of a sacrament depends entirely upon the Word of promise and enlarges it to include within the scope of the divine Word the idea of a sacramental universe. He underlines the naturalness of using earthy, material things from a sacramental universe to speak to men and women who also are part of God's creation, but to speak to them in their faith of a historical divine revelation. So God "by His Word can use" and we "by our faith can use natural objects" as sacramental expressions of God's faithfulness and mercy. This is further emphasized as he discusses the interrelationship of body and spirit; so material aids as sacramental symbols are proper as long as we use them to personalize rather than to depersonalize our relationship to God. It is God who works faith in our hearts, his graciousness overcoming our distrust. The role of the sacraments in the growth of this faith is implicit. In the lecture on the sacraments in sacred history he discusses quite helpfully the dominical institution of the sacraments, the sacraments as an extension of the incarnation, and the eschatological nature of the sacraments. In this discussion he re-emphasizes that in the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper, the church looks both back to the death and resurrection of Christ and forward to the full enjoyment of the kingdom. The sacraments then have promise and hope in them as well as teaching and remembrance.

The lecture on "The Sacrament of Baptism" is of interest particularly to those of the adult immersionist tradition. It is in this chapter that he shows the influence of his own tradition. There is not space here to show how he develops such subjects as the symbolism of baptism with reference to immersion, and infant baptism or believer's baptism. Sufficient to say that in previous lectures he made the point that the efficacy of sacraments is to be seen in relationship to the faith of the individual; so it would seem that he had forgotten this emphasis in dealing with the faith of the infant or child. He concludes this chapter by saying,

> *But* if we of the reformed tradition do defend infant baptism on the lines I have indicated (as I believe we must), then surely it follows that we must make much more than we have often done of the subsequent step, whether we call it confirmation or anything else, when the baptized person, having come to years of understanding, makes profession of faith and is ad-

> mitted to full communion. For whatever else the individual does at that point, he ought to be laying hold by faith of what was given him as an infant in the sacrament of baptism.

The height of the religious expression of Donald Baillie is to be seen in his fourth and fifth lectures on the real presence and the eucharistic offering. Again, one can see the real power of a lifelong church experience. He discusses the Lord's supper in terms of its dramatic symbolism, and of the real presence; he holds that the Presbyterians have attempted to express in a safer and surer way what both Catholic and Lutheran points of view have tried through an inadequate metaphysics to express in their way. This is seen when Presbyterians say that Christ is as truly present to the faith of the receiver as the bread and wine are to his outward senses. In essence, he points out that we, in the holy communion, offer ourselves to God, but this offering is only possible because of what Christ has previously done in his eternal sacrifice.

The article reprinted from *The Scottish Journal of Theology,* on "Philosophers and Theologians on the Freedom of the Will," is essentially a discussion of various concepts of freedom of will and a dwelling on the thesis that free will is not simple and that the introduction of the role of God through his grace into the life of man, does not hinder man's expression of will but rather that only through divine grace can a man be free to do and be what he ought to do and be.

"The Preaching of the Christian Doctrine" was an address to ministers. Here he shows his "all roundness" in Christian life in his ability to move from theological frames of reference into the practical frame of reference. He speaks of preaching doctrine, incidentally or at all times, and on specific times and occasions such as the seasons of the Christian year. He emphasizes that preaching should be truly biblical; that is, the doctrine should spring out of the Bible and should be closely related to the problems of the daily life of the modern world.

This short book reflects the heart and soul of Donald M. Baillie. Though it deals with heavy subjects, it presents them in such fashion as to reach into the heart and deeply into the faith of the reader.

JOHN MCCAW

The Divinity School
Drake University

PEACE IN HEAVEN AND ON EARTH. By William Robinson. Northwest Christian College, Eugene, Oregon, 1956. 61 pages. $1.00.

Few men in our generation have seen more deeply into the mystery of fellowship with Christ than William Robinson. It is therefore particularly welcome that we should have in print this little study on the nature of the church in the epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians. Throughout, Professor Robinson seeks to set forth the nature of the church, "free from secular conceptions, especially that of a successful business corporation, and restored to the grandeur of its spiritual being as the Body of Christ" (p. 5).

Among the other images used by St. Paul, Dr. Robinson finds that of "the Body of Christ" fundamental, because it above all describes the church in terms of its inner mystery in Christ, and because it sets forth the nature of the church as both a dynamic and an ontological reality. Here we have carefully avoided the "occasionalist" error which construes the church solely in terms of saving events and its mission to the world, and also the "scholastic" error which construes the church solely in terms of static being and fixed institutions. The exposition

is wonderfully true to the realism and vigor of Paul.

Recognizing the inevitable relation of the doctrine of the church to the doctrine of Christ Dr. Robinson, in many striking passages, shows how faulty Christology is reflected in serious aberrations in our conception of the church. Thus, for example, speaking of the fact that when the human Jesus was rediscovered the first result was to secularize the divine Christ, he says:

> This is even more visible when we come to the Church which is the Body of Christ, and as an entity is compared with Christ. Our conceptions of this entity have again followed the path of so spiritualizing the Church that eventually it has become almost a purely secular body without any divine element at all. Paradoxically by refusing the Divine-Human, and stressing the spiritual we are eventually left with nothing but the secular, for the human is what we best know [p. 22].

The relation of the church to the atonement is expounded in such a way that full weight is given not only to the act of reconciliation but to reconciliation in the Body of Christ's flesh, for reconciliation in Christ and union with Christ are basically one. It is that two-fold reality that is the basis of the nature and the mission of the churches, as of the Christian life. Jesus Christ reconciles us in himself to what he is in his divine-human person and so gives us to share in his own mystery and in his own mission. It is from this point that Dr. Robinson goes on to expound his conception of the church as "a saved and a saving society." These are enlightening and striking pages, but I find myself unable to follow him, at least in the language he uses about the mission of the church "to redeem the world," and so to continue the redeeming work of Christ. Is not this to press the Christological analogy in such a way as to forget that the church shares in the mystery of Christ in quite a *different* way from Christ, and so can only engage in the mission of reconciliation, and in the suffering it involves, in a way appropriate to a community of redeemed *sinners* and not of redeemers? If Dr. Robinson's language were to be taken too literally (as he does not mean it to be), it would not be very far removed from the Roman Catholic conception of the co-redemptive activity of Mary who epitomizes in herself the essential function of the church! Of course Dr. Robinson cannot in any sense be accused of such mariological heresy, and he makes it clear that the church is related to Christ the sole Head and Lord only as servant and as slave, but it is well to be on guard against the notion of co-redemption which is as current among some Protestants today as among some Romans.

When Dr. Robinson comes to expound the nature of the unity which the church embodies in the incarnate love of God, and which through the church Christ wills for the whole of creation in heaven and earth, we cannot but follow him with gratitude and admiration. It is in this teaching that we have the secret of Dr. Robinson's own ecumenical soul and his passion for proclaiming the reconciliation and unity of Christ to the world in its disorder and strife, as also to the churches in their denominational divisions. Here is a theologian whose praise is in all the churches, who transcends so many of their differences, and who belongs to them all as a greater teacher in the Lord. Some of the sentences from these last pages can be taken as clear indication of the mission and inward compulsion of Dr. Robinson himself.

> When we think of the unity of the Church we are faced not only with a present task, but with a future task. The Church must be united so that it may show the pattern of unity to the world. The world is in dire straits at this hour. If Christ is the hope of the world and the hope is that unity brought to the world, the Church by

> its own united nature must prove to the world that Christ can produce the unity required. . . . It is certainly a most terrible sin to divide the Church. But we go about the world hardly caring that we inherit this sin from our forefathers. The consciousness of it ought to haunt us like a nightmare. . . . 'When the Son of Man comes, will He find faith on the earth?' That is the nadir we face. What the answer will be depends upon us and how much we cherish our denomination instead of the one true Church [p. 57].

The more this little book will be read, the deeper will be the insight into the amazing purpose of God in the communion of his love.

T. F. Torrance

New College
University of Edinburgh

Body and Soul, A Study on the Christian View of Man. By D. R. G. Owen. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia. 239 pages. $3.75.

What kind of creatures are we, after all? This is an endlessly fascinating question and almost any book which offers us an answer to it is bound to be interesting. But, by the same token, it is also bound to be inconclusive. For if there were a simple, straightforward answer to the question "What is man?" the odds are better than even that we should have come up with it before now. Every philosopher worth his salt, and every theologian worthy of the name, has had a fling at the problem—and this in itself is mute witness to its final mystery.

Body and Soul is yet another attempt —interesting, able, learned, forthright. It is, indeed, a shade *too* forthright. For Professor Owen has come up with a very provocative and instructive thesis—and then goes on to spoil it by his excessive zeal for an open-and-shut case.

His primary interest is a valid *rapprochement* between scientfic naturalism and Christian thought. He believes with Michael Foster, "that Christianity *alone* made possible both positive science and technics" (p. 20). Therefore, science (rightly construed) and Christianity (properly understood) can be reconciled, to the mutual benefit of each. Indeed, "the *only one* of the great world religions about which it is even possible to raise the question of a synthesis with this scientific naturalism is Christianity" (p. 21). The same unqualified assertion is repeated two pages later (p. 23). The reason for this is that *all* the other religions "are so uniformly world-denying and world-escaping"; whereas, "Christianity is not a religion in this sense at all." Owen quotes Schweitzer as agreeing that Christianity is "world-affirming" —a startling shift from Schweitzer's own emphasis on this point in *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* (p. 400-401). By this time, the critical reader is likely to be braced against such sweeping generalizations. And there are more to come.

For the test case in the reconciliation between scientific naturalism and Christianity is the nature of man, and the crux of this question is the relation between "body" and "soul." Here again, for Owen, the issues are simple and clear. On the one hand, there is the "religious" view of man (chs. II-IV), which maintains "a sharp distinction between the body and the soul" (p. 33). This view "is Greek and not Christian in origin"—and that's bad! There is, however, a great deal of this "religious" dualism in what has passed for "Christianity." Professor Owen traces its history in "Christian" thought from the second century to modern times—with evident distaste. Even St. Thomas Aquinas, the likeliest exception in the whole story, is tainted with "religion"; his conception of soul as subsistent form "is *just* the old 'Orphic' idea of a detachable soul" (p. 67).

On the other side, there is the "scientific" view of man, which sees body and soul as integral functions of a natural unity. At its best, scientific naturalism recognizes a unique dimension in the human organism. It is self-awareness—and a full recognition of this overcomes a "one-level materialism, an absolute determinism and a complete relativism" (p. 147). Soul is not something more or other than "the material constituents of human nature; it *is* these material constituents, organized in a definite way" (p. 153).

Owen then maintains that this naturalistic view of the self agrees with the "biblical" view, which is traced and interpreted in chs. VIII-X. There is scarcely any body-soul dualism anywhere in the Bible, and where it does occur, it is an intrusion and corruption. "The spirit of the Bible as a whole" is opposed to other-worldliness, asceticism, mysticism (p. 197). All these arise from some form of dualism, and this is "Greek"—that dirty word again! But by this time, one is weary of stabbing the margins of the book with question-marks or noting exceptions which call for qualification.

Now, the pity of all this is that, *on the whole*, Professor Owen is *right*, and his book is a very useful reminder of the distinctive Christian emphases upon the *goodness* of the creature and the created world, the *singularity* of the individual person and the psychophysical *unity* of the self. It *is* important to recognize the parallels which exist between the biblical notion of the wholeness of man and modern psychotherapeutic insights into the integrity of all the energy-systems functioning in a human being. It *is* needful to reject all "little-man-in-the-head" psychologies if we are to understand either the Bible or the modern "sciences of man." Thus, if one can disregard, or allow for, the flagrant oversimplifications in its argument, *Body and Soul* has much to teach us of a healthy-minded psychology and ethic which corresponds to the best wisdom of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and modern thought. It deserves, and will reward, careful and thoughtful reading.

And yet, even if we accept Owen's basic contentions and, with him, reject all metaphysical dualisms which despise the "body" and exalt the "soul," the non-identity of "soul" and "body" remains to plague us. If Thomas Aquinas could not avoid the notion of the "soul" as self-subsistent form, the rest of us had best beware of any simplicist monism—for Thomas was deeply concerned to maintain the unity and integrity of the individual person, and he was a good man with distinctions! And then there are the last two phrases of the Apostles Creed. Professor Owen deals with these, of course, but none too successfully.

Body and Soul calls for a sequel. Allowing its main thesis, we need a more balanced and profound exploration of the residual problems which are thus exposed. It would have to be a humbler and wiser book, but it would be also a more illuminating one. One might hope that Professor Owen would himself provide this sequel. His gifts and concerns are suited to such a task.

ALBERT OUTLER
Perkins School of Theology
Southern Methodist University

MODERN SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN BELIEFS. By Arthur F. Smethurst. Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1957. xi, 300 pages. Index. $4.00.

The author of this clearly written work is exceptionally well qualified for his task. He is canon residentiary of Salisbury Cathedral, in England, and honors graduate in theology of Oxford, and holds a Ph. D. in geology from the University of London. His writing also shows him to be thoroughly at home in physics and philosophy. He is a

loyal son of the Church of England. The "Christian Beliefs" he sets out to defend are those of the Apostles' and Nicene creeds, though he allows that the philosophical terminology of the latter is in need of revision. As a good scientist he repudiates all tendencies to rest beliefs on mere official authority, even that of ecumenical councils, but he claims that the doctrines of the two great creeds have acquired a unique authority through the testing of spiritual experience over the centuries in the acceptance and practice of them. For the Thirty-Nine Articles and other later creeds anl confessions, he says, much less can be claimed. For the Bible itself, as a whole, he claims much less again. It contains, amidst much inaccurate history and myth, the human record of the "mighty acts" in which God's eternal "Word" to man is revealed, and is thus the source whence valid and important doctrines are to be derived, by intelligent analysis and discussion, and tested by spiritual experience over the centuries.

This position, which permits a great deal of "demythologizing" to be applied to the Bible but resists the "demythologizing" of the ecumenical creeds, is one that should receive careful attention in those theological circles which have been assustomed to exalt the authority of the Bible, as in some sense inspired, over that of the creeds, as mere human selections and interpretations of doctrines found in the Bible. It is a reversal of the criterion of religious truth expressed in the slogan "Where the Scriptures speak we speak." It is, however, more traditionalist than the slogan "No creed but Christ." The latter might be taken as the critical result of a more stringent application of Smethurst's criterion —the testing of doctrine in the crucible of centuries of spiritual experience. It is this criterion, certainly, that is sound, rather than the appeal to the authority of "inspired" texts. And Smethurst is right in his conclusion that it requires much more demythologizing of the Bible than of the ecumenical creeds. In the mind of the present reviewer, however, it also requires a good deal of demythologizing of the latter.

For most readers the main interest of Smethurst's book will be in his analysis of the history and conclusions of modern science. He ably demonstrates the fact that the basic assumptions of science concerning the sort of order in nature are in harmony with Christian conceptions of its relation to the purposes of God. He also shows that the context *and the limitations* of scientific knowledge are such that there can be no *necessary* conflict between it and basic Christian beliefs, once we take these as expressed in the ecumenical creeds rather than in the Bible. These arguments are contained in Part I, and these chapters, in the mind of the reviewer, are the best in the book.

Part II deals with Christian conceptions in relation to specific scientific findings in physics, biology and psychology. It is scientifically sound but theologically weak because of its literal adherence to the doctrines of the ecumenical creeds. The rigid, traditional interpretation of divine omnipotence makes desperate assumptions (such as actual intervention of devils) seem necessary to deal with the problem of physical evil. A similar traditionalism regarding the resurrection of the body (both of the Christian and of Christ) inclines him to lean toward materialistic interpretations of the life of man; and these require a much heavier reliance on miracle than would be needed by some less materialistic alternatives which modern philosophy and parapsychology show to be reasonable possibilities. In Part III, which deals with miracle and the creeds, Smethurst appeals to divine omnipotence and the limitations of science to open the way

for acceptance of the virgin birth and the reappearance of the body of Christ, but his scientific conscience balks at most other nature miracles. The selection of what miracles to believe, and what not, thus takes on an arbitrary appearance.

In summary, the position may be stated thus. The content of religious faith must be determined by spiritual experience, tested through the centuries. The limitations of scientific and philosophical knowledge are such that the way is open to faith to formulate and hold whatever doctrines its spiritual needs require and its spiritual experience seems to validate. For Smethurst, spiritual experience seems to validate the two great ecumenical creeds as a whole; but the spiritual validation of these, in detail, is not attempted in this book. To the present reviewer, what seems to be thus validated is a much simpler creed, much more easily reconcilable with the known laws of nature and the often tragic facts of human life.

A. Campbell Garnett
The University of Wisconsin

Living and Knowing. By E. W. F. Tomlin. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1955. 275 pages. $5.00.

This work is a valiant attempt to find a common medium in which to interpret physical nature, biological life, mind, value and God. It is ambitious. While it poses some questions that should have been raised long since, its answers are of dubious value.

In the preface the author sets forth two theses that he hopes to establish: (1) that life and consciousness are identical and (2) that there is a realm of absolute values.

His first thesis is not established at all. He merely shows, what has long been widely believed, that it is fruitless to sequester mind and body into two alien realms, and that plainly there are many connections between consciousness and the physical world. But "consciousness" attributed to plant life or to protozoa is and remains highly speculative. To say that "consciousness" and "life" are identical is to say that either word could be substituted for the other without loss of meaning. Plainly this is not the case.

The principal concern of the book is the rehabilitation of finalism in biology and of values in the world. Mr. Tomlin deplores the mechanistic theory of evolution, saying that consciousness could not have been blindly evolved from non-conscious matter. Natural selection explains survival, but when evolutionists go on to speak of the "fittest" they are employing finalist terms.

His chief case against biological mechanism rests on the ability of the organism to repair damage and even to replace lost parts, and that in ways radically different from that which occurs in the development of the embryo. He cites G. Wolff's experiments in removing the crystalline lens of a marine snail's eye. The lens was soon replaced in its entirety and with no noticeable defects. This implies a concern of the organism for its whole structure that cannot be explained in physical or chemical terms. This much teleology must then be granted.

The author goes on to make an interesting distinction between "structure" and "form." Structure is the disposition of parts in space and time and represents what the physicists call "composition of forces." Form is a unity of forces, preserving structures through time, and containing genuine potentiality. As such, the form is the *telos* and must be regarded as "outside the time series" (p. 125).

This is an interesting thesis. Yet the biologist has a right to ask how he can verify it in his laboratory. And when the *telos* is linked with "values," a vague term at the best, which are sup-

posed to be "absolute" in the world, the biologist will likely throw up his hands. For the religious thinker, and Mr. Tomlin is interested in validating Christian belief, we must assume that the Creator had certain purposes in making just the world that he did and that his values are "absolute." Further, the Christian thinker must find a certain tension between his belief and the thesis that mechanistic and random variations are used to "explain" living organisms. But intellectual integrity forbids us to pretend to a knowledge we do not in fact possess. It is not at all clear how the biologist can take account of finalism in his science, nor does Mr. Tomlin's work offer significant help.

A good many theses are developed in the book that must be regarded as purely speculative. For example, the author maintains that the "primary consciousness" of any organism is directed toward enjoying itself, while "secondary consciousness" includes perception of external objects and develops later. Again, the *telos* of an organism has a central role in developing the structure of an organism so as to adapt it to its environment.

The writer is widely read in philosophy and theology and in the physical and biological sciences and quotes from a wide variety of writers. He comes up with many flashing sentences. "If the Ontological Proof encouraged belief in anything, it was in logic rather than in God" (p. 252). "That a philosophical system gets the God it deserves has been repeatedly proved" (p. 115). This book is excellent as a stimulant; it raises many provocative questions and is therefore worth careful reading, if that reading be severely critical and very close. But this is philosophy with a light touch and the book must at the end prove frustrating to the serious and informed reader.

J. Harry Cotton
Wabash College

THE IMAGE. By Kenneth Boulding. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1956. 175 pages. $3.75.

This book by Kenneth Boulding contends that all levels of life, and even inorganic phenomena, come to be what they are, and what they are yet to be, in terms of *images* they "possess" of themselves and all the relationships that go to make up their "world." On the inorganic level, and even the subhuman organic level, this seems to involve an incipient teleology, though this reader does not recall the author's having stated as much. The main body of the work is devoted to an analysis of human experience in various dimensions for purposes of illustrating the pivotal role of the image in determining human behavior. The image simply represents what men know, or, more precisely, think they know, as the basis for their responses to their situations. The image will be projected out of a man's personal history, which will include, of course, his interrelatedness with his culture. So conceived, the image will include both *facts* and *values*—a refreshing perspective in an era which has striven so hard to give values a secondary and quite dubious status in comparison with so-called facts.

It is the thesis of this book that the concept of the *image* has the possibility of becoming a new intellectual discipline, indeed a new science. The author would call this new science *eiconics*. In this discipline Mr. Boulding sees the possibility of a fresh perspective and a new methodology for some of the fundamental problems which have plagued mankind from the dawn of civilization. Briefly put, these problems reduce to one, namely, how men may progressively achieve order and identity in conjunction with freedom and openness. The problem, of course, has many ramifications, from the in-

dividual's efforts to achieve genuine selfhood to a culture or a nation's attempt to maintain identity and yet to respond creatively to the ever-present processes of change.

Primarily, the author of *The Image* is concerned with the state of fragmentation in the contemporary world's quest for knowledge. The very demand for concentration upon the development and refinement of a methodology distinctive to the various fields of inquiry has led to the intellectual fragmentation of our culture as a whole. Is it possible to develop an intellectual orientation and methodology that can over-arch the various distinctive disciplines, making it possible for these disciplines to preserve their self-identity and yet to orient themselves creatively to what is taking place in a culture's total quest for knowledge?

Mr. Boulding believes that the answer to this question is affirmative, and that the answer may be found in what he hopes can become the science of eiconics, the doctrine of the *image*. We cannot go into detail on his rather complex argument beyond pointing out two important implications he believes his position to contain. First, he believes that the doctrine of the image circumvents the prickly problem of epistemology; which is to say that we have to do with men's images, not with the question of correspondence or lack of correspondence with what is "externally" real. (Is this circumventing the epistemological issue or simply giving evidence of some form of critical realism?) Secondly, we may reiterate the author's conviction that the *image* involves a congruence of fact and value. All things considered, this is probably the most important aspect of the entire thesis. Whatever the ontological status of the image, it represents the wholeness of the individual's experience and also the wholeness of the phenomenon perceived through the medium of the image, i.e., including the relationships of value import. And it might be said, parenthetically, that in the development of this point it becomes clear that the author, though not a theologian as such, is in sympathetic rapport with the growing edge of contemporary Christian thinking on this crucial issue.

It is not easy to appraise this book. There is something fresh about the image concept as a convenient handle for getting hold of the problem concerned. But the basic thesis itself does not strike this reader as anything new in principle, reminding one in many ways of John Dewey's emphasis upon "creative intelligence" or Whitehead's philosophical elaboration of his doctrine of "organism." One does find, however, a persistent effort on Boulding's part to keep his doctrine of the image as free as possible from restrictive metaphysical limitations which bind the reader to a "system" with ramifications he may not care to accept. In any event, this book is an interesting attack on the problem. But more needs to be said (and one hopes a bit less tediously said) before it can be clear whether eiconics is a promising perspective and method for dealing with this difficult problem or rather a useful instrument for stating it.

HERNDON WAGERS
Perkins School of Theology
Southern Methodist University

Christian Education and Religious Living

DIMENSIONS OF CHARACTER. By Ernest M. Ligon. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1956. xii, 470 pages. Bibliography, index, study outline. $6.50.

For many years the so-called "Ligon Plan" has been in the limelight off and on. Its founder, the author of the present volume, would prefer to have it referred to by its correct name—the Character Research Project, centered at Union College, Schenectady, New York—but actually its development has been the lengthened shadow of one man's vision, aided and strengthened by the corps of researchers whom he has assembled to work on it across the years.

What is the purpose of the "CRP," as the author succinctly refers to the project throughout this book? The basic motive has been to do scientific research into the question as to how Christian character may be developed in children and young people.

Dr. Ligon has almost a messianic confidence in the powers of scientific research to bring in the revolution of character which he is convinced the world needs:

> The whole purpose of this book is to show the abundant rewards that can come to everyone if they [*sic*] seek to learn the secrets of the universe, by using this form of prayer—for all genuine scientific endeavor is a form of prayer. . . . The pessimist looks only within that circle [*i.e.*, the present-day "circle" in which we find ourselves] and says, "You can't change human nature." We say, let's take a look inside the circle.

This is not the first time, perhaps, that the scientific method has been labeled "a form of prayer." But this particular road to truth in which Dr. Ligon trusts utterly is not deemed by him adequate unless it be the most thoroughgoing kind of scientific research. So important is the task that not only social laboratory experts must be engaged in it, but many others; parents, teachers, children themselves, are summoned to become "co-scientists." Each is engaged in a monumental common effort to find out how character can be formed according to the highest possible goals. "I also believe," he writes, "that the Church commits sacrilige whenever it refuses to use to the fullest possible extent any method by which to learn more about the will of God, and science is certainly one of the most effective."

So important is the overall need, he feels, that all the efforts in curricular development now being made by the various denominations are a mere trickle in what ought to be a mightily surging tide of research. "It is my conviction that new curricula ought to be beginnings, not ends, and that these, like those before them, will make hardly a dent in our civilization unless denominations and character-building agencies invest at least a third of their income in research — scientific research!" As to CRP itself, he is convinced that "the period of endless harvest" is now at hand, and that the influence of its findings will be a highly significant factor in religious and character education in the years ahead.

All of this raises some very interesting questions. The presuppositions of this approach need to be examined as to the religious implications of the scientific method itself. Is this the chief approach to spiritual truth? Does it square with the presuppositions of the gospel itself? The fact of the matter

is that Dr. Ligon never seems to deal adequately with the Christian category of revelation. Always the emphasis seems to be on man's search for truth, on the unfolding of persons' understanding of God, on the fuller application of the teachings of Jesus. In other words, basically this is the extension into the mid-twentieth century of nineteenth century liberal theology wedded to the scientific research methodology. "Getting unbiased evidence is the key to the scientific method." Is it possible for the Christian understanding of life to emerge in such an atmosphere of detachment? If the religious educative process itself is to be construed as an aspect of research, does this mean that commitment is always emergent, God an eternal question-mark?

All of this is not to disparage the very genuine efforts which CRP has been making to get objective data regarding problems of character education. It does, however, raise the question as to whether an adequate Christian education can ever be constructed on a *didache* which is not seen to be derived from the kerygmatic revelatory actions of God Himself. One suspects that what we have here is a kind of Hegelian synthesis set forth as a goal to be striven for until new problems arise which make new syntheses necessary. For a basic assumption of the approach is the so-called "infinity principle"—and this implies that the ultimate will of God can never be known for sure.

One is grateful for a psychologist who is not afraid to identify himself with religion as wholeheartedly as does Dr. Ligon. He does not hesitate to recognize the significance of the concept of self in terms of "the kind of personality structure religious thinkers through the ages have called a soul." But at times one gets the impression that essentially theological concepts are reinterpreted in such a way as to put an overly psychological emphasis on them. For example, we can cite the "Child of God concept," which is one of the tool concepts employed in this research. How is this understood? "Each individual, owing not to his particular native endowments, but owing to the maximum potential of his total personality, has the capacity for making an important contribution to the world." This implies that all are children of God in terms of psychological goals rather than in terms of the classical view of man's becoming a child of God through faith-response to God's action.

On the credit side, high praise must be given the author for many insights which spring from these pages, such as his emphasis on creative conflict, his sober view of "group dynamics," his skillfully developed testing instruments, his emphasis on the home as a factor in education, his profound analysis of various schools of psychology as they contribute to our current understandings of personality. All of these, as well as many additional insights, make this a book worthy of being read and studied, provided one takes a cue from Dr. Ligon himself and uses highly selective judgment as to what to accept as "ultimate."

KENDIG BRUBAKER CULLY
Seabury-Western Theological Seminary

AN APPROACH TO CHRISTIAN EDUCATION. Edited by Rupert E. Davies. Epworth Press, London, 1956. vii, 159 pages. $4.50.

A better title for this symposium by English Methodist scholars and teachers might appear by substituting "Apology For" in place of "Approach To." Each chapter is contributed by a teacher from a certain discipline, *i.e.*, natural sciences, mathematics, history, the classics, literature, the modern languages, religion, and the book con-

cludes with some recommendations for required school worship. Each writer attempts to discuss the relationships between his specialty and Christianity and underscores a positive frame of reference which might be described as a kind of "Christian determinism."

This reviewer found the chapter on mathematics very interesting. The writer, Leonard Bielby, senior mathematics master at the City of Oxford High School for Boys, attributes religious values to the study of mathematics, especially in respect to attitude building.

On the whole the book is a scholarly collection of writings useful to the Christian educator interested in a value approach to subject matters. Rupert Davies, toutor at Didsbury College, and editor of the work, in the opening chapter declares the following philosophy which sets the direction for what is to follow: "Thus a Christian Education will pursuasively recommend, in all legitimate ways, the acceptance of the Christian faith; it will show the intellectual and moral weakness of every competing faith and lack of faith" (p. 18).

EDWARD DYER

Hiram College

THE STRANGER IN MY HOUSE. By Walter W. Sikes. Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1957. 96 pages. $.75.

PERSONALITY AND RELIGION. By Paul E. Johnson. Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1957. 297 pages. Bibliography and index. $4.50.

Professor Sikes' little book deals with the age-old question, Who am I? and the accompanying questions, Where do I belong? Where is my home? What am I here for? What should I do? What is my destiny? What is the meaning of my life?

These are questions that are being asked by many people in many disciplines, so the author turns to the answers or suggestions by science, philosophy, psychology and psychiatry.

The scientific approach he calls "looking at man from below." This can tell us much about man but not everything. To get a full view we must "look at ourselves from another and higher point of view which we may call the view from above." This is the view of Christian faith.

Man has many selves. Man must come to the decision as to which one of his possible selves he wants to be. Man's task is to become his best self, but it is not easy. It is a continuous struggle. It is only achieved when man says not "I" but "we"; when "in partnership with love he recognizes his relationship with all men and with God."

The one limitation one might mention about the book is the brevity of some of its chapters; for example, the discussion of science has only six pages as does the chapter on psychology. However, it is designed as a brief book and can only be introductory in such areas.

One can think of several uses for such a book. It is thought-provoking reading as it is; it could be the basis for a discussion group which wants to explore the meaning of life; also, a pastor will find many ideas and illustrations that could be useful in sermon preparation.

One should point out that the price is very modest. Seventy-five cents for a book in these days is almost unheard of, but that is no doubt due to the fact it is available in cardboard covers. One can think of many volumes that cost much more that are worth far less.

Dr. Paul Johnson has made a real contribution to an understanding of the relationship of psychology and religion in several volumes, all of which have been well written and well received. In his latest study, he discusses the relationship of psychology

and religion in a study of personality.

He analyzes the thought of four of the most influential theorists in the realm of the psychology of personality: Sigmund Freud, Kurt Lewin, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Gordon W. Allport. Each of these, he feels, has a distinct contribution to make in our understanding of personality, but each, especially each of the first three, is incomplete at the point of religion and an understanding of its contribution to personality.

The book is divided into three sections. The first is entitled "To Be a Person" and discusses the meaning of personality and how it develops from infancy (here he follows Freud) to childhood (here Lewin) through youth (here Sullivan) to maturity (here Allport). The second section, entitled "To Be Religious," discusses the condition of religious growth and the adventures of a religious person; and the third, entitled "To Be Whole," deals primarily with psychotherapy and religion, stressing the value of love and community.

Interspersed in his discussion are some chapter-length case histories that illustrate the principles he is discussing.

Some of the chapter headings indicate the areas he discusses: "The Mystery of Personality," "The Lonely Person," "Conditions of Religious Growth," "Adventures of a Religious Person," "Psychotherapy and Religion," and "Dimensions of Personality."

CHARLES F. KEMP
Brite College of the Bible
Texas Christian University

DYING WE LIVE. Edited by Helmut Gollwitzer and others. Pantheon Books, New York, 1956. xxi, 285 pages. $4.50.

This is a book which the reader will open with the kind of vague curiosity or burning interest with which he approaches any new book, but which he will lay down with reverence and in the spirit of prayer. What Fox did for our ancestors with his "Book of Martyrs" has been achieved for us in a memorable way in this testimony of faith.

Kathe Kuhn, honorary secretary of the American Committee to Aid Survivors of the German Resistance, working with Helmut Gollwitzer, German pastor, has collected and published farewell letters written in the face of death by men and women of the German resistance between 1933 and 1945. They were aided by the poet, Reinhold Schneider. The German edition has been translated by Reinhard C. Kuhn. The letters range from simple notes of farewell to extended statements of faith. They have been written by a wide range of personalities, from an unnamed farm boy to leading figures of the German nation and church such as Pastor Bonhoeffer, Father Delp, and Count Moltke. These range in age from the late teens (college students apprehended for distributing anti-nazi pamphlets) to mature age, but the largest number are from men and women of about forty years of age. They have written to their wives, mothers, children, other relatives, and intimate friends in the time of imprisonment, trial, and impending execution. With eyes lifted to eternity, they see life steadily and whole as they give their moving testimonies of faith.

To many modern Christians, feverishly searching for "peace of mind," security, and cultural success, in religious guise, this book will come as an excellent corrective. Doubtless it will cause some rethinking of the question "What is peace of mind?"

Perhaps the book can be summarized in the letter of Alexis, Baron Von Roenne, to his aged mother in which he wrote,

> I know that in spite of your great longing and joy at the prospect of going to the Savior, mortal fear at the thought of just the physical process of death torments you and because of that I have wanted so very much to say to you that our Lord can *completely erase* this too, if we ask Him to do so. So have no fear at all. Father used to tell me that our grandfather on his deathbed refused a soothing medicine with the words, "everything must be endured." He stood so sovereign over death—it was quite magnificent.

These words—"sovereign over death" —summarize the book. And it is "quite magnificent." It is the kind of book which one will want to place near his bed, returning to it again and again, as one reads the Psalms.

Among other things it will serve to discredit those who attempt to indict a generation or a nation. The Germany of Nazism has been seen in all of its vicious perspectives. The Germany of faith shines through these letters, and more important, the Christ of faith.

LAWRENCE W. BASH
University Christian Church
Austin, Texas

THIS IS MY FAITH. By Stewart G. Cole, Editor. Harper and Bros., New York, 1956. 291 pages. $4.50.

The editor of this book put five questions to the twenty-five "representative Americans," including himself, who contributed the essays that make up this book. These are the questions in abbreviated form: What values found in the Judaeo-Christian religions should be emphasized today? What grounds have you for religious convictions about cosmic reality in the light of modern science? Are the human values expressing the genius of the democratic movement and of personal moral character intrinsic elements of your religious faith? Do you assume that supreme values available to moral man are aspects of one spiritual reality? Does the concept "God" serve an essential purpose in your rationale of religion?

The nature of these questions shows that they were directed to men who would bring their scientific, philosophical, and psychological views to bear on religious faith. The answers vary greatly according to the divergent patterns of thought extending from naturalism and humanism to theism.

Two well known scholars of the Disciples of Christ, William Clayton Bower and Winfred E. Garrison, have written chapters for this symposium. Their testimonials will cause hundreds of their former students to remember gratefully how they opened up the way of faith when science was challenging Christian belief, and an obscure biblicism made the Bible a block in the way rather than the light of the way. To recall how these teachers and others like them saved the faith of many and made the faith of many more a living reality is to pay in a small way a debt that even the neo-orthodox owe to the liberals for unshackling the Book of Books.

Lacking in this volume is any evidence of the influence of the current theological movements on the faith of thoughtful men in this generation. Surely a survey of this kind is not fully representative when this omission has to be noted.

HAMPTON ADAMS
Park Avenue Christian Church
New York

THE VOICE AT THE BACK DOOR. Elizabeth Spencer. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1956. 334 pages. $3.95.

One night a young white couple in a small Mississippi town were aroused by the voice of a Negro. The colored man had not knocked, but had stood saying, "Mister Harper? Mister Harper?" over and over. "And now that they saw him," Miss Spencer observes, "it seemed they had heard him for certain all the time, for no telling how long, for it is part of the consciousness of a Southern household that a Negro is calling at the back door in the night."

The "voice at the back door" in this thematic novel of changing racial patterns in the South is the call of the Negro for full acceptance as a human being. The voice is heard almost exclusively at the back door of the white man's consciousness, but the call is becoming inescapable.

Miss Spencer with perception and sensitivity pictures what happens when the town hero stakes his life upon the proposition that White and Negro alike should be handed the same justice so long as he is sheriff.

The significance of this first-rate novel, however, lies not in the portrayal of the heroism of one white man. Miss Spencer's brilliance as an artist lies in her keen analysis of the elements in human nature which interplay to make race relations the extremely perplexing problem they are today.

The author knows well that a multitude of cacophonous voices call at the front doors of the hearts of Southern white citizens. She has heard the voices of pride, sex, insecurity, family, passion, revenge and guilt, making their demands upon the souls of men. With the calmness of a craftsman she has written her findings down. The result is a fascinating novel.

Miss Spencer's analysis holds out little hope for a cure. Two glimmerings of hope are present. One lies in the fact that there is an increasingly guilty conscience among Southern white people in regard to their treatment of the Negro. The novel closes with the sickening realization upon the part of one white citizen of his own treachery. The other gleam of hope lies in individuals like Duncan Harper who here and there will stand by their convictions even when they know that their actions in the end will seemingly change nothing basic in their community's relationships. Possibly the blood of white Southern martyrs will eventually nurture the seeds of redemption.

Yet this is slim hope in the light of the Christian hope of redemption through Jesus Christ. Does Miss Spencer see a power for transforming good in the church and its ministry? In the distant background the author hears voices of white citizens singing, "O Lamb of God, I come! I come!" But none of them really comes, and none really intends to. The church in Winfield County, Mississippi, is impotent either to strengthen the voice pleading at the back door for justice, or to silence the voices clamoring for continued injustice at the front door. It is content to sing about "a fountain filled with blood," which somehow will "save." It sees no connection between the shed blood of Christ and the blood being splattered today because of racial animosity.

Miss Spencer's observations are never amiss. We could only wish that she were as good a student of the "how" as she is of the "why."

COLBERT S. CARTWRIGHT
Pulaski Heights Christian Church
Little Rock, Arkansas

THE COLLECTED POEMS OF KATHLEEN RAINE. Random House, New York, 1957. xv, 175 pages. $3.50.

IN THE ROSE OF TIME. By Robert Fitzgerald. New Directions, New York, 1956. 150 pages. $3.00.

CHILDREN OF THE LADYBUG. Robert Thom. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1956. viii, 89 pages. $2.00.

In introducing her collection Miss Raine points out that she has discarded many poems, among them "those that include any trace of ecclesiastical symbolism or sentiment." She adds, "I would not venture to say that no Christian poetry is likely to be pure at this time, but I know it for myself."

This statement is not particularly startling when we remember that many modern poets, in their quest for individuality and in their desperate desire to be honest, have been suspicious of conventional religious thought and phrasing. The amazing thing is that after such a pronouncement one still finds in this book numbers of poems which are definitely religious. "Good Friday," "Whitsuntide, 1942," "Written in Exile," "The Human Form Divine," and others are written against a Christian background and with intense Christian aspiration.

Like the metaphysicals of the seventeenth century, Miss Raine knows how to use the religious tradition without appearing to be confined by it. It is not something that she merely accepts, but she moves forward, conscious of it around her, making fresh personal discoveries, often feeling the sense of lost-ness which so many modern intellectuals have been unable to avoid, yet at times making the bold leap of the philosophical idealist who senses God vividly as the reality giving life to everything in our experience:

> And distant constellations move
> About the centre of a thought
> By the fiat of that love
> Whose being is the breath of life,
> The terra firma that we tread
> The divine body that we eat,
> The incarnation that we live.

The idealism, stemming from Plato, owes something also to Blake and Boehme, to whom she refers. Philosophers with a touch of poetry in their souls will like such simple but compelling statements as:

> My house, my rooms, the landscape
> of my world
> Hang, like this honeycomb, upon a
> thought.

Miss Raine also shows an acquaintance with scientific thought. Concepts from chemistry, evolutionary thought, and psychology appear quite naturally in the poems, fused by an intelligence that is sensitive, informed, and refined.

Special attention should be called to the beautiful "Northumbrian Sequence," suggested by Bede's immortal passage comparing the life of man to the flight of the sparrow through the hall.

It seems to this reviewer that much of Kathleen Raine's work is religious poetry in the best sense of the term, for it shows the fearful, honest, glorious quest of an individual who loves God not only with the heart and the soul, but also with the mind.

Robert Fitzgerald ranges easily from the classical to the contemporary. His translations of Horace and Catullus, his Latin titles, his many allusions show that he is at home with his Latin, but he also knows how to be colloquial, as in "Cobb Would Have Caught It," a baseball idyll, and "The Imprisoned," where there is a ride on the subway and the elevated, a down beat session, and a morning scene in the city. Fitz-

gerald can make metaphor out of the commonplaces of modern life, such as a windshield with its

> Slim blades cutting
> Fins of transparency among water jewels.

This writer shows a wide acquaintance with other modern American poets. He mentions Tate, Cummings, Crane, and Wheelwright, and one guesses that he has learned from Pound, Eliot, and MacLeish. "In This House" shows the influence of Cummings, and "Mementoes" contains echoes of Sandburg. "First Movement" is somewhat in the manner of MacLeish, but it is a genuine and original achievement.

"Testamentary" is Mr. Fitzgerald's disdainful comment on what men have made of modern life and what they have let it become—for the sake of riches. It is a stirring indictment.

Robert Fitzgerald is a significant poet who has barely missed being included in the anthologies and who is therefore unknown to many who rely exclusively upon anthologies for their reading material. This volume reminds us that Fitzgerald's work should be more widely read.

In his preface to Robert Thom's *Children of the Ladybug*, a play which was written under the Scholars of the House program in the Graduate School at Yale, Boyd Smith tells us that when the play was produced, it received "violently mixed reviews by members of the audience—'this was the worst' or 'this was the best' in the history of the University Theater."

The plot has something of the simplicity and intensity of Greek drama, and the characters move inexorably toward the catastrophe: "It was all bound to happen and we were destined to be shaped by this event."

A family where the parents do not love each other is in effect a broken home, and the lives of the children are irreparably damaged. David's college friend has become a father substitution, his sister a mother substitution. For Elizabeth Beekman, the mother, Christopher becomes a kind of husband substitution. It is all very tragic, somewhat reminiscent of O'Neill or Jeffers.

For this reviewer the play does not fully succeed. The characters are in a pitiable plight, but none of them moves the reader sufficiently to call forth genuine pity or sympathy. Although much of the dialogue is original and highly effective, the repetition often seems mannered. But this young author shows definite promise, and we may expect to hear from him again.

JOHN MILLS TURNER
Lynchburg College

Books Received

BAINTON, ROLAND H. *Yale and The Ministry.* Harper and Brothers, New York, 1957. xiii, 287 pages. Notes and index. $5.00.

BALDWIN, MONICA. *The Called and The Chosen.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1957. iii parts, 306 pages. $3.95.

BISHOP, ELIZABETH, ed. *The Diary of Helena Morley.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1957. iii parts, 281 pages. $4.75.

BLACKWOOD, ANDREW W. JR. *The Holy Spirit in Your Life.* Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, 1957. xi, 169 pages. $2.50.

BUCK, CARLTON C. *At The Lord's Table.* The Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1956. 191 pages. Indices.

CARAMAN, PHILIP. *Priest of The Plague.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1957. xi, 201 pages. Appendix and index. $3.75.

CHEVERTON, CECIL F. *The Old Testament For New Students.* The Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1957. 224 pages. Bibliography and index . $3.00.

CONNOLLY, FRANCIS X. *Saint Philip of The Joyous Heart.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1957. xii, 189 pages. $1.95.

DAY, BERTRAM. *Paul, The Tent Maker.* The Christopher Publishing House, Boston, Massachusetts, 1957. 107 pages. $2.00.

DEBOER, CECIL. *Responsible Protestantism.* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, 1957. viii, 247 pages. $3.50.

DEFERRARI, ROY J. *The Sources of Catholic Dogma.* B. Herder Book Company, St. Louis, 1955. xxxiv, 67 pages. Appendices and indices. $8.50.

DERLETH, AUGUST. *Columbus and The New World.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1957. xii, 190 pages. $1.95.

EBIZAWA, NORIMICHI, ed. *Japanese Witnesses For Christ.* Association Press, New York, 1957. v, 96 pages. $1.25.

ELBIN, PAUL N. *Worship for The Young In* SPIRIT. The Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1957. xxxvii, 144 pages. $2.50.

FERM, VIRGILIUS. *Pictorial History of Protestantism.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. 368 pages. $10.00.

GRIFFETHS, LOUISE. *Who Am I?* The Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1956. 143 pages. $1.50.

GRIFFETHS, LOUISE AND WARREN. *God's World and Ours.* Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1956. 96 pages.

GUARESCHI, GIOVANNI. *Don Camillo Takes the Devil By the Tail.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1957. 218 pages. $3.00.

HARLOW, S. RALPH. *Thoughts For Times Like These.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. Index. 181 pages. $3.00.

HEATH, SPENCER. *Citadel Market and Altar.* Science of Society Foundation, Baltimore, 1957. xxx, 259 pages. Index. $6.00.

HELIN, MAURICE. *A History of Medieval Latin Literature.* William Salloch, New York, 1949. v, 130 pages. Bibliography and index.

HOMAN, H. W. *St. Anthony and The Christ Child.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1958. 185 pages. $1.95.

HOPPER, MYRON TAGGART. *The Candle of The Lord.* Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1957. 240 pages. $2.50.

HUNTER, BARTON. *The Big Difference.* Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1957. 96 pages. $ .75.

HUTTON, SAMUEL W. *Home Dedication Service.* Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1957. 30 pages.

INCE, ELIZABETH. *St. Thomas More of London.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, Inc., New York, 1957. 188 pages. $1.95.

JONES, CLAUDE C. *The Teaching Methods of The Master.* The Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1957. xix, 144 pages. Bibliography. $2.50.

JONES, RUSSELL BRADLEY. *Gold From Golgotha.* Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, 1957. vii, 96 pages. $1.75.

KARRER, OTTO, ed. *Meister Eckehart Speaks.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1956. xii, 72 pages. $2.75.

KIMPEL, BEN F. *Language and Religion.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. 153 pages. References and index. $3.75.

LAMPE, G. W. H. and K. J. WOOLLCOMBE. *Essays On Typology.* Alec R. Allenson, Inc., Naperville, Ill., 1957. 80 pages. Indices. $1.50.

LAPPIN, S. S. *Run Sammy Run.* Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1958. 224 pages.

LARDEN, BRENDAN and MILTON LOMASK. *St. Thomas Aquinas.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, Inc., New York, 1957. 190 pages. $1.95.

LOMASK, MILTON. *St. Augustine and His Search For Faith.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York; Burns and Oates, London, 1957. 190 pages. $1.95.

LOWITH, KARL. *Meaning In History.* The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957. Notes, Appendix, and Index. vii, 257 pages. $1.50.

LAUCKS, IRVING F. *A Speculation In Reality.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1953. x, 154 pages. Index. $3.75.

McCarthy, Helen. *Lydia Longley, The First American Nun.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1958. 187 pages. $1.95.

MacKenna, Stephen, translator. *Plotinus, The Enneads.* Pantheon Books, Inc., New York, 1957. li, 635 pages. Appendices, I, II, and III. $12.50.

Maule, C. F. D. *Christ's Messengers.* Association Press, New York, 1957. iii, 94 pages. $1.25.

Maycock, Edward A. *A letter of Wise Counsel: Studies In The First Epistle of Peter.* Association Press, New York, 1957. 93 pages. $1.25.

Morrow, Ethel Belle. *Scientific Views of Religion.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. 348 pages. $5.00.

Morton, Nelle. *The Bible and Its Use.* Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1957. 143 pages. $1.25.

Neill, Stephen. *Who Is Jesus Christ?* Association Press, New York, 1957. 92 pages. $1.25.

Nicole, Albert. *Judas.* Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, 1957. iii parts, 81 pages. $1.50.

Niles, Daniel T. *Living With The Gospel.* Association Press, New York, 1957. viii, 92 pages. $1.25.

Noerdlinger, Henry S. *Moses and Egypt.* University of Southern California Press, Los Angeles, 1956. ix, 202 pages. Postscript, bibliography, list of libraries and museums consulted, and index.

Northcott, Cecil. *Livingston In America.* Association Press, New York, 1957. vii, 92 pages. $1.25.

Norvell, Anthony. *How To Control Your Destiny.* David McKay Co., New York, 1957. xiii, 218 pages. $4.00.

O'Connor, D. J. *The Philosophy of Education.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. vii, 148 pages. Bibliography and index. $3.75.

Odegard, Holtan P. *Sin and Science.* The Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1956. 245 pages. Notes, bibliography and index. $3.00.

Owen, G. Frederick. *Abraham to the Middle East Crisis.* Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1957. xlii, 429 pages. Index and bibliography. $5.95.

Parker, T. Valentine. *American Protestantism.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1956. viii, 219 pages. Index. $3.75.

Pieper, Josef. *The Silence of St. Thomas.* Pantheon Books, Inc., New York, 1957. 122 pages. Notes. 122 pages. $2.75.

Pierhal, Jean. *Albert Schweitzer, The Story of His Life.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. 160 pages. $3.00.

Pierson, Roscoe M. and G. Hugh Wilson. *Hand List of the Histories of Local Congregations of the Disciples of Christ in Kentucky which are located in the College of the Bible Library.* College of the Bible Library, Lexington, 1956. 34 pages.

Pies, Otto, S. J. *The Victory of Father Karl.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1957. 210 pages. $3.75.

Pirone, Frank J., M. D. *Science and the Love of God.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. xi, 233 pages. $4.25.

Pittenger, W. Norman. *The Church, The Ministry, and Reunion.* The Seabury Press, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1957. ix, 147 pages. Notes and bibliography.

Porterfield, Austin L. *Mirror Mirror.* Leo Potishman Foundation, Fort Worth, 1957. viii, 282 pages. Index. $5.00.

Power-Waters, Alma. *Mother Seton and the Sisters of Charity.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, Inc., New York, 1957. 190 pages. Contents, author's note, in the years that followed, $1.95.

Purvis, Juanita. *Friends Near and Far.* Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1956. 96 pages.

Questions on Doctrine, Seventh-Day Adventists. Review and Herald Publishing Association, Washington, D. C., 1957. xi, 720 pages. Index.

Ramm, Bernard. *The Pattern of Authority.* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, 1957. 117 pages. Bibliography and Index.

Ream, Guin. *Come Worship.* Bethany Press, St. Louis, 1957. 128 pages. $2.00.

Ridderbos, Herman N. *When the Time Had Fully Come.* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, 1957. 104 pages. Indices. $1.50.

Ridderbos, N. H. *Is There A Conflict Between Genesis I and Natural Science?* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, 1957. 88 pages. Notes and Indices.

Robinson, George L. *Autobiography.* Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, 1957. xxx, 142 pages. $2.50.

Rosenkranz, Samuel. *The Meaning In Your Life.* Philosophical Library, Inc., New York, 1958. v, 146 pages. Index. $3.00.

Runes, Dagobert D. *A Book of Contemplation.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. 149 pages. $3.00.

Schneider, Johannes. Translated by William A. Mueller. *The Letter to the Hebrews.* Wm. R. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, 1957. 139 pages. Appendix. $2.50.

Shah, Sayed Idries. *Oriental Magic.* Philosophical Library, Inc., New York, 1957. xviii, 206 pages. Bibliography, list of notes, glossarial index. $7.50.

SHAW, J. G. *Edwin Vincent O'Hara.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1957. xiii, 227 pages. $4.00.

SHEEHAN, ARTHUR and ELIZABETH. *Father Damien and the Bells.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, Inc., New York, 1957. 174 pages. $1.95.

SIMPSON, E. K. and F. F. BRUCE. *Commentary On the Epistles to the Ephesians and the Colossians.* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, 1957. x, 328 pages. Index. $4.00.

SMITH, TIMOTHY L. *Revivalism and Social Reform.* Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1955. 253 pages. Critical essay on the sources of information, index. $4.00.

SPIKE, ROBERT W. *In But Not Of The World.* Association Press, New York, 1957. 110 pages.

SPINOZA, BARUCH. *The Road to Inner Freedom.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. 215 pages. Acknowledgments. $3.00.

STONEHOUSE, N. B. *Paul Before the Areopagus.* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, 1957. iii, 197 pages. $3.50.

SZTANKAY, ZOLTAN. *Christianity, Democracy, and Technology.* Philosophical Library, New York, 1957. xiii, 182 pages. $3.75.

TENNEY, MERRILL C. *Interpreting Revelation.* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, 1957. 220 pages. Notes, bibliography, index of subjects, index of scripture. $3.50.

THOMAS, W. H. GRIFFITH. *Through the Pentateuch Chapter by Chapter.* Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, 1957. 191 pages. Editor's preface, contents. $3.00.

TODD, G. HALL. *The Gamblers At Golgotha.* Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, 1957. xiv, 151 pages. $2.75.

WEBER, H. R. *The Communication of the Gospel to Illiterates.* SCM Press Ltd., London, 1957. 128 pages. Plates and bibliographical references.

DE WOHL, LOUIS. *Saint Joan, The Girl Soldier.* Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, New York, 1957. 189 pages. $1.95.

Contributors

THORWALD W. BENDER is professor of theology in Northern Baptist Theological Seminary.

JAMES A. HUSTON is professor of history, philosophy, and government at Purdue University.

E. D. KLEMKE is a member of the faculty of Kendall College.

VICTOR P. MORRIS is dean of the school of business administration in the University of Oregon.

MARTIN NIEMOLLER is president of the Evangelical Church of Hesse-Nassau, Germany.

NOEL SALTER is clerk assistant to the Assembly of Western European Union, with offices in Paris.

WALTER W. SIKES, professor of Christian ethics in the School of Religion, Butler University, is a book review editor of ENCOUNTER.

LEWIS S. C. SMYTHE is professor of Christian community in the College of the Bible, Lexington, Kentucky.

DONOVAN E. SMUCKER is a member of the faculty of Bethany Biblical Seminary.

OLIVER READ WHITLEY is professor of sociology of religion at Iliff School of Theology.

Editorial Board of *Encounter*

The Faculty

of the SCHOOL OF RELIGION, Butler University
an accredited theological seminary

O. L. SHELTON, D.D. — *Dean, and Professor of Christian Ministries*
BEAUFORD A. NORRIS, M.A., B.D., PH.D.
Assistant Dean, and Professor of Preaching Pastoral Care, and Urban Church
TOYOZO W. NAKARAI, M.A., PH.D.
Professor of Semitic Languages and Literature
S. MARION SMITH, M.A., B.D. — *Professor of New Testament*
DAVID C. PELLETT, M.A., B.D., PH.D.
Associate Professor of Semitic Languages and Literature and New Testament
JAMES G. CLAGUE, B.D. — *Associate Professor of Systematic Theology and Christian Doctrine*
WALTER W. SIKES, M.A., B.D., S.T.M., TH.D.
Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Christian Ethics
RONALD E. OSBORN, M.A., B.D., PH.D. — *Professor of Church History*
FRANK J. ALBERT, B.D.
Associate Professor of Historical Theology and Church History
ROBERT TOBIAS, M.A., B.D., TH.D.
Associate Professor of Ecumenical Theology and Church History
JOSEPH M. SMITH, B.D., M.A.
Assistant Professor of History of Religions and Missions
GEORGE C. STUART, *B.D.*
Assistant Professor of Preaching, Pastoral Care, and Urban Church
FRANKLIN E. RECTOR, M.S., PH.D. — *Professor of Rural Church*
JAMES B. MILLER, B.D., ED.D. — *Professor of Christian Education*
ALFRED R. EDYVEAN, M.A., B.D., PH.D.
Professor of Speech, Radio, Television and Drama
JAMES C. CARLEY, JR., M.M., D.S.M.
Associate Professor of Church Music
HENRY K. SHAW, M.A. in ED., D.D. — *Librarian*
ARTHUR HOLMES, PH.D., TH.D., LL.D.
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Philosophy of Religion
WILLIAM ROBINSON, M.A., D.D., S.T.D.
Emeritus Professor of Christian Doctrine
A. C. WATTERS, PH.D. — *Emeritus Professor of Missions*